Summary
In Smith v. Conley, 152 Ga. App. 589, 591 (263 S.E.2d 453), we reversed a summary judgment which the trial court granted without a hearing, without fixing a time for a hearing and without giving appellants notice of the time when judgment would be rendered, and we said that if local court rules are not in substantial compliance with the Civil Practice Act with regard to summary judgments, they are of no effect.
Summary of this case from Ferguson v. MillerOpinion
58097.
ARGUED JULY 9, 1979.
DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 1979. REHEARING DENIED NOVEMBER 29, 1979.
Inspection of records. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Alverson.
Malcolm S. Murray, for appellants.
Tyrus R. Atkinson, Jr., for appellees.
The trial court sustained appellees' motion for summary judgment as to their complaint and their motion to dismiss appellants' counterclaim. We reverse in both instances.
1. The court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment without holding a hearing or fixing a time for a hearing on the motion and without giving appellants notice of the time when judgment would be rendered. That procedural shortcoming requires reversal. CPA § 56 (c) (Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c)); Peoples Financial Corp. v. Jones, 134 Ga. App. 649 ( 215 S.E.2d 711) (1975); Enochs v. Sisson, 301 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1962).
2. The trial court also erred in granting appellees' 12 (b) (6) motion. CPA § 12 (b) (6) (Code Ann. § 81A-112 (b) (6)). In their counterclaim, appellants have stated a claim for malicious abuse of process. "[A] counterclaim for malicious abuse of civil process presents a valid cause of action subject only to the presentation of sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's burden of proof... Since the allegations of the instant counterclaim were sufficient to meet the requirements of notice pleading, and it is not premature, the questions raised therein should be left for the trier of fact to consider..." Morris v. Lester Laboratories, 147 Ga. App. 833, 835 ( 250 S.E.2d 569) (1978). Neither is there any basis in the record for the trial court's statement, in the dismissal order, that appellants had "conceded" the counterclaim.
Judgment reversed. Quillian, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.
ARGUED JULY 9, 1979 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 1979 — REHEARING DENIED NOVEMBER 29, 1979.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
On motion for rehearing, appellees have attempted to supplement the record by submitting the trial court's rules concerning motion procedure. Those rules allegedly require us to decide differently. However, as they were not introduced into evidence or otherwise made part of the trial court record, we will not consider them. See Stein Steel c. Co. v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 110 Ga. App. 489 (2) ( 138 S.E.2d 910) (1964). We note that if the local court rules are not in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Civil Practice Act with regard to summary judgment proceedings, they are of no effect.
Motion for rehearing denied.