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stating "[t]he legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b), § 1915(e)(B), or § 1997e(c) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Summary of this case from Jessman v. Schuylkill Cnty. PrisonOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-cv-01757
06-26-2017
CHRISTIAN MICHAEL SMITHSON, Plaintiff, v. TREATMENT SUPERVISOR SCOTT KOONS, et al., Defendants.
(KANE, J.)
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, Christian Michael Smithson, filed his pro se complaint on September 4, 2015. (Doc. 1). Attached to the complaint were several documentary exhibits, and Smithson filed additional exhibits in support of the complaint on September 23, 2015, and December 2, 2015. (Doc. 1; Doc. 7; Doc. 17). In the complaint, Smithson alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional right to access the courts on four separate occasions, and he claims that that he is entitled to an award of damages from each of the four defendants in the amount of $250,000 per violation pursuant to an "801 Notice" that he apparently believes operates in the nature of self-executing contract between himself and the defendants. Thus, he appears to seek an award of $1 million in contractual damages from each defendant.
Smithson appears to subscribe to the specious "redemptionist" theory, common among individuals in the sovereign citizen, militia, and tax protestor movements. Adherents to this "redemptionist" theory believe
that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the "strawman." The "strawman" purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in 1993, and, instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country's national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free.
Smithson originally submitted his complaint to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for filing. Upon determining that the complaint did not relate to any open bankruptcy case on its dockets, the bankruptcy court recommended on September 9, 2015, that the reference of this case to the bankruptcy court be withdrawn. (Doc. 1-2). Later that day, this civil action was opened in the district court.
For the reasons set forth herein, we recommend that the action be dismissed sua sponte as frivolous and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).
I. BACKGROUND
At the time of filing, Smithson was a criminal defendant in proceedings before the Court of Common Pleas for York County, Pennsylvania, being held in custody at the York County Prison. See Commonwealth v. Smithson, Docket Nos. CP-67-CR-0007794-2012, CP-67-CR-0000709-2013 (York Cty. C.C.P.). The charges are not specified in his pleadings, but it appears that he was found guilty and sentenced to serve a prison term while this federal civil action was pending, based on his subsequent transfer from the York County Prison to SCI Camp Hill, a state correctional institution located in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. (See Doc. 18). Based on publicly available records, Smithson is currently incarcerated at SCI Rockview, a state correctional institution located in Centre County, Pennsylvania.
It is clear from the papers filed in this action that Smithson is an adherent
to the belief that even though he was born and resides in the United States, he is his own sovereign and is therefore not a United States citizen. This belief is the hallmark of the sovereign citizen movement. So-called sovereign citizens believe that they are not subject to government authority and employ various tactics in an attempt to, among other things, avoid paying taxes, extinguish debts, and derail criminal proceedings.Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (2011) (footnote omitted). See generally Charles E. Loeser, From Paper Terrorists to Cop Killers: The Sovereign Citizen Threat, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1106, 1120-29 (2015) (describing the common beliefs and tactics of sovereign citizens).
The tactic adopted by Smithson here was the preparation of an "801 Notice" dated June 29, 2015, advising the defendants that they each would be fined $250,000 per violation of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1, at 6). The "801 Notice" explicitly stated that: "NOTICE TO THE AGENT IS NOTICE TO THE PRINCIPAL & NOTICE TO THE PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO THE AGENT . . . ." (Id.).
On August 6, 2015, Smithson began submitting invoices charging the defendants $250,000 per alleged violation of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1, at 7-14). The first set of invoices purported to charge each of the defendants $500,000 for unspecified violations that occurred on June 29, 2015, and August 5, 2015. (Id.). A second set of invoices purported to charge each defendant $250,000 for an unspecified violation that occurred on September 11, 2015. (Doc. 7). A third set of invoices purported to charge each defendant $250,000 for an unspecified violation that occurred on November 27, 2015. (Doc. 17). No copies of further invoices have been filed with the Court.
The case record for this case includes additional invoices submitted by the plaintiff. (Doc. 4; Doc. 6). But these other invoices appear to have been misfiled in this case; they appear to have been intended for filing in the unrelated case of Smithson v. York County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 1:15-cv-01794 (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 4, 2015).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner is seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 Fed. App'x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it is "frivolous" or "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis and actions concerning prison conditions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). See generally Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and standards).
