Opinion
No. 2-14-1168
10-15-2015
NICHOLAS A. SKRIDLA, Administrator of the Estate of MARGARET E. SKRIDLA, deceased, NICHOLAS A. SKRIDLA, Personal Representative of MARGARET E. SKRIDLA, deceased, NICHOLAS A. SKRIDLA, as Father and Next Friend of MAXAMILLIAN J. A. SKRIDLA, a minor, and NICHOLAS A.SKRIDLA, Individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, f/k/a GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, a foreign limited liability company, DANA J. FANARA, and AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, a Michigan corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County.
No. 10-L-364
Honorable Eugene G. Doherty, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Zenoff and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Because spoliation of evidence is a derivative cause of action, the limitations period of the underlying action applies, and plaintiff's spoliation counts should have been dismissed pursuant to defendant's section 2-619.1 motion.
¶ 2 On February 19, 2014, plaintiff filed a forty-two-count, fourth-amended complaint for damages arising from an automobile accident involving his decedent and son on December 3, 2009. Only plaintiff's claims of spoliation of evidence against defendant Auto Owners Insurance Company (Auto Owners) (counts XXXVII through XLII) are the subject of this appeal. The claims against Auto Owners were added in the fourth-amended complaint, when Auto Owners was joined as a defendant. The other counts of this products liability and personal injury action remain pending in the trial court.
¶ 3 Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the spoliation counts with prejudice pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010)) on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action for spoliation against Auto Owners because plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to establish that Auto Owners owed a duty to plaintiff to preserve the evidence at issue.
¶ 4 Auto Owners argues on appeal that the dismissal was properly entered under section 2-615 and also maintains that the spoliation counts should have been dismissed for the additional reason that they were untimely, as Auto Owners argued in its combined section 2-619.1 motion (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010)) in the trial court. Both parties again argue the statute of limitations issue on appeal. We agree with Auto Owners that the spoliation counts were statutorily barred. Because we affirm dismissal of counts XXXVII through XLII on this basis, we do not reach the merits of plaintiff's section 2-615 arguments.
¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 6 According to plaintiff's fourth-amended complaint, plaintiff's wife, Margaret, and son, Maxamillian, were injured on December 3, 2009, when their stopped vehicle was rear ended by an automobile driven by defendant Dana Fanara. Margaret's injuries led to her death on January 24, 2012; Maxamillian survived.
¶ 7 On February 9, 2014, plaintiff filed his fourth-amended complaint, naming Fanara's automobile liability insurance carrier, Auto Owners, as a defendant. Plaintiff alleged that Auto Owners undertook an investigation of Fanara's vehicle, inspecting all damage to the vehicle, and, after completing its investigation, sold the vehicle for salvage. In so doing, plaintiff alleged, Auto Owners failed to download the sensory diagnostic module installed in the vehicle and also deprived plaintiff of any opportunity to download it, thereby destroying evidence as to Fanara's speed and braking prior to rear ending the vehicle driven by Margaret and carrying Maxamillian. Although plaintiff's complaint does not allege when the spoliation occurred, an exhibit attached to plaintiff's response to Auto Owners' motion to dismiss the spoliation counts indicates Fanara's vehicle was sold to the salvage company on January 21, 2010.
¶ 8 Plaintiff's spoliation claims were predicated upon wrongful death on behalf of Margaret (count XXXVII), survival on behalf of Margaret (count XXXVIII), spoliation on behalf of Maxamillian for his personal injury (count XXXIX), loss of consortium on behalf of Nicholas (count XXXX), family expense on behalf of Margaret for her personal injuries (count XXXXI), and family expense on behalf of Maxamillian for his personal injuries (count XXXXII).
¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 A motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2014)) admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but asserts an affirmative defense that defeats the claim. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 578-79 (2006.) We
review de novo the disposition of a motion for dismissal based on the statute of limitations. In re Marriage of Morreale, 351 Ill. App. 3d 238 (2004). On review, we may consider admissions in the record and exhibits that are attached to pleadings (Pearson v. Lake Forest Country Day School, 261 Ill. App. 3d 228, 231 (1994)), and we can sustain dismissal on any basis found in the record. Milo v. Alberto-Culver Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 822, 825 (1999). In addition, the application of a statute of limitations to a cause of action presents a legal question, which is also reviewed do novo. Travelers Casualty & Insurance Co. v. Bowman, 229 Ill. 2d 461, 466 (2003).
¶ 11 There is conflicting opinion in the Illinois Appellate Court as to the appropriate statute of limitations for a cause of action for spoliation of evidence. In Babich v. River Oaks Toyota, 377 Ill. App. 3d 425 (2007), the plaintiff filed products liability and negligent spoliation claims against the defendants. The First District held that the expiration of the limitations period for the plaintiff's products liability action precluded him from prosecuting his negligent spoliation action. Id. at 431. Citing Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 192-93 (1995), the court noted: "it is well settled that Illinois courts do not recognize negligent spoliation of evidence as an independent cause of action." Id. Rather, negligent spoliation is "a derivative action that arises out of other causes of action, including a negligence cause of action." Id. Therefore, the same statute of limitations applies to a negligent spoliation action as applies to the underlying cause of action. Id.
