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noting that under Strickland, choices made after reasonable investigation are virtually unchallengeable
Summary of this case from Mendoza v. StateOpinion
No. 14-03-01174-CR
Memorandum Opinion filed March 22, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 337th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 944,657. Affirmed.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices EDELMAN and SEYMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant, Vincent Dee Smith, guilty of possession of a controlled substance. He appeals his conviction on the grounds that the trial court erred by (1) overruling his objection to improper jury argument, and (2) denying his motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion and affirm. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
I. Background
On April 4, 2003, Harris County Sheriff Deputies Silvio and Malinowski responded to a disturbance call at the home of appellant's parents. Deputy Silvio testified that upon arriving at the home, he saw appellant standing in the front yard. Deputy Silvio also observed another male and a female standing near a vehicle parked in the street. Deputy Silvio testified that for his safety he conducted a pat-down search for weapons on appellant, and he discovered a glass pipe containing cocaine residue in appellant's pocket. Deputy Malinowski testified that when he arrived at the home, he approached the male and female standing near the vehicle. He testified that he saw Deputy Silvio conduct a pat-down search of appellant, but he did not actually see Deputy Silvio recover the pipe from appellant's pocket. Appellant was the only witness to testify for the defense. He testified that a neighborhood officer responded to the disturbance call before Deputies Silvio and Malinowski. Appellant testified that he was sitting in the back of the neighborhood officer's patrol car when Deputies Silvio and Malinowski arrived, and that Deputy Silvio never performed a pat-down search. Appellant testified that the officers recovered three or four crack pipes from the purse of the female standing near the street.II. IMPROPER JURY ARGUMENT
In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to comment on appellant's non-testimonial demeanor during jury argument in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. A proper jury argument must fall within one of four general areas: (1) summation of the evidence, (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence, (3) answer to the argument of opposing counsel, or (4) a plea for law enforcement. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 154 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Torres v. State, 92 S.W.3d 911, 920 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). Generally, a prosecutor's comments regarding the defendant's non-testimonial courtroom demeanor do not fit within one of the four approved areas, and therefore, are improper. See Good v. State, 723 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986).A. PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS
During closing argument, the prosecutor made the following comments regarding appellant's courtroom demeanor:[Prosecutor]: [Appellant] even admits he's never met [the arresting officers]. They have no reason to get up there and lie about him. He says he's never been in trouble in his neighborhood; so why would they be — why would they have this vendetta against him? Why? He's asking you to believe him, convicted dope dealer, a burglar, a forger, a drug user, a crack pipe user, over officers, deputies that were called out to a scene, checking by with a disturbance. Who are you going to believe? I'm not asking you to try him because of his past, but that gives weight to his credibility as a witness.
Why would he get up there and lie? He's got a lot of reasons to get up there and lie. He knows he's facing 20 years in prison in the penitentiary. The officers, they don't have any reason to lie. . . .
I think Mr. Smith's behavior in this court has been outrageous. The way he's been acting in court, does it even surprise you he would get up there —
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I object. This is outside the record.
[The Court]: Overruled.
[Prosecutor]: Didn't it surprise you that he would get up there and lie about officers. The disrespect he's shown this jury, the disrespect he's shown me, the Court, his own lawyer, interrupting her when she's trying to make an objection. Did it even surprise you that he would get up and act and lie the way that he did?The record reflects that during Deputy Silvio's testimony, appellant was squirming around in his seat. At some point in the trial, appellant's behavior became so disruptive that deputies had to sit behind defense counsel. In addressing appellant's argument, we will assume that the prosecutor's comment was also a reference to this non-testimonial demeanor. The context of the prosecutor's statements shows that the comment regarding appellant's courtroom behavior was intended as an attack on appellant's credibility as a witness. At trial, appellant testified on his own behalf, thereby subjecting his credibility to attack by evidence of prior criminal convictions. See TEX. R. EVID. 609. The State suggests that because appellant placed his credibility in issue, it was proper for the prosecutor to comment on appellant's non-testimonial courtroom demeanor to attack his credibility. Relying on Good, the State contends that improper jury argument only occurs if the prosecutor requests that the jury draw an inference of guilt. We disagree. In Good, the prosecutor made the following statement to the jury:
You observed his [appellant's] demeanor in this courtroom and I submit to you it is a reasonable deduction that he would have reacted in some way, shown some concern. He has just sat there cold, unnerved, uncaring, just like he was that morning [of the burglary]. That tells you a great deal about him. That has nothing to do with articulation or being able to speak or education. No, that has to do with the fact that he is guilty and he could care less this week that he is guilty and he could care less back on June 9th, 1983.Good, 830 S.W.2d at 735 (emphasis in original). In finding that the prosecutor's comments constituted reversible error, the Good Court emphasized the harmfulness of the prosecutor arguing that a defendant's non-testimonial demeanor is evidence of guilt. See id. at 737. However, the broader holding in Good is that a defendant's demeanor, in any respect other than when he is testifying, is not subject to comment by the prosecutor. See id. at 736 ("Allowing the State to summarize appellant's nontestimonial demeanor impermissibly placed appellant's demeanor before the jury through the prosecutor's unsworn jury argument."). Moreover, it is clear that comments regarding a defendant's non-testimonial demeanor do not fit within any of the permissible areas of jury argument. See Guidry, 9 S.W.3d at 154. Because the prosecutor's comment regarding appellant's non-testimonial demeanor does not fit within any of the permissible areas of jury argument, the trial court erred in overruling appellant's objection to the comment. Accordingly, we must consider the harmful effect of the error to determine whether it warrants reversal.
