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refusing to dismiss a claim for benefits against a plan administrator, but dismissing such a claim against an employer
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:01-CV-2097-G
April 19, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendants Boy Scouts of America ("BSA") and The Standard Insurance Company ("Standard") (collectively, "the defendants") to dismiss the claims of the plaintiff Raymond F. Sleater ("Sleater"). For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
In his complaint, Sleater included Boy Scouts of America Long Term Disability Income Plan ("the Plan") as a defendant. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 1, 9-10. The Plan, however, is not a party to this motion to dismiss. See Motion to Dismiss for Failtire to State a Claim and Notice of Motion of Defendants Boy Scouts of America and The Standard Insurance Company at 1. Also, the correct name for the Plan is "Boy Scouts of America Long Term Disability Income Benefit Plan." See Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim of Boy Scouts of America and The Standard Insurance Company at 2.
I. BACKGROUND
Sleater seeks to recover long-term disability benefits as well as attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") at 9. In support of this claim, Sleater alleges the following facts.
Sleater began working for BSA as a newsletter editor in May of 1985. Id. at 2. As a BSA employee, Sleater was eligible for a benefits program which included a long-term disability plan ("the Plan"). Id. Standard acted as BSA's claims administrator for the Plan. Id. at 3.
Sleater stopped working at BSA in February of 1999 due to severe back pain. Id. at 4. On March 5, 1999, Sleater submitted his claim to Standard for long-term disability benefits. Id. On August 12, 1999, Standard denied Sleater's claim. Id. at 5. Soon thereafter, Sleater requested — and was granted — a review of his claim. Id. at 5-6. On December 6, 1999, Standard denied Sleater's appeal. Id. at 6. Standard then forwarded Sleater's claim to its "Quality Assurance Unit" for an independent review. Id. at 6-7. The Quality Assurance Unit concluded that Standard had correctly denied Sleater's claims. Id. BSA adopted Standard's conclusions, thus denying Sleater long-term disability benefits. Id.
Sleater filed this suit on December 10, 2001 asserting causes of action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Specifically, Sleater brings one claim for non-payment of benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and another claim for attorneys' fees and costs under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Id. at 8-10. The defendants, contending that BSA and Standard are improper parties to a claim for ERISA benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), seek dismissal of Sleater's claims against BSA and Standard pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Notice of Motion of Defendants Boy Scouts of America and The Standard Insurance Company ("Motion") at 1-2.
II. ANALYSIS A. Standard for Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." However, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983) (citing Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1357 at 598 (1969), for the proposition that "the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.").
In determining whether dismissal should be granted, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and Sales System, Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994); Norman v. Apache Corporation, 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991).
Sleater seeks damages under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) for failure to provide ERISA benefits. See Complaint at 8-9. As a subsection of ERISA's civil enforcement provision. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) specifies the types of claims that may be brought by a beneficiary. The statute provides, in part, that a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
B. The Defendants' Grounds for Dismissal
The defendants contend that Sleater's claim against them should be dismissed because BSA and Standard are not proper parties to a 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) ERISA benefits claim. The defendants argue that the statute provides that the Plan is the sole proper party. Motion at 3. See Silvertooth v. UNUM Life Insurance Company of America No. Civ. A. 99-CV-0519-M, 2001 WL 21262 at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2001) (Lynn, J.) (holding that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) contains no provision allowing the plaintiff to recover from an entity besides the plan for underpayment of benefits.).
Sleater contends that both BSA and Standard are proper parties because another subsection of the ERISA statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d), expands the universe of parties that can be sued. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Response") at 4. That section of the statute provides:
Any money judgment under this subchapter against an employee benefit plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall not be enforceable against any other person unless liability against such person is established in his individual capacity under this subchapter.
Sleater argues that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2) "does not preclude suing other entities" and should be construed to mean that "if a party can establish liability against an entity — other than the employee benefit plan — it may certainly do so." Response at 4 (emphasis in the original).
Of the cases cited by Sleater to support this contention, however, Response at 7-8, only two — Daniel v. Eaton, 839 F.2d 263 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826 (1988), and Garren v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 114 F.3d 186 (11th Cir. 1997) — involved the statutory provision in question, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and neither applied § 1132(d)(2).
