From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Smith v. Pathmark Stores

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Dec 16, 2008
57 A.D.3d 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)

Opinion

No. 2008-02158.

December 16, 2008.

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff is the primary beneficiary under a certain Pathmark 401k Savings Plan, the defendant estate of Margaret O'Neill by Tom O'Neill, executor, appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Weber, J.), dated February 28, 2008, as granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, dismissed its counterclaims, declared that the plaintiff is the primary beneficiary under the Plan, and directed the defendant Pathmark Stores, Inc., formerly known as Supermarkets General Corporation, to deliver the corpus of the account to the plaintiff.

William R. Garbarino, Sayville, N.Y. (Donald R. Hamill of counsel), for appellant.

Benjamin J. Klemanowicz, Jr., P.C., Mineola, N.Y. (Richard J. Vande Stouwe of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.

Before: Skelos, J.P., Lifson, Santucci and Balkin, JJ. concur.


Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff met his burden in moving for summary judgment by establishing, prima facie, that he was the designated beneficiary under a Pathmark 401k Savings Plan (hereinafter the Plan) maintained by his former wife, now deceased (hereinafter the decedent), as an employee of the defendant Pathmark Stores, Inc., formerly known as Supermarkets General Corporation (hereinafter Pathmark) ( see Storozynski v Storozynski, 10 AD3d 419). In opposition, the appellant, the estate of the decedent (hereinafter the Estate), failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Contrary to the Estate's contention, the stipulation entered into by the plaintiff and the decedent prior to her death did not constitute a waiver of the plaintiff's interest in the Plan. The stipulation did not expressly reference the Plan, and the general release language contained therein was insufficient to effectuate a valid waiver ( see Eredics v Chase Manhattan Bank, 100 NY2d 106, 112-113; Storozynski v Storozynski, 10 AD3d 419; cf. Silber v Silber, 99 NY2d 395, 404, cert denied 540 US 817; Valentin v New York City Police Pension Fund, 16 AD3d 145).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, dismissed the counter-claims asserted by the Estate, declared that the plaintiff is the primary beneficiary under the Plan, and directed Pathmark to deliver the corpus of the Plan to the plaintiff.

The Estate's remaining contention is without merit.


Summaries of

Smith v. Pathmark Stores

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Dec 16, 2008
57 A.D.3d 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
Case details for

Smith v. Pathmark Stores

Case Details

Full title:DAVID SMITH, Respondent, v. PATHMARK STORES, INC., Formerly Known as…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Dec 16, 2008

Citations

57 A.D.3d 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 9981
869 N.Y.S.2d 584

Citing Cases

In re Christie

" ‘Where the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously set forth, effect must be given to the…

Edwards-Mcmahon v. Christie (In re Christie)

" Where the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously set forth, effect must be given to the…