Opinion
Case Number 02-10211-BC.
June 18, 2003.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The petitioner, Harold Lee Smith, a Michigan prisoner currently confined at the Macomb Correctional Facility in New Haven, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he is incarcerated in violation of his constitutional rights. The petitioner claims that the convictions and sentences which led to his incarceration were imposed in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The respondent contends that the petition lacks merit. The Court agrees, and will deny the petition.
I.
On October 27, 1999, the petitioner pleaded guilty to violating an Ingham County personal protection order ("PPO") and was sentenced to 60 days in jail. He was thereafter transported to Eaton County for arraignment on charges of first-degree home invasion, aggravated stalking, and aggravated domestic violence for the same conduct which gave rise to the PPO violation. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the Eaton County charges with the trial court on the basis of double jeopardy. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. People v. Smith, No. 99-332-FH (Eaton Co. Cir. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000).On April 7, 2000, the petitioner pleaded guilty to first-degree home invasion, aggravated stalking, unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle, aggravated domestic violence, and fleeing and eluding arising from the incident which gave rise to the PPO violation. On May 4, 2000, he was sentenced as a habitual offender to concurrent terms of 5-20 years on the home invasion conviction, 4-20 years each on the stalking and unlawful driving conviction, and 1-2 years each on the domestic violence and fleeing convictions.
Following sentencing, the petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals asserting a double jeopardy violation. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied the application for lack of merit. See People v. Smith, No. 234091 (Mich.Ct.App. June 25, 2001) (unpublished). The petitioner also filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. People v. Smith, 465 Mich. 948, 639 N.W.2d 806 (2002).
The petitioner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on August 2, 2002 claiming that his Eaton County convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The respondent filed an answer to the petition on January 17, 2003, asserting that it should be denied for lack of merit.
II.
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, federal courts may not upset a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ("In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct."); see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous.").
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. . . .
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).
The Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1) "when a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. . . .
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.Id. at 409, 410-11. See also Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 2002).
All of the petitioner's convictions implicated in this case resulted from guilty pleas. In the Eaton County case, the guilty pleas were entered without reserving the right to challenge the denial of the motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The guilty pleas, however, do not present a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of the petitioner's constitutional claim, since under Michigan law, a potential double jeopardy violation raises a jurisdictional issue that cannot be waived by a guilty plea, and may be considered on appeal despite the failure to preserve the issue by conditional guilty plea. See People v. New, 427 Mich. 482, 488-89, 398 N.W.2d 358, 361 (1986); People v. Shipe, 190 Mich. App. 629, 630, n. 3 476 N.W.2d 490, 491 n. 3 (1991); see also Tesmer v. Granholm, Nos. 00-1824 00-1845, 2003 WL 21383179, at *15 (6th Cir. June 17, 2003) (en banc). The petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because his Eaton County convictions were based upon the same conduct as his Ingham County PPO conviction and thus violate double jeopardy principles. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution commands that no "person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides three basic protections: "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted). "These protections stem from the underlying premise that a defendant should not be twice tried or punished for the same offense." Shiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994) (citing United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975)). However, in the context of multiple punishments, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a state from defining one act of conduct to constitute two separate criminal offenses. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[b]ecause the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are `multiple' is essentially one of legislative intent." Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984). Thus, "even if the two statutes proscribe the same conduct, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the imposition of cumulative punishments if the state legislature clearly intends to impose them." Brimmage v. Sumner, 793 F.2d 1014, 1015 (9th Cir. 1986). When "a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, . . . a court's task of statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983). In determining whether the Michigan legislature intended to authorize separate, cumulative punishments in the circumstances present here, this Court "must accept the state court's interpretation of the legislative intent for the imposition of multiple punishments." Brimmage, 793 F.2d at 1015; see also Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368.
The PPO statute at issue in this case provides in relevant part:
An individual who is 17 years of age or more and who refuses or fails to comply with a personal protection order under this section is subject to the criminal contempt powers of the court and, if found guilty, shall be imprisoned for not more than 93 days and may be fined not more than $500.00. . . . The criminal penalty provided for under this section may be imposed in addition to a penalty that may be imposed for another criminal offense arising from the same incident.Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2950(23) (emphasis added). The Michigan Legislature has also specifically authorized cumulative punishment for both a PPO violation and aggravated stalking, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.411i(6); People v. Coones, 216 Mich. App. 721, 727-28, 550 N.W.2d 600, 603 (1996), as well as for both a PPO violation and first-degree home invasion. See Mich. Comp. Laws 750.110a(9). The trial court in this case concluded that the petitioner's Eaton County convictions arising from the same conduct that led to his PPO conviction did not violate double jeopardy, in part, because the Michigan Legislature authorized multiple punishments. See 2/25/2000 Hrg. Tr. at 12-13. This decision is consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent and constitutes a reasonable application thereof. The PPO statute at issue authorizes criminal penalties for conduct arising from the same incident as the PPO violation and demonstrates the Michigan Legislature's intent to impose multiple punishments in this context. The record thus reflects that the petitioner was properly convicted and sentenced on the Eaton County charges as a matter of Michigan law, such that no double jeopardy violation has occurred. Habeas relief is not warranted.