Opinion
No. 45, 1999.
Submitted: November 23, 1999.
Decided: January 24, 2000.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County, in CR. A. Nos.: IK97-02-0093, 0094, IK97-05-0141, 0142, 0143, and 0144.
AFFIRMED.
Before WALSH, HARTNETT, and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 24th day of January, 2000, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court that:
1) Slade was convicted, after a jury trial, of two counts of delivery of cocaine, two counts of conspiracy in the second degree, and one count each of possession of cocaine and marijuana. Slade's only claim on appeal is that the Superior Court erred in refusing a plea bargain that he decided to accept during jury selection for his trial.
2) Several times, during the course of pre-trial preparations, the State offered to nolle prosse all other charges and recommend a three year sentence if Slade would plead guilty to attempted delivery of cocaine and theft. At his final case review, one week before trial, Slade again refused the plea offer. He changed his mind shortly after jury selection began on the day of trial, and told the court that he wanted to accept the plea.
3) The Superior Court asked Slade whether it was the same plea offer that he had rejected at the final case review, and whether anything had happened since the final case review to make Slade change his mind. Slade said that it was the same offer and that there were no changed circumstances that caused him to change position. The Superior Court then advised Slade that he could plead guilty to all of the charges or go to trial, but that it was too late to accept a plea offer. The court explained that Slade had not established good cause to deviate from the court's case management procedures, which require the State to make its best offer and the defendant to accept or reject that offer no later than the date of the final case review.
4) A defendant has no constitutional right to have the court accept a plea agreement. The decision to accept or refuse a plea is committed to the discretion of the trial court and this Court, therefore, reviews for abuse of discretion.
See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
See Howard v. State, Del. Supr., 458 A.2d 1180, 1185 (1983).
5) The Superior Court, like all trial courts, has inherent discretion to control its own docket and scheduling. Pursuant to that discretion, the Superior Court has established guidelines identifying final case review as the last time at which a plea may be tendered, absent good cause shown. Those guidelines are authorized by and consistent with Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e) (5), which provides that, "[e]xcept for good cause shown, notification of the existence of a plea agreement shall be given at . . . such . . . time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the court."
See United States v. Gamboa, 11th Cir., 166 F.3d 1327, 1331 (1999). See also United States v. Ellis, 5th Cir., 547 F.2d 863, 868 (1977).
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e) (5). See also Gamboa, 166 F.3d at 1331 ("courts may reject guilty pleas that are tendered after a deadline set by the court."); Ellis, 547 F.2d at 868 (upholding trial court's refusal to accept plea after deadline).
6) Slade could have accepted the plea at his final case review, but he declined and chose to go to trial. He has shown no "good cause" for his last minute change of heart. Accordingly, we find that the trial court acted well within its discretion in refusing to accept the plea after its deadline had expired.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger Justice