The defendants contend that § 1132(d) allows for entities beside the Plan to be sued only for breach of fiduciary duty, not for failure to provide ERISA benefits. Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim of Defendants Boy Scouts of America and The Standard Insurance Company ("Reply") at 3. The defendants argue that "the proper claim to be brought against fiduciaries is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(2)" and that Sleater has neither identified BSA or Standard as fiduciaries nor brought a claim against them for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 3-5. The court agrees with the defendants, see Reply at 5-6, that an employer is a proper defendant under § 1132(a)(2), not § 1132(a)(1)(B). See Silvertooth, 2001 WL 21262 at *5; see also Murphy v. Wal-Mart Associates' Group Health Plan, 928 F. Supp. 700, 709-10 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that there is no provision in § 1132(a)(1)(B) to support giving beneficiary a cause of action against any entity other than the plan and that § 1132(a)(2) allows a participant "to sue a fiduciary of the plan for breach of fiduciary duty.").
1. As Plan Administrator, Standard is a Proper Party
The Fifth Circuit has not decided whether plan administrators are proper parties to a 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) claim. Other courts have generally held, however, that suits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) may be brought only against the plan. See, e.g., Roig v. Limited Long Term Disability Program, No. Civ. A. 99-2460, 2000 WL 1146522 at *8.9 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2000); Murphy, 928 F. Supp. at 710; Silvertooth, 2001 WL 21262 at *5.
However, courts have distinguished cases where an entity undertakes the role of plan administrator. See Layes v. Mead Corporation, 132 F.3d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the insurance company, as designated administrator, was a proper party defendant to a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)); Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corporation, 887 F.2d at 1195, 1199 (2nd Cir. 1989) (holding that "[i]n a recovery of benefits claim, only the plan and the administrators and trustees of the plan in their capacity as such may be held liable.").
In this case, Standard was the Plan's designated Claims Administrator and, as such, is a proper party. See Complaint at 3. Therefore, the court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss Sleater's claims for relief against Standard.
The defendants further contend that Standard is not a proper party because Sleater never identified Standard as the Plan administrator. See Reply at 7. However, in his complaint, Sleater identifies Standard as "Claims Administrator for the Plan" responsible for receiving, processing, investigating and evaluating claims. See Complaint at 3. Also, Standard undertook the duty of administrator by processing Sleater's claim. See Complaint at 4-8.
2. As an Employer, BSA is not a Proper Party
In order for BSA, as the employer, to be a proper party to this suit, Sleater would have to show that BSA was administrator of the Plan. See Daniel, 839 F.2d at 266 (holding that "[u]nless an employer is shown to control administration of a plan, it is not a proper party defendant in an action concerning benefits"); see also Layes, 132 F.3d at 1249 (holding that the employer was not a proper party defendant because the insurance company was designated administrator of the long-term disability plan); Garren, 114 F.3d at 187 (holding that an employer that was designated as the Plan Administrator was a proper party defendant). Nowhere in his complaint does Sleater allege that BSA had any role or capacity other than that of employer. Sleater contends that BSA is a "party in interest" and possibly a "fiduciary" but supplies no information indicating that BSA functioned as Plan administrator. Response at 3-6. For this reason, it appears that BSA is not a proper party to this suit and should be dismissed.
To show that BSA fits into an ever-expanding realm of possible defendants, Sleater cites language from the case of Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 246 (2000). Response at 6. 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir. 1997) "[T]here can be no limit on `the universe of possible defendants' where the statute does not first establish one." Response at 6 (quoting Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 246.) However, Sleater fails to note that the Supreme Court in that case narrowed the universe of possible defendants by stressing that the ERISA statute "warrants a cautious approach to inferring remedies not expressly authorized by the text . . ." Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 246. Furthermore, the Court in Harris Trust dealt with a claim for breach of fiduciary responsibility, not a claim under § 1132(a)(1)(B). See id. at 241-42, 246.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The plaintiff's claims against BSA are DISMISSED. In all other respects, the defendants' motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.