CARRICO, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Jimmy Lee Smithey, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, filed a motion for judgment against Sinclair Refining Company, a corporation, and Frank Carper, hereinafter referred to as the defendants, to recover damages in the sum of $25,000.00 for personal injuries sustained when the automobile operated by the plaintiff was in a collision with the vehicle owned by Sinclair Refining Company and operated by its agent, Frank Carper.

At a jury trial the defendants admitted liability for the plaintiff's injuries, and the case was submitted to the jury on the issue of damages alone. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $15,000.00, which the defendants moved to set aside, on the ground that it was excessive.

The trial judge, in a written opinion, held that the verdict was excessive and put the plaintiff on terms to accept an award of $5,000.00 or face a new trial on the issue of damages. The plaintiff accepted the reduced judgment for $5,000.00 under protest, according to the provisions of Sec. 8-350, Code of Virginia, 1950, and excepted to the court's action in ordering the remittitur of $10,000.00. Plaintiff sought and was granted a writ of error.

The defendants assigned cross-error to the ruling of the trial court, asserting that they were entitled to a new trial as to the full amount of damages. However, the assignment of cross-error was not printed as required by Rule of Court 5:1, Sec. 6(d), was not urged in argument before us, and therefore will not be considered.

The collision in which the plaintiff suffered his injuries occurred on September 3, 1959. The trial was held approximately ten months later, on June 24, 1960. The evidence submitted to the jury concerning plaintiff's injuries was accurately summarized in the trial judge's written opinion as follows:

"The evidence shows that at 7 p.m. on September 3rd the plaintiff, a young man 21 years old, was involved in a head-on collision on Victory Boulevard in this city between the car driven by him and a truck driven by Frank Carper, a servant and employee of the Sinclair Refining Company. Immediately after the accident the plaintiff crawled through the window of his automobile and walked to the other vehicle. He stated the impact of the vehicles caused him to have a 'numb feeling.' He then went to the Maryview Hospital where he received emergency treatment. He was charged $3.00 for this service and was told to see his family physician. The next day he saw Dr. W. S. Jennings. X-rays were taken and these were negative as to any broken bones. The doctor found the plaintiff suffering with a 'crushing injury to chest, multiple contusions and lacerations of the left arm, right knee, and a sprain and strain of the thoracic and lumbosacral spine.' The only treatment given was 'strapping and medication to relieve pain and discomfort and relieve spasms of the muscles involved in the injury.' The physician saw the plaintiff only four times, namely, September 4, 5th, 19th and 30th, exclusive of his visit on the day before the trial. All visits were at the doctor's office and the last visit on the day before the trial was to refresh the doctor's memory of the case so that he might intelligently testify; to permit the doctor to re-examine the plaintiff, if necessary, and to inform the doctor of the plaintiff's subjective complaints if there were no lingering objective signs of injury. The doctor's bill for services was $16.00 and the x-ray cost was $40.00. The plaintiff suffered no permanent injuries of any nature or kind (page 26).

"According to the plaintiff, he was bruised in a rib just below the heart; he suffered from soreness and stiffness for several days; he had a slight injury to the arm that caused him to lose grip in his hand for 'a couple of days,' but this 'went down all right;' he had a little trouble with his chest that lasted 'two or three days,' but 'it got all right' yet some soreness was still there; and he stated that he still has pain in his back. The plaintiff lost only seven days from his work as a helper in a filling station. His wages for this period were $45.00. Since leaving his employment with the service station, he has worked continuously as a bus driver, operating buses eight hours a day. He complains of discomfort after working about six hours. From these complaints the doctor characterized this condition of the plaintiff as a chronic low back strain as distinguished from an acute strain. He found some slight limitation of back motion, but this would not be permanent."

The evidence further discloses that Dr. Jennings, the only physician to treat the plaintiff, instructed the plaintiff to return for further treatment after the visit of September 30th. However, the plaintiff failed to follow the doctor's instructions and did not again seek medical attention until the day before trial, excusing his failure by testifying, "I don't like doctors."