B. HARM ANALYSIS
Erroneous rulings related to jury argument are generally treated as non-constitutional error within Rule 44.2(b). Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 692 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). Rule 44.2(b) requires that we disregard any error not affecting substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Stated differently, "[a] criminal conviction should not be overturned for non-constitutional error if the appellate court, after reviewing the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect." Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). When analyzing the harm caused by an improper jury argument, we examine the following factors: (1) severity of the misconduct (the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's comments), (2) measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct. Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259.1. Severity Of The Misconduct
When considering this factor, we examine the egregiousness of the prosecutor's conduct in conjunction with the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's comments. Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). However, prejudice to the defendant is clearly the touchstone of this factor. Id. In Good, the court found the prosecutor's comment to be harmful because it focused on the defendant's neutral courtroom demeanor to draw an unreasonable inference of guilt. Good, 723 S.W.2d at 738. Here, we do not find the prosecutor's comment to be as egregious as the comment in Good. The prosecutor in this case did not focus on appellant's neutral courtroom behavior to draw an unreasonable inference of guilt. Instead, the prosecutor focused on appellant's disruptive courtroom behavior. Further, even the court in Good acknowledged the possibility that a jury might draw some conclusions from watching a defendant during trial. See id. at 736 n. 3. Thus, while the prosecutor should not have alluded to appellant's disruptive behavior, we do not find the comment to be as egregious as a reference to neutral courtroom demeanor that draws an unreasonable inference of guilt. More importantly, we find that the prejudicial effect on appellant was minimal. Unlike in Good, the prosecutor in this case did not ask the jury to draw an inference of guilt from appellant's non-testimonial demeanor. Rather, the prosecutor focused the jury's attention on appellant's non-testimonial demeanor to challenge his credibility as a witness. The record reveals that appellant's credibility had already been significantly diminished through the introduction of his numerous prior criminal convictions. Moreover, the jury was in a position to evaluate appellant's non-testimonial demeanor on its own. Thus, the prosecutor's comment did not likely have much effect on the jury's assessment of appellant's credibility.2. Measures Adopted to Cure the Misconduct
The trial court did not take any curative action because it overruled appellant's objection. Therefore, this factor weighs in appellant's favor.3. Certainty of the Conviction Absent The Misconduct
The State's evidence consisted of the testimony of two police officers. Deputy Silvio testified that he searched appellant and found a pipe containing crack cocaine. While Deputy Malinowski did not see whether the pipe was retrieved from appellant, he did confirm that Deputy Silvio conducted a pat-down search of appellant. This testimony refuted appellant's testimony that the officers never conducted a search. The only counter-evidence offered by appellant was his own testimony. Appellant claimed that Officer Silvio never conducted a pat-down search. As noted earlier, the credibility of appellant's testimony was significantly diminished by the introduction of his numerous prior criminal convictions. Thus, there was a substantial certainty of appellant's conviction absent the improper jury argument. After examining the prosecutor's comment in light of the Mosely factors, we find that although the comment was improper, there was insufficient harm to warrant reversal of appellant's conviction. We overrule appellant's first issue.III. Motion for New Trial
In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant complains his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to interview or call witnesses to testify on his behalf during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, and (2) failing to call witnesses to testify regarding mitigating factors during the punishment phase.A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for new trial, a defendant must show (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing standards of professional norms, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); Rodriquez v. State, 899 S.W.2d 658, 664 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). In considering the first prong, we indulge a strong presumption that counsel's actions fell within the range of reasonable professional behavior. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). To overcome this presumption, an allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly demonstrated in the record. Id. We assume counsel's actions and decisions were reasonably professional and motivated by sound trial strategy. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994).B. Guilt/Innocence Stage of Trial
Appellant first contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to contact or interview potential witnesses to testify at the guilt/innocence stage of trial. Defense counsel has the duty to make an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case by seeking out and interviewing potential witnesses. Ex Parte Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Ex Parte Ybarra, 629 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). Although counsel must make reasonable investigations of the case, counsel may decide further investigation is unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. We assess counsel's decision not to investigate further for reasonableness in all the circumstances then existing, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. Id. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant introduced affidavits from three individuals stating that they would have testified on appellant's behalf at the guilt/innocence stage of the trial. Doris Washington, appellant's aunt, averred that she was at the home of appellant's parents when appellant was arrested, and she never saw the police officers search appellant. She stated that she was never contacted by appellant's counsel before trial. Joyce Eaden, appellant's mother, averred that she was watching from her front door when appellant was arrested, and the police officers never searched appellant. Eaden stated that she was never contacted by appellant's counsel before trial, although she tried to contact counsel many times. Finally, John Buck, appellant's neighbor, averred that on the day appellant was arrested, Buck drove past the home of appellant's parents several times. Buck stated that the first time he drove by, only one police officer was at the house. Buck stated that appellant was sitting in the back of the officer's car, and that appellant was not causing a disturbance. Buck stated that he again drove by appellant's house about forty-five minutes later. At that time, there were two patrol cars present, and appellant was still sitting in the first patrol car. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense counsel testified that before trial she met with appellant and discussed the witnesses listed in the offense report. She also requested that appellant provide her with a list of potential witnesses so they could be subpoenaed for trial, but appellant never provided her with the names of any witnesses. The record further reflects that just before voir dire, appellant informed the court that he had witnesses to testify on his behalf, but trial counsel had not subpoenaed any of them. Counsel informed the court that, before trial day, she did not know appellant had any witnesses, and if she had known, she would have secured their presence at trial. Following voir dire and jury selection, the court recessed early so that appellant's witnesses could be subpoenaed. At that time, counsel spoke to appellant about contacting the witnesses. Counsel testified as follows:I informed [appellant] that I had an investigator who was on call. When I went to the holdover, that I would miss lunch, contact the investigator, that the investigator Randy Cunningham would actually go out and bring his witnesses to court, if necessary, and that we would have them here; just give me the names. [Appellant] informed me that he wanted to get his own witnesses and he would not give me the names of any witnesses. He would bring his own witnesses to court.Based on defense counsel's testimony, it is apparent that appellant not only refused to cooperate with defense counsel in locating witnesses, but also informed counsel that he desired to procure the presence of his own witnesses. Appellant contends that even if he was "totally uncooperative and refused to name the witnesses as trial counsel testified, it is still counsel's duty to attempt to locate witnesses helpful to the defense." Appellant maintains that defense counsel must make an independent investigation regardless of complications in a given case. See Ex Parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 517 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986)). However, while counsel has a duty to investigate the facts of a given case, her client has a reciprocal duty to forego that which impedes counsel's ability to reasonably perform. See Rodriquez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. ref'd). Withholding the identity of potential witnesses is such an impediment. See Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) (refusing to hold counsel ineffective when the defendant failed to impart sufficient information to permit trial counsel to determine the identity of supposedly key witnesses). When a defendant withholds information that is vital to his defense, he may not complain about the effect that his own evasive conduct had upon the performance of counsel. See Rodriquez, 74 S.W.3d at 569. "Any other result would be to allow a defendant to benefit from his own mis or non-feasance, and, this we will not permit." Id. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was not required to find defense counsel ineffective for failing to interview these potential witnesses whose names appellant already knew but withheld. Appellant further contends his uncooperativeness did not excuse defense counsel from failing to interview his mother, Joyce Eaden, because counsel had independent knowledge that Eaden was at home when appellant was arrested. Appellant relies on Butler v. State, in which defense counsel was found to be ineffective when he failed to interview a potential alibi witness that he knew lived with the defendant, even though counsel was unaware whether the witness was home at the time the offense was committed. 716 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). We agree that the facts in this case are somewhat analogous to those in Butler. However, we note that each case involving the constitutional issue of ineffectiveness of counsel must be evaluated based on the specific conduct of the parties involved. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Because the reasonableness of counsel's actions may be substantially influenced by the defendant's own words or actions, such facts are pertinent to evaluating defense counsel's representation. Id. Here, before trial, counsel consulted with appellant about the case and requested a list of potential witnesses. Despite defense counsel's efforts, appellant never informed counsel that Eaden could be a beneficial witness. Moreover, appellant informed counsel that he did not want to speak with counsel about witnesses and that he would "get his own witnesses." Further, counsel testified that before trial she spoke with appellant's father on a number of occasions; yet nothing in the record suggests that appellant's father informed counsel that Eaden witnessed appellant's arrest. Further, at the hearing, defense counsel was asked if she recalled speaking with Eaden. Defense counsel responded, "I don't recall. Now, I could have, because I called the house a number of times, and what the father had told me definitely would not have been a benefit to call, not for the defense. It would have been for them to call, the prosecutors to call, but not for the defense." Based upon the circumstances of this case, we conclude that defense counsel's failure to conduct further investigation into Eaden's potential testimony was plausible. Counsel could have reasonably concluded in her professional judgment that based upon the information provided by appellant's father and appellant's own words and actions, any further investigation would not have been fruitful. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that counsel's actions in this case did not rise to the level of constitutional ineffectiveness.