¶ 12 However, in Schusse v. Pace Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority, 334 Ill. App. 3d 960 (2002), the First District stated that, because the limitations period for the commencement of a negligent spoliation claim "is not otherwise provided for by statute," it is governed by the five-year period in section 13-205 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2014)). Id. at 970 (further holding that the cause of action may accrue on the date that the
evidence is destroyed). Schusse cited Cammon v. West Suburban Hospital Medical Center, 301 Ill. App. 3d 939 (1998), another First District case that held that the limitations period for a negligent spoliation claim is five years (set forth in section 13-205) because it is not otherwise provided for by statute. Id. at 951.
¶ 13 This court recently determined that Babich presents the better view. See Wofford v. Tracy, 2015 IL App (2d) 141220, ¶¶ 30-35 (holding that the limitations period of the underlying action applies because spoliation is a derivative cause of action). In Wofford, the plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants for negligence, spoliation, conspiracy, conversion, and res ipsa loquitur following a house fire. In their spoliation counts, plaintiffs alleged that, as a proximate result of defendants' destruction of evidence, they were prejudiced in that they " 'lost the opportunity to examine evidence from the fire scene to determine the cause, origin, and spread of the fire in order to successfully bring a personal injury lawsuit against [d]efendants.' " (Emphasis deleted.) Wofford, 2015 IL App (2d) 141220, ¶ 30. The trial court dismissed the spoliation claims with prejudice as time-barred and entered a finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010) that the spoliation of evidence counts were immediately appealable.
¶ 14 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the five-year statute of limitations in section 13-205 of the Code applied. Section 13-205 provides:
"[A]ctions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied, or on awards of arbitration, or to recover damages for an injury done to property, real or personal, or to recover the possession of personal property or damages for the detention or conversion thereof, and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued." 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2014).
The plaintiffs contended that section 13-205 should apply because a spoliation action does not arise from personal injuries, but from destruction of property. This court disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs' spoliation claims only sought recovery for personal injuries. Although the spoliation claims alleged the destruction of personalty to establish spoliation of evidence, the claims did not seek damages for the damage or destruction of personal property. The plaintiffs sought to establish that the destruction of evidentiary personalty entitled them to damages for personal injury. Wofford, 2015 IL App (2d) 141220, ¶ 30. The court found the proper focus to be the plaintiffs' underlying negligence claims and the recovery sought in those counts. Id. ¶ 34.
¶ 15 Following Babich, the court held that, "because spoliation is a derivative action, the limitations period of the underlying actions—section 13-202 [735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2014)]—applies." Wofford, 2015 IL App (2d) 141220, ¶ 35 (noting that this conclusion accounts for the fact that spoliation claims are not independent torts). We further noted our agreement with Schusse's statement that the discovery rule applies to determine the commencement of the limitations period. Id. n.7 (citing Schusse, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 970).
¶ 16 In Wofford, the fire, the plaintiffs' injuries, and the demolition of the property occurred on October 9, 2010, and soon thereafter. Thus, in order to comply with the two-year statute of limitations, the plaintiffs had to file their claim by about October 9, 2012. The plaintiffs filed their first complaint directed against the defendants on July 25, 2013, which was within the five-year property and catch-all damage statute, but not within the personal injury statute. See Wofford, 2015 IL App (2d) 141220, ¶ 31 n.6.
¶ 17 In this case, plaintiff's spoliation of evidence counts, with the exception of his wrongful death spoliation count, all arise from underlying actions for personal injury to another—survival (count 38), personal injury to Maxamillian Skridla, loss of consortium, and family expense due
to injuries to the deceased and the minor. Because these claims are actions "deriving from injury to the person of the other," they are subject to commencement "within the same period of time as actions for damages for injury to such other person." 735 ILCS 13-201 (West 2010). Thus, the two-year limitations period of section 13-202 applies to these personal injury actions. The two-year limitations period of section 180/2 of the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/2 (West 2010) applies to the wrongful death claim. Pursuant to Wofford, the two-year limitations periods of the underlying actions—sections 13-202 and 180/2—also apply to plaintiff's derivative spoliation actions. Wofford, 2015 IL App (2d) 141220, ¶ 35.
¶ 18 Plaintiff's personal injury causes of action accrued on the date of the accident, December 3, 2009; his wrongful death claims accrued at the time of Margaret's death, January 12, 2012. By plaintiff's own admission, Fanara's vehicle was sold for salvage on January 21, 2010. Plaintiff does not argue that he discovered the destruction on any other date. Thus, plaintiff had two years from January 21, 2010, or until January 21, 2012, to file spoliation claims arising from his personal injury actions. Such claims were not filed until February 9, 2014. Even if he had two years from Margaret's death, or until January 12, 2014, to file his spoliation claim arising under the Wrongful Death Act, the claim was untimely.
¶ 19 Plaintiff raises a concern, shared by the trial court, that unfairness to a plaintiff could result if the limitations period for a spoliation action begins to run on the same day as the limitations period for the underlying claim. We have alleviated this concern by holding that the commencement of the limitation period for a spoliation action may be postponed until the plaintiff knows or should have known of