The sole question to be determined is whether the trial judge erred in ruling that the verdict of the jury was excessive, and in requiring the plaintiff to remit $10,000.00 of the verdict as an alternative to the granting of a new trial.

In this Commonwealth we have, by decisions so numerous and so familiar that they require no citation, sought to uphold the sanctity of the jury verdict. It is our duty to sustain a verdict that has been fairly rendered.

In personal injury cases, where the action merely sounds in damages and where there is no rule for measuring such damages, the amount to be awarded is left largely to the discretion of the jury. The verdict of the jury, arrived at upon competent evidence and controlled by proper instructions, in an impartially conducted trial, has always been held to be inviolate against disturbance by the courts. Farish Co. v. Reigle, 11 Gratt. (52 Va.) 697, 722; Ward v. White, 86 Va. 212, 220, 9 S.E. 1021, 1024; E. I. DuPont Co. v. Taylor, 124 Va. 750, 762, 763, 98 S.E. 866, 870; Dinwiddie v. Hamilton, 201 Va. 348, 352, 353, 111 S.E.2d 275, 277, 278.

It is not our intention to depart from these salutary rules.

But this is not to say that the verdict of a jury is not subject to the control of the courts. A healthy administration of justice requires that, in a proper case, the courts must take action to correct what plainly appears to be an unfair verdict. This authority is an ancient and accepted part of the common law. As related to the problem before us, it has been recognized by the legislature in its enactment of Code Sec. 8-224, relating specifically to the power of the court to award a new trial where the damages awarded by a jury are either too small or excessive, and Code Sec. 8-350, supra, relating to the procedure to be followed in protesting and seeking an appeal from a court's action in ordering a remittitur.

In a case where the verdict of a jury is attacked on the ground that it is excessive, the rules controlling the actions of the court in relation thereto are clear and well defined. If the verdict merely appears to be large and more than the trial judge would have awarded had be been a member of the jury, it ought not to be disturbed, for to do so the judge must then do what he may not legally do, that is, substitute his judgment for that of the jury. Aronovitch v. Ayres, 169 Va. 308, 328, 193 S.E. 524, 531; Simmons v. Boyd, 199 Va. 806, 811, 812, 102 S.E.2d 292, 296.

But if it appears that the verdict is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court and to create the impression that the jury has been influenced by passion, corruption or prejudice, or has misconceived or misunderstood the facts or the law, or if the award is so out of proportion to the injuries suffered to suggest that it is not the product of a fair and impartial decision, then it becomes the plain duty of the judge, acting within his legal authority, to correct the injustice. Chesapeake O. Ry. Co. v. Arrington, 126 Va. 194, 217, 101 S.E. 415, 423, cert. denied 255 U.S. 573, 41 S.Ct. 376, 65 L.Ed. 792; C. D. Kenny Co. v. Solomon, 158 Va. 25, 30, 31, 163 S.E. 97, 98, 99.

Under the law as it now exists, taking into consideration the practice at common law, as supplemented by Code Sections 8-224 and 8-350, in a case where the quantum of damages is the sole issue, if a Court determines that a verdict is excessive, it may put the successful party on terms to accept a reduced amount, deemed reasonable to compensate the injured party, as an alternative to awarding a new trial, or it may order a new trial as to the whole amount of damages.

The plaintiff contends, however, that in personal injury cases the court is powerless to order a plaintiff to release a part of his verdict or else face a new trial, because there is no standard by which the damages in such cases may be determined.

This contention is without merit.

