Opinion
No. 2-088 / 00-1454.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, THOMAS R. HRONEK, District Associate Judge.
Petitioner claims the district court acted illegally and exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering his driving privileges revoked for six years under Iowa Code section 321J.4(4) (1999) following his guilty plea to operating while intoxicated, second offense. WRIT ANNULLED.
Donald Juhl, Nevada, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Holmes, Story County Attorney, and Angelina Newman, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Petitioner, Roy Smith's, case comes before us on a writ of certiorari issued by the supreme court in May 2001. He claims the district court acted illegally and exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering his driving privileges revoked for six years under Iowa Code section 321J.4(4) (1999) following his guilty plea to operating while intoxicated, second offense. We annul the writ.
Smith was stopped on April 30, 2000, failed field sobriety tests, and refused to provide a breath sample to determine his blood alcohol content. The State charged him with OWI, third offense, based on earlier convictions on May 16, 1998 and December 2, 1998. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State reduced the charge to OWI, second offense, in exchange for his guilty plea. In its plea offer, the State noted, "As discussed, Mr. Smith will still be subject to a six year driver's license barrment due to this being his third OWI in his lifetime." In Smith's written guilty plea, he "reserve[d] the right to argue, at sentencing, the legality of the six year bar." The court accepted Smith's plea on July 5, 2000. At sentencing on July 26, 2000, the district court reserved judgment on the State's application for an order for a six-year driver's license revocation.
On August 4, 2000, the district court issued its order directing a six-year revocation of Smith's driver's license under Iowa Code section 321J.4(4). The court noted the instant offense occurred within twelve years of both previous convictions but sentencing occurred more than twelve years after Smith's first conviction. Smith argued the court should not consider his first conviction because the records of that conviction should have been deleted after twelve years under Iowa Code section 321.12(4). The State argued both earlier convictions should be considered because they occurred within twelve years of the instant violation. The district court considered the language of Iowa Code sections 321.12, 321J.2(4), and 321J.4(4) together with the supreme court's decision in Wyciskalla v. Iowa District Court, 588 N.W.2d 403 (Iowa 1998) in concluding:
It appears, therefore, that the only reasonable interpretation, while considering Sections 321J.4(4), 321J.2(4) and 321.12, Iowa Code, together, is consideration of convictions, revocations, deferred judgments and out-of-state convictions which occurred within 12 years prior to the instant violation date.
Following the district court's order, Smith petitioned the supreme court for a writ of certiorari.
"Certiorari is a law action to determine whether a tribunal . . . has exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally." Polk County Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 594 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Iowa 1999). Our review depends on the nature of the issues raised. Id. We review a district court's interpretation of a statute for correction of errors of law. See State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000).
Smith claims the district court's decision misinterprets the language of Iowa Code section 321J.2(4)(c), which reads, in pertinent part:
Each previous violation on which conviction or deferral of judgment was entered prior to the date of the violation charged shall be considered and counted as a separate previous offense. (emphasis added).
He contends the language italicized above merely modifies the initial part of the sentence, so it is the date of the previous violation that should be considered, not the previous conviction or deferred judgment. Smith argues the legislature's intent is made clear if the sentence is read without the phrase italicized above:
Each previous violation . . . prior to the date of the violation charged shall be considered and counted as a separate previous offense.
Smith's claim fails for four reasons. First, had the legislature intended the italicized language to be a parenthetical, as Smith argues, it could have set off the text with commas or rearranged the word order. To read the sentence as Smith suggests requires a tortured construction of the grammar of the sentence. We presume the legislature drafted the language to be read in a normal manner, without the necessity for the reader to rearrange or omit words in order to understand what the legislature meant.
Second, in State v. Raim, the supreme court interpreted the language of Iowa Code section 321.281(2) (1983), which was a precursor to Iowa Code section 321J.2(4):
That section read, in pertinent part:
No conviction for, or plea of guilty to, a violation of this section which occurred more than six years prior to the date of the violation charged shall be considered in determining that the violation charged is a second, third or subsequent offense.
Iowa Code § 321.281(2)(c) (1983).
The issue is whether the six-year period prior to the date of the most recent violation runs from the date of prior offenses or from the date of conviction on such offenses in order to determine if the most recent violation is a second, third or subsequent violation. Stated another way, the issue is whether the phrase "which occurred more than six years prior to the violation charged" modifies the preceding words "conviction" or "violation" in the statute. See Iowa Code section 321.281(2)(c). We conclude the phrase modifies the word "conviction."State v. Raim, 381 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Iowa 1986). The district court's interpretation of the current statutory language follows the supreme court's in State v. Raim.
Third, the district court's interpretation fits with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.6(5), which covers pleading previous convictions in an indictment or trial information:
If the offense charged is one for which the defendant, if convicted, will be subject by reason of the Code, to an increased penalty because of prior convictions, the allegation of such convictions, if any, shall be contained in the indictment. . . .
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.6(5) (2002) (formerly Iowa R. Crim. P. 6(5)) (emphasis added); see Raim, 381 N.W.2d at 637-38.
Fourth, Smith's reliance on Wyciskalla is misplaced. The language in the opinion he cites in support of his claim is a statement of Wyciskalla's position, not the ruling of the supreme court. See Wyciskalla, 588 N.W.2d at 407. The court's holding in Wyciskalla is not contrary to the district court's ruling in the instant case. Other cases have reached similar results. See, e.g., State v. Wiseman, 614 N.W.2d 66, 67-8 (Iowa 2000) (concluding penalty enhancement is based on time from prior conviction); State v. Barlow, 242 Iowa 714, 719, 46 N.W.2d 725, 728 (1951) (stating prior offenses for enhancement purposes were "synonymous with convictions"); accord State v. Ridout, 346 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1984).
We conclude, therefore, the district court correctly interpreted the statutory language and committed no legal error. We annul the writ of certiorari.
WRIT ANNULLED.