Opinion
14-P-1644
02-23-2016
ALAN SLISKI & another v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF LINCOLN.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
This is an appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) that determined the plaintiffs' property valuation by the town of Lincoln's board of assessors (town) was correct viewing the property as a whole. The plaintiffs own two parcels of land: the larger one lies in Lincoln and Wayland and is 4.665 acres (273 Concord Road); the smaller one also lies in both Lincoln and Wayland but is only .07 acre (0 Concord Road). Approximately twenty-five years ago, the plaintiffs received a G. L. c. 61A exemption for 273 Concord Road, except for the 5,445 square feet (or 0.125 of an acre) that lie under the plaintiffs' house. The town refers to this 0.125 acre as the "prime site."
Only the portions of the lots that are in Lincoln are the subject of this appeal.
273 Concord Road encompasses a single-family house with an attached garage and deck, and some "yard items" that are also valued and taxed.
The plaintiffs dispute their fiscal year 2010 tax assessment for both parcels. As to 273 Concord Road, they argue that the assessment accurately reflects neither the value of the prime site nor the value of the land as a whole due to the c. 61A exemption. The 2010 "tax card" for that property shows a total taxable valuation of $726,397, of which $314,300 is attributed to the house, $58,800 to yard items, $352,800 to the .0125 acre of land under the house, $382 to the 3.54 acres of pasture, and $115 to the 1.00 acre of woodland. The town appraised the agricultural portions at $30,000 per acre, but appraised the prime site at a rate of $2,822,688 per acre. The town appears to have arrived at this latter figure by assigning a value of $7.20 per square foot to the prime site and then applying a multiplier of 9.00. Because the factor of 9.00 is unexplained in the record and indeed appears to be contradicted by the town's own documents, we vacate that portion of the board's decision pertaining to the 2010 tax for 273 Concord Road and remand the matter for further consideration by the board.
The plaintiffs also sought an abatement for fiscal year 2011, but there is no evidence pertaining to that fiscal year in the record. The inadequate record precludes us from reviewing the plaintiffs' arguments with respect to fiscal year 2011. See Mass.R.A.P. 18(a), as amended, 425 Mass. 1602 (1997).
As to 0 Concord Road, which is valued, assessed, and taxed under G. L. c. 59 as undeveloped land, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any error in the board's decision. Although it is true that the plaintiffs purchased this "sliver" of unbuildable land for $100 from their neighbor, it does not follow unavoidably that the sales price is the fair market value. The sale was not an arm's-length transaction on the open market.
Discussion. "Exemption statutes are strictly construed." New England Forestry Foundation, Inc. v. Assessors of Hawley, 468 Mass. 138, 148 (2014). The party seeking an exemption bears the burden of proving its entitlement. Ibid. We will not disturb the decision of the board "if it is based on substantial evidence and on a concrete application of the law." Koch v. Commissioner of Rev., 416 Mass. 540, 555 (1993). "We limit ourselves in our review of this question to a determination whether the decision of the board is supported by substantial evidence. . . . Furthermore, '[o]ur determination must be made upon consideration of the entire record.'" Nashawena Trust v. Assessors of Gosnold, 398 Mass. 821, 825 (1986), quoting from New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 465-466 (1981).
As stated by the board, "[i]n abatement proceedings, 'the question is whether the assessment for the parcel of real estate, including both the land and structures thereon, is excessive. The component parts, on which that single assessment is laid, are each open to inquiry and revision by the appellate tribunal in reaching the conclusion whether that single assessment is excessive.' Massachusetts Gen[.] Hosp[.] v. Belmont, 238 Mass. 396, 403 (1921)."
Here, the plaintiffs' real estate tax bill shows only the value of the land and the value of the buildings thereon. It is the property tax card which sets out the various components of the valuation and the appraised value of each. The property tax card also sets out the use value for the various components, but for the purposes of this decision, we rely solely upon the appraised value.
