Opinion
No. 1D20-2419
05-18-2022
Janett Maxine SMITH, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. George Andrew Wellington SMITH, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Ross A. Keene of Ross Keene Law, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Laura E. Keene of Beroset & Keene, Pensacola, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Ross A. Keene of Ross Keene Law, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Laura E. Keene of Beroset & Keene, Pensacola, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Jay, J.
The former wife—Janett Maxine Smith—appeals the Amended Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage and Order on Petitioner's Motion for Rehearing. Because the trial court did not make the findings of fact required by statute, we reverse the Amended Final Judgment's award of alimony and its equitable distribution of marital assets. We also remand so the trial court can address the former wife's claim that the former husband—Dr. George Andrew Wellington Smith—must obtain life insurance to secure any award of alimony that the former wife receives.
I.
A trial court in a dissolution matter must make specific findings of fact that are tailored to the relevant statute—whether it be for alimony, the equitable distribution of marital assets, or child support. See § 61.08, Fla. Stat. (alimony); § 61.075, Fla. Stat. (equitable distribution); § 61.13, Fla. Stat. (child support). Because dissolution proceedings are in equity, the trial court has significant discretion, and its factual findings are entitled to much deference from an appellate court. Rosen v. Rosen , 696 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla. 1997) ("The legislature has given trial judges wide leeway to work equity in chapter 61 proceedings."); Herzog v. Herzog , 346 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 1977) (reaffirming that in an appellate proceeding, "the trial court's findings of fact are shielded from attack and are clothed with a presumption of validity" unless they lack substantial evidentiary support).
However, there is appellate review to be done, and we typically review dissolution judgments to ensure that the statutory factors have been addressed and that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's factual determinations. Specific factual findings by the trial court facilitate an appellate court's review in this respect. But the absence of those findings makes that review—in any meaningful sense—nearly impossible. Thus, the trial court's findings of fact are indispensable to the appellate process. McCarty v. McCarty , 710 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (requiring the trial court to make factual findings "serves the laudatory goals of avoiding arbitrary outcomes and facilitating efficient appellate review"). Or, more practically speaking, if the trial court fails to make these necessary findings, it can frustrate appellate review. Id. ; see also Miller v. Miller , 589 So. 2d 317, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ("[B]ecause the trial court failed to include specific findings with respect to the alimony, asset distribution, child support, imputed income, retirement plan and attorney fee issues, meaningful appellate review of the judgment appealed from is precluded.").
II.
The alimony statute requires the trial court to "first make a specific factual determination as to whether either party has an actual need for alimony or maintenance and whether either party has the ability to pay alimony or maintenance." § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. If the court finds that alimony is warranted under this standard, it must then determine the appropriate type and amount of alimony based on "all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
(d) The financial resources of each party, including the nonmarital and the marital assets and liabilities distributed to each.
(e) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties and, when applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient education or training to enable such party to find appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education, and career building of the other party.
(g) The responsibilities each party will have with regard to any minor children they have in common.
(h) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a nontaxable, nondeductible payment.
(i) All sources of income available to either party, including income available to either party through investments of any asset held by that party.
(j) Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties."
Id. Without the benefit of this statutory analysis, an appellate court is unable to determine if the moving party proved his or her need for alimony. See Dal Ponte v. Dal Ponte , 692 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) ("Without proper statutory findings, we cannot determine if Former Wife proved need for the alimony awarded.").
Similarly, the equitable distribution statute states that any "distribution of marital assets ... shall be supported by factual findings in the judgment or order based on competent substantial evidence with reference to the factors enumerated in subsection (1)." § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat. Pointedly, it directs that the distribution of assets "shall include specific written findings of fact as to the following:
(a) Clear identification of nonmarital assets and ownership interests;
(b) Identification of marital assets, including the individual valuation of significant assets, and designation of which spouse shall be entitled to each asset;
(c) Identification of the marital liabilities and designation of which spouse shall be responsible for each liability;
(d) Any other findings necessary to advise the parties or the reviewing court of the trial court's rationale for the distribution of marital assets and allocation of liabilities."
Id . "Without such findings, the appellate court is unable to conduct a meaningful review of the distribution ordered by the trial court." Navarro v. Navarro , 209 So. 3d 74, 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing Shoffner v. Shoffner , 744 So. 2d 1157, 1157–58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ); see also Williams v. Williams , 133 So. 3d 605, 606 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (the trial court "must make specific written findings of fact identifying marital assets and individually valuing significant assets").
In the present case, the trial court's judgment includes only cursory and conclusory factual determinations (e.g., simply stating that it considered all the factors). This was error, and the former wife preserved the issue for appeal in her Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration. See Owens v. Owens , 973 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Because a proper review of the trial court's decision evades us, remand is necessary for the trial court to reevaluate its award of alimony and the equitable distribution of marital assets by making the necessary findings of fact. See Fulmer v. Fulmer , 961 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Those findings should be tailored to the statutory factors set out in sections 61.08(2) and 61.075(1) and (3), Fla. Stat.
III.
The former wife also argues the trial court failed to address her claim that the former husband must obtain life insurance to secure an award of alimony. "To the extent necessary to protect an award of alimony, the court may order any party who is ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure such alimony award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose." § 61.08(3), Fla. Stat.; Ruberg v. Ruberg , 858 So. 2d 1147, 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Generally, when life insurance is ordered to secure an award of permanent alimony, the trial court must make findings that the required life insurance is reasonably available and reasonably affordable to the obligor. See Payton v. Payton , 109 So. 3d 280, 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ; Norman v. Norman , 939 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In the present case, even though the former wife requested life insurance during the final hearing and again in her Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration, the trial court failed to acknowledge the plea in the Amended Final Judgment. This omission was error, and remand is required for the court to address whether the former husband must secure any alimony award with life insurance. See Duffey v. Duffey , 972 So. 2d 290, 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).
IV.
To summarize, we reverse the Amended Final Judgment to the extent it (1) lacks the necessary findings of fact concerning the award of alimony and the equitable distribution of the parties’ assets and (2) fails to address the former wife's life insurance claim. We remand the case to the trial court to address these omissions in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Because we reverse the Amended Final Judgment, we need not address the former husband's one-issue cross appeal.
REVERSED and REMANDED .
Ray and Tanenbaum, JJ., concur.