Opinion
Mo. 30283.
November 7, 1932.
1. CRIMINAL LAW.
Competency of confession is primarily for trial judge, whose ruling will be upheld if not overwhelmingly contrary to weight of evidence.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
Evidence held to show that accused's confession of burglary was free and voluntary and made while in normal mental condition.
3. CRIMINAL LAW.
Where great weight of evidence was that accused charged with burglary was not so intoxicated that he did not know right from wrong, instruction that voluntary intoxication did not excuse crime held not error.
APPEAL from circuit court of Hinds county. HON. W.H. POTTER, J.
Roy Arnold, of Jackson, for appellant.
A confession made under the influence of fear is not a voluntary confession and should not be admitted in evidence. But the fear must have been caused by outside pressure brought to bear on the accused and not by his own imagination.
1 R.C.L. 556-559, 564-565, secs. 105, 110, 112.
Slight expressions, calculated to engender hope of benefit, or fear or injury will vitiate a confession thereby.
Simon v. State, 37 Miss. 288.
Confessions of guilt obtained by force are inadmissible under any circumstances, or for any purpose whatever. Their admission would be a violation of that clause of the Constitution which prohibits the compelling of a party from giving evidence against himself.
Jordan v. State, 32 Miss. 382; McMasters v. State, 82 Miss. 459; Bishop v. State, 96 Miss. 846.
It is the duty of no one to extort confession from prisoner; rather he should be warned that any statement may be used against him.
Whip v. State, 143 Miss. 757.
Confessions are inadmissible when they are secured by "treatment designed to compel confession."
State v. Roberson, 103 So. 283, 157 La. 974; State v. Bernard, 106 So. 656, 160 La. 9.
Confession induced by fear, though not by spoken threats, are not voluntary.
Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116; Beaird v. State, 109 So. 77, 20 Ala. 176.
The court is required to consider the condition, situation, and character of defendant and circumstances under which confession was made in determining its character.
Caraway v. State, 101 So. 912, 20 Ala. 362. W.D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.
The trial court ruled that on the matter of whether or not the defendant was too drunk to know what he was saying, it was a question for the jury to decide, and not the court. This ruling of the trial judge was correct.
Evans v. State, 132 So. 563.
The question of the competency of such confession is primarily and exclusively the province of the court, and the holding of the trial court on the admissibility vel non of such confession will not be disturbed on appeal, unless it clearly appears that his action is manifestly wrong.
Tyler v. State, 131 So. 417; Durham v. State, 131 So. 422; Whittaker v. State, 142 So. 474.
Police officers do not have to warn against a confession by accused, and such confession, if otherwise admissible, can be received in evidence.
Thomas v. State, 124 So. 766; Jackson v. State, 140 So. 683.
Argued orally by Roy Arnold, for appellant, and by W.D. Conn, Jr., for appellee.
The appellant was indicted on the charge of burglary and larceny of certain merchandise from an Illinois Central Railroad Company's car in the city of Jackson, Mississippi, and was convicted and sentenced to serve two years in the state penitentiary, from which conviction this appeal is prosecuted.
When the detective who had charge of the matter sought to arrest the appellant, he resisted and was shot by the officer; the wound being a flesh wound. He attempted then to escape, was caught, and confessed to the robbery, implicating another. He was carried to the Charity Hospital and his wound was dressed, and while there, in charge of the police officers of the city, he made a full confession implicating another person. When this confession was offered, it was objected to on the theory that the appellant was drunk, and unable to appreciate the effect and the consequences of what he was doing.
The trial judge heard all the testimony bearing on his condition, and there was testimony showing that he was thoroughly normal and that the confession was free and voluntary, in all respects. There was other testimony that he was drunk, but the physician who treated him said that he observed nothing abnormal about his mental condition, and that if he had been in an irresponsible condition they would have kept him at the hospital.
The competency of the confession is primarily for the trial judge, and if there is evidence to sustain his findings, and it is not overwhelmingly contrary to the weight of all the evidence, his ruling will be upheld.
The evidence in this case was ample to show that the confession was free and voluntary, and that the appellant was in a normal mental condition, fully able to appreciate the nature and consequences of his act.
There is an instruction given for the state to the effect that a person who voluntarily becomes intoxicated cannot escape the consequences of the crime committed while intoxicated.
As applied to the case at bar as disclosed by the record, we do not think the instruction was erroneous. The great weight of the evidence was to the effect that the appellant was not intoxicated to the extent that he did not know right from wrong. The judgment will, therefore, be affirmed.
Affirmed.