It is stated in Burk's Peading and Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 321, pp. 582-585:

"It would seem that in cases where there is no legal measure of damages, as well as in those in which such legal measure exists, where the verdict is plainly excessive the court may put the successful party on terms to release what it regards as excessive, although there is no standard by which the excess can be measured, and, in Virginia, may enter up a final judgment for the reduced amount without any further trial. The court simply exercises its best judgment as to what is right under the circumstances of the case, subject to review for error. But the court cannot act arbitrarily. The assessment of damages is peculiarly the province of the jury, and when the question before the jury is merely as to the quantum of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled, and there is evidence to sustain the verdict, no mere difference of opinion, however decided, can justify an interference with the verdict for that cause. . . ."

In other words, if the verdict is fairly reached, is sustained by the evidence, and there is no standard to measure the damages, it is not then excessive and cannot be disturbed. On the other hand, if the verdict is plainly excessive it necessarily follows that it is not supported by the evidence, and it may be corrected, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, by putting the prevailing party on terms to accept a reduced amount or else submit to a new trial. E. I. DuPont Co. v. Taylor, supra, 124 Va. at pp. 763-765; American Oil Co. v. Nicholas, 156 Va. 1, 12-14, 157 S.E. 754, 758, 759; 13 Mich. Jur., New Trials, Sec. 57, p. 696; 39 Am. Jur., New Trial, Sec. 210, p. 204.

Each case must be judged on its own merits, according to its own peculiar facts and circumstances. What is fair in one case might be entirely inadequate or grossly excessive in another. If the size of the verdict bears no reasonable relation to the damages disclosed by the evidence, it is manifestly unfair. If a standard to measure the damages is lacking, we must depend upon the trial judge to use his sense of justice and fairness, sometimes aided by the "average verdict rule," to correct the unfairness. Glass v. David Pender Grocery Co., 174 Va. 196, 201, 202, 5 S.E.2d 478, 481.

In the case before us, the plaintiff's injury was not of a serious nature nor was it permanent or disabling in any way; he was never hospitalized except for emergency treatment; he lost only $45.00 in wages; he expended only $59.00 for medical treatment, $40.00 of which was for x-rays; his capacity to earn was not impaired; his pain and suffering was slight, and his only complaint at the time of trial was described by him in this equivocal manner:

"Well, my back hurt me a little bit, and well it hurt me a great deal."

Under these circumstances, although the evidence is devoid of even a suggestion that the jury was actuated by passion, prejudice or corruption, an award of $15,000.00 could only have resulted from a misconception or misunderstanding of the seriousness of the plaintiff's injuries. The size of the verdict, so out of proportion as it is to the plaintiff's injuries and his medical expenses and loss of wages, is sufficient, standing alone, to shock the conscience of the court and to cast upon it the stamp of unfairness.

The law has wisely placed in the hands of the trial judge the power to exercise his sound discretion in supervising the verdicts of juries to prevent miscarriages of justices. The law intends that this power should be exercised, and that the judge should be more than a mere referee between the litigating parties. The ultimate test, in a case of this nature, is whether or not the discretion has been abused.

We cannot say, on the record before us, that there has been any such abuse. This being true, we will not disturb the action of the lower court. It is clearly shown by the record, that before putting the plaintiff on terms to accept the reduced judgment, the trial judge, who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing them testify, first hand, to what we must now glean from the printed page, was completely familiar with all of the evidence and the incidents of trial.

In what we have said we have not been unmindful of the fact that the jury placed a value of $15,000.00 on the plaintiff's damages, and of the weight such a finding is ordinarily accorded, but in this case the jury's verdict has been disapproved by the trial judge, and such verdict is not, therefore, entitled to the same weight we would have been required to give it if it had been approved by him. Butler v. Darden, 189 Va. 459, 471, 53 S.E.2d 146, 151; Clark v. Parker, 161 Va. 480, 486, 171 S.E. 600, 601.

We are of the opinion that the trial judge did not err in holding the verdict of $15,000.00 to be excessive, and in ordering a remittitur of $10,000.00 thereof, in lieu of the granting of a new trial. His actions are, accordingly,

Affirmed.