An action is "frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Thomas v. Barker, 371 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (M.D. Pa. 2005). To determine whether it is frivolous, a court must assess a complaint "from an objective standpoint in order to determine whether the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual contention." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992)); Thomas, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 639. Factual allegations are "clearly baseless" if they are "fanciful," "fantastic," or "delusional." See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33. "[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Id. at 33. A district court is further permitted, in its sound discretion, to dismiss a claim "if it determines that the claim is of little or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial." Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1089.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c)(1) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brodzki v. Tribune Co., 481 Fed. App'x 705, 706 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010); Banks, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 588. "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Access to the Courts
In his complaint, Smithson appears to claim that the four defendants—York County Prison; its warden, Mary Sabol; its deputy warden, Clair Doll; and a treatment supervisor there, Scott Koons—violated his constitutional right to access to courts on four separate occasions: June 29, August 5, September 11, and November 27, 2015.
It is well-established that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). "A prisoner raising an access-to-courts claim must show that the denial of access caused him to suffer an actual injury." Garcia v. Dechan, 384 Fed. App'x 94, 95 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). "An actual injury occurs when the prisoner is prevented from or has lost the opportunity to pursue a 'nonfrivolous' and 'arguable' claim." Garcia, 384 Fed. App'x at 95; see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Favors v. Hoover, No. 13-cv-428 (JRT/LIB), 2014 WL 4954682, at *18 (D. Minn. May 13, 2014) ("Mere disturbance in the pursuit of litigation without prejudice to litigation interests does not suffice to allege actual injury.") (citing Monskey v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1997)). Moreover, under Bounds, the "injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354.
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.Id. at 355.
With respect to the state criminal proceedings against Smithson, based on publicly available court records, it is clear that Smithson was represented by court-appointed counsel—Seamus Donohue Dubbs, Esq.—on the relevant dates. See Commonwealth v. Smithson, Docket Nos. CP-67- CR-0007794-2012, CP-67-CR-0000709-2013 (York Cty. C.C.P.). This fact forecloses any access-to-courts claims with respect to Smithson's state criminal proceedings as a matter of law. See Pressley v. Johnson, 268 Fed. App'x 181, 183 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (alleged destruction of prisoner's legal materials did not deny access to courts where he was represented by counsel and received a jury trial on his civil rights claims); Walters v. Edgar, 973 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("The fact that counsel represented him on appeal [from a criminal conviction and sentence] . . . satisfies the requirements of Bounds v. Smith."); Wilson v. Wittke, 459 F. Supp. 1345, 1346 (E.D. Wis. 1978) ("[T]he plaintiff is represented by counsel and therefore has adequate access to the courts. . . . [T]he plaintiff's claim that he is being deprived of access to the courts is clearly foreclosed by Bounds v. Smith"); Urbano v. McCorkle, 164 (D.N.J. 1971) (finding no denial of access to the courts where prisoner was represented by counsel and was allowed reasonable contact with counsel), aff'd mem., 481 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1973).
These judicial proceedings constitute public records of which this Court may take judicial notice in ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 373 F.2d 771, 778 (3d Cir. 1967). --------
A review of our own records does not reveal any habeas actions by Smithson during the relevant time period, but it does reveal the existence of a federal civil rights action challenging the conditions of Smithson's pretrial confinement at York County Prison. In Smithson v. Federico, Case No. 1:15-cv-02073 (M.D. Pa. filed Oct. 28, 2014), Smithson claimed that prison officials had violated his constitutional due process rights by refusing to let him work a prison job while awaiting trial. On July 30, 2015, we recommended dismissal of that action for failure to state a claim, and on August 20, 2015, the district court adopted our recommendation and dismissed the action. See Smithson v. Federico, No. 1:14-cv-2073, 2015 WL 5012570 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2015), appeal dismissed, No. 15-3156 (3d Cir. June 6, 2016). Smithson filed a notice of appeal on September 2, 2015, and his appeal was dismissed by the Third Circuit on June 6, 2016, for failure to prosecute—Smithson failed to file the requisite appellant's brief and appendix. There is nothing in the record of that case to suggest any activity—or failure to act—that might correspond with the dates alleged in connection with Smithson's claims in this case (June 29, August 5, September 11, and November 27, 2015).
Smithson had two other civil actions pending for parts of the relevant time period—Smithson v. Rizzo, Case No. 1:14-cv-01866 (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 25, 2014), and Smithson v. York County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 1:15-c-v01794 (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 4, 2015)—but neither of these cases concerned the conditions of Smithson's confinement.
Because Smithson has failed to plead any actual injury that he has suffered as a result of the alleged violation of his right to access the courts, it is recommended that his federal access-to-courts claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).
