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Skripek v. Skripek

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
May 5, 1997
239 A.D.2d 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)

Opinion

May 5, 1997

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Orange County (DiBlasi, J.).


Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Initially, where as here, there is no allegation that the Trial Justice is legally disqualified from presiding over the proceeding ( see, Judiciary Law § 14), disqualification is only appropriate where the court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned ( see, Matter of Johnson v. Hornblass, 93 A.D.2d 732). On the record before this Court, we conclude that the Trial Justice did not improvidently exercise his discretion in concluding that his recusal was not warranted ( see, Matter of D'Alessio v. Gilberg, 208 A.D.2d 625).

Further, notwithstanding a party's good faith belief that a court's order raises a conflict and irrespective of how misguided and erroneous the court's order may be, a party is not free to disregard it and decide for himself the manner in which to proceed ( see, Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458; Matter of Balter v. Regan, 63 N.Y.2d 630, cert denied 469 U.S. 934; Matter of Village of St. Johnsville v. Triumpho, 220 A.D.2d 847, 848; Sprecher v. Port Washington Union Free School Dist., 166 A.D.2d 700). Courts have repeatedly held that criminal contempt proceedings do not fall within the scope of the automatic stay under section 362 (a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code ( 11 U.S.C. § 362[a]; see, In re Maloney, 204 B.R. 671; In re Moon, 201 B.R. 79, 84-85; In re Newman, 196 B.R. 700, 704; In re Campbell, 185 B.R. 628; In re Kearns, 168 B.R. 423; In re Rook, 102 B.R. 490, 493-494; see also, Scully v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 489 N.W.2d 389, 392-393 [Iowa]).

In the case herein, where the order appealed from clearly served to punish the defendant for disregarding a prior order of the court dated July 17, 1995, the order appealed from was issued to protect the dignity and the power of the court to regulate proceedings before it. Accordingly, the defendant was not at liberty to disregard the earlier order, where at the time it was issued, that order was facially valid and sufficiently clear ( see, 11 U.S.C. § 362[b][1], [4]; Matter of Rivera v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 501, 516; Sigmoil Resources N.V. v. Vittorio Lecca Ducagini Duca Di Gueveara Suardo Fabbri, 228 A.D.2d 335; Kampf v Worth, 108 A.D.2d 841, 842; In re Maloney, supra, 204 Bankr, at 671; In re Newman, supra, 196 Bankr, at 704; In re Campbell, supra., 185 Bankr, at 631; In re Rook, supra, 102 Bankr, at 495) and the court had jurisdiction over the matter ( see, In re Maloney, supra; In re Newman, supra). Thus, the court's adjudication of criminal contempt was proper.

Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Santucci and Altman, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Skripek v. Skripek

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
May 5, 1997
239 A.D.2d 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
Case details for

Skripek v. Skripek

Case Details

Full title:JUDI R. SKRIPEK, Respondent, v. JOSEPH P. SKRIPEK, Appellant

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: May 5, 1997

Citations

239 A.D.2d 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
658 N.Y.S.2d 62

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