The board determined that most of the plaintiffs' "contentions addressed only the valuation or classification of the various land components of the subject properties. . . . [T]axpayers do not conclusively establish a right to abatement merely by showing that their land is overvalued. 'The tax on a parcel of land and the building thereon is one tax . . . although for statistical purposes they may be valued separately.' Assessors of Brookline v. Prudential Ins[.] Co., 310 Mass. 300, 317 (1941)." Although we do not quarrel with this principle, we are troubled here in two respects by the manner in which the board appears to have applied it.
The board made no specific findings regarding the valuation of the property, stating instead that "the appellants' contentions relative to the misclassifications of the portions of the subject properties . . . did not address the issue of whether the subject assessments, as a whole, reflect the fair cash values of the subject properties for both fiscal years at issue." See Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Belmont, 238 Mass. at 402.
First, the board did not appear to have considered the methodology underlying the town's valuation of the prime site. According to the town's "Residential Land Valuation Narrative" for 2010, the value for land in neighborhood MA (to which the plaintiffs' property is assigned) is $576,000 per 80,000 square feet (i.e., $7.20 per square foot). That same document states that a factor of 1.00 should be applied to property within neighborhood MA. Nowhere in the town's valuation narrative is there a factor of 9.00; indeed, all the factors are 1.91 or less. The record does not show the origin of, or basis for, the factor of 9.00 or why the town applied it to the plaintiffs' property. Accordingly, on this record, we are not confident that the board could, or did, determine that the requirement of G. L. c. 61A, § 15, inserted by St 1973, c. 1118, § 1, that "all land occupied by a dwelling or regularly used for family living shall be valued, assessed, and taxed by the same standards, methods and procedures as other taxable property" was satisfied.
"Prime site is defined by the town as "[t]he first 80,000 [square feet] (1.84 acres) required under Lincoln zoning to have a conforming building site."
The plaintiffs also seek relief from the assignment of their property to an MA neighborhood. They seek reassignment to an XP neighborhood to reduce their tax bill. Based on the record before us, we discern no error in the board's determination that there was insufficient evidence submitted by the plaintiffs for reversal of the town's assignment of the property to the MA neighborhood.
At oral argument, town counsel stated that the valuation methodology for the prime site was related in some fashion to a previous decision of the Appellate Tax Board. But that information too is not in the record.
It is true that the plaintiffs bear the burden of proof for their claim against the town. In this instance, however, they were thwarted by the failure of the Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services to produce their records and certification review for the town for the year 2009.
Second, "[u]nder G. L. c. 61A, agricultural land is assessed at a rate significantly lower than its value under the highest and best use standard on which real property is typically assessed." Billerica v. Card, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 664, 666-667 (2006), citing Sudbury v. Scott, 439 Mass. 288, 294 (2003). The record shows that the town took the c. 61A designation into account with respect to the valuation of the nonprime site portions of the parcel. It does not follow, however, that the c. 61A designation was properly reflected in the valuation of the property as a whole. See Adams v. Assessors of Westport, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 183-184 (2010), quoting from Sudbury v. Scott, supra at 296 n.11 ("We strive to adopt a reading [of the exemption statute] 'consistent with purpose of the statute and in harmony with the statute as a whole,' . . . and we also bear in mind the general principle favoring strict construction of tax statutes to resolve doubt in favor of taxpayers"). The plaintiffs sufficiently raised -- and the record sufficiently supports -- the possibility that the unexplained factor of 9.00 on the prime site was employed to impermissibly offset the tax consequences of the c. 61A designation.
That portion of the board's decision relating 273 Concord Road for fiscal year 2010 is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the board for reconsideration and findings concerning the valuation of the prime site (and, particularly, the use of the factor of 9.00), and whether the valuation of the prime site impermissibly undermined the tax purpose and effect of G. L. c. 61A on the remainder of the parcel and on the valuation of the property as a whole. The decision is otherwise affirmed.
So ordered.
By the Court (Cohen, Grainger & Wolohojian, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: February 23, 2016.