B. State Law Contract Claim
Alternatively, Smithson appears to be attempting to assert a state-law claim for breach of contract. He appears to claim to have unilaterally contracted with the defendants by means of the "801 Notice," contending that the defendants' failure to respond constitutes consent, a process purportedly authorized by the Uniform Commercial Code—a claim that is "simply incorrect as a matter of black-letter contract law." Brown v. Aponte, Civil Action No. 06-2096, 2006 WL 2869524, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2006). Smithson contends that each of the defendants has contracted to pay him $250,000 per violation of his constitutional rights.
But none of the defendants signed the purported contract or otherwise responded to it. Under Pennsylvania law, "[t]o be a contract, the offer must be accepted. An offeree has a right to make no reply to offers, and his silence and inaction cannot be construed as an assent to the offer." In re Baum's Estate, 117 A. 684, 685 (Pa. 1922); see also Cohen v. Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231, 236 (M.D. Pa. 1950) (citing Baum's Estate).
To form an enforceable contract, both parties must manifest an intention to be bound by its terms. The "decisive inquiry in contract formation is the 'manifestation of assent of the parties to the terms of the promise and to the consideration for it.'" Silence will not constitute acceptance of an offer in the absence of a duty to speak. Merely sending an unsolicited offer does not impose upon the party receiving it any duty to speak or deprive the party of its privilege of remaining silent without accepting.Brown, 2006 WL 28869524, at *3 (citations omitted). Smithson's unilateral attempt to impose a contractual obligation did not create a duty on the part of the defendants to respond, and their mere silence, in the absence of any intent by them to be bound, could not create a valid contract. See id. Accordingly, Smithson has failed to state a breach of contract claim upon which relief can be granted. Indeed, it is clear that his claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, and thus it is legally frivolous.
Accordingly, it is recommended that Smithson's breach-of-contract claims be dismissed as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).
C. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, based on the facts alleged in the complaint and on the plaintiff's litigation history in this court, it is clear that amendment would be futile. It is therefore recommended that this action be dismissed without leave to amend.
IV. PLRA "THREE STRIKES" WARNING
The plaintiff is hereby notified that a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
If this recommended disposition is adopted by the presiding United States District Judge, the dismissal of this action as frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) will constitute a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and together with the accumulation of prior strikes it will bar the plaintiff from proceeding in forma pauperis in later cases absent a showing of imminent danger. See Smithson v. York Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-01794, 2016 WL 4521854 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2016) (recommending dismissal as frivolous and for failure to state a claim), adopted by 2016 WL 4523985 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2016), appeal dismissed, No. 16-3691 (3d Cir. Dec. 13, 2016); Smithson v. Federico, No. 1:14-cv-2073, 2015 WL 5012570 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2015) (dismissing action for failure to state a claim), appeal dismissed, No. 15-3156 (3d Cir. June 6, 2016). See generally Byrd v. Shannon,715 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2013) (articulating Third Circuit standard for application of § 1915(g) "three strikes" rule).
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that:
1. The complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED as frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1); and
2. The Clerk be directed to mark this case as CLOSED. Dated: June 26, 2017
s/ Joseph F . Saporito , Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated June 26, 2017. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Dated: June 26, 2017
s/ Joseph F . Saporito , Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). Other hallmarks include the characterization of laws of general applicability and court rulings as "contracts" between the government and the litigant, see, e.g., Roche v. Attorney Gen., 420 Fed. App'x 124, 125 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), the use of "copyrighted" personal names, see Monroe, 536 F.3d at 203 & n.2, and the use of a hyphen and/or colon to signify a plaintiff's "real" name, see United States v. Rigler, 885 F. Supp. 2d 923, 930 n.4 (S.D. Iowa 2012); Audio Invs. v. Robertson, 203 F. Supp. 2d 555, 565 n.2 (D.S.C. 2002). Here, the plaintiff refers to himself in the caption of his pleadings as "Christian Michael : Smithson ©," the "Secured Party/Petitioner/Plaintiff" in this action. (Doc. 1). In signing his complaint, he has identified himself as "Christian Michael : Smithson ©, Plaintiff/Petitioner/Secured Party[,] Without Prejudice All Rights Reserved[,] (UCC 1-308/formerly 1-207 and/or UCC 1-103(b))." (Id.). The Court declines to participate in this sophomoric exercise, and has docketed this case simply as having been brought by Christian Michael Smithson, his real and legal name. The style or capitalization of his name in the caption is of no legal significance in any event, but merely identifies Smithson as the party bringing this action. See Jaeger v. Dubuque Cty., 880 F. Supp. 640, 643-44 (N.D. Iowa 1995).