Opinion
Civil No. 3:20-CV-964
02-11-2021
HUNTER SMETANA, et al., Plaintiffs v. TUNKHANNOCK BOROUGH, et al., Defendants
(Judge Conner)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss filed by Tunkhannock Borough and Officer Stevens. (Doc. 8). The plaintiffs filed this action two days after they were criminally charged in Wyoming County, Pennsylvania, with Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver. Commonwealth v. Smetana, CP-66-CR-189-2020; Commonwealth v. Kluk, CP-66-CR-191-2020. These charges, which are still currently pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County, stemmed from a vehicle stop conducted by Officer Stevens of the Tunkhannock Borough Police Department on March 26, 2020, during which Officer Stevens found and seized a substance he believed to be marijuana. For their part, the plaintiffs claim that the substance found during the stop was legally purchased CBD and/or hemp, which their company 3BUDS LLC, the corporate plaintiff, lawfully distributed.
Thus, the plaintiffs were charged with these state criminal offenses on June 12, 2020, and this civil lawsuit followed on June 15, 2020. (Doc. 1). The complaint alleges various civil rights violations, including interference with the plaintiffs' right to counsel, false arrest, unlawful seizure, and supervisory liability claims against the Borough. (Id.) In their complaint the plaintiffs sought wide-ranging relief, including nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief and the dismissal of the state criminal charges. (Id.) Thus, the complaint expressly invited us to intervene in this pending state case.
The Borough and the arresting officer, Officer Stevens then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the Younger abstention doctrine bars federal consideration of these claims at this time, as these criminal cases against the plaintiffs are still pending in state court. After consideration, we agree that the Younger abstention doctrine applies here, and this court should exercise its discretion to dismiss the prayer for injunctive relief in this case. Further under the Younger abstention doctrine, and consistent with settled caselaw, it is recommended that the damages aspect of the case be stayed pending completion of the state criminal proceedings. Accordingly, we will recommend that the defendants' motion to dismiss be granted, in part, and this case be stayed, in part.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Presently, it appears that this state case is scheduled for trial on March 29, 2021. Commonwealth v. Smetana, CP-66-CR-189-2020; Commonwealth v. Kluk, CP-66-CR-191-2020. --------
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.-, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id., at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, [ ] "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement of relief.' "Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id., at 1950. Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, "documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that "[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment"). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, for the reasons set forth below it is recommended that this complaint be dismissed, in part, and stayed, in part, pending completion of the state criminal case.
B. The Younger Abstention Doctrine Applies Here and Compels Dismissal of the Plaintiff's Prayer for Injunctive Relief and a Stay of the Damages Claims in the Complaint at this Time.
In the instant case, this complaint seemingly invites us to issue wide-ranging injunctive relief affecting this ongoing state criminal case. Indeed, the plaintiffs' complaint requests that this court enter an order dismissing the pending criminal charges against the plaintiffs. To the extent that the plaintiffs urge this Court to enjoin aspects of their pending state case, and in effect calls upon us to dictate the result of that case, this pleading runs afoul of a settled tenet of federal law, the Younger abstention doctrine.
The Younger abstention doctrine is inspired by basic considerations of comity that are fundamental to our federal system of government. As defined by the courts:
Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) ("[W]e have concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or
enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.").Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009).
This doctrine, which is informed by principles of comity, is also guided by these same principles in its application. As the Third Circuit has observed:
"A federal district court has discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding." Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)). As noted earlier, the Younger doctrine allows a district court to abstain, but that discretion can properly be exercised only when (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2008).Kendall, 572 F.3d at 131.
Once these three legal requirements for Younger abstention are met, the decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover, applying these standards, federal courts frequently abstain from hearing matters which necessarily interfere with ongoing state criminal cases. Id.; Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).
In this case, the plaintiff's pro se complaint reveals that all of the legal prerequisites for Younger abstention are present here with respect to those claims that seek to enjoin an ongoing state case. First, it is evident that there are state proceedings in this case. Second, it is also apparent that those proceedings afford the plaintiffs a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues raised in this lawsuit in this state case. See Sullivan, 362 F. App'x at 249-50. Finally, it is clear that the state proceedings implicate important state interests, since these matters involve state criminal law enforcement, an issue of paramount importance to the state. See, e.g., Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl, 282 F.3d 204.
Specifically, in this case the plaintiffs assert violations of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Fourth Amendment seizure violations, Due Process violations, false arrest, and municipal liability, all of which are intertwined with and are dependent upon the result of the ongoing state criminal proceedings. Indeed, the state criminal court is arguably the most appropriate vehicle by which to bring claims relating to probable cause, unlawful seizures, and interference with the right to counsel. With respect to the Monell claim against the Borough regarding its THC testing policy, in our view these issues of municipal liability will similarly turn on the outcome of the state criminal proceedings against the plaintiffs. Thus, the plaintiffs will have an adequate opportunity to address these constitutional claims during the pendency of their state proceedings. Moreover, the plaintiffs are not barred from seeking legal recourse from this court following the conclusion of their state proceedings, should the outcome of those proceedings be unfavorable to them.
Since the legal requirements for Younger abstention are fully met here, the decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of this Court. Lui, 369 F.3d at 325. However, given the important state interest in enforcement of its criminal laws, and recognizing that the state courts are prepared to fully address the merits of these matters, we believe that the proper exercise of this discretion weighs in favor of abstention and dismissal of this request for injunctive relief at the present time. Id.; Zahl, 282 F.3d 204.
Indeed, the plaintiffs concede as much in their response to this motion to dismiss, but request that we stay the damages claims in the case pending completion of the state criminal prosecution. (Doc. 18 at 4-5). We agree that a stay of the damages claims, rather than dismissal, would be appropriate here. In this regard, the Court of Appeals has observed in the past when applying the Younger abstention doctrine that:
With respect to Plaintiffs' claims for damages and attorney fees . . . in their individual capacities, however, we have held that "a district court, when abstaining from adjudicating a claim for injunctive relief, should stay and not dismiss accompanying claims for damages and attorney fees when such relief is not available from the ongoing state proceedings." Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).Howard v. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 398 F. App'x 807, 811 (3d Cir. 2010). Such a course is particularly appropriate here since the disposition of these criminal charges, which may occur as soon as March 2021, may well affect the viability of the plaintiffs' damages claims in a number of respects.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) be GRANTED, in part, and the prayers for injunctive relief in this complaint should be dismissed. As for the plaintiffs' claims for damages, consistent with settled case law, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this aspect of the case be STAYED pending completion of the state criminal proceedings.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 11th day of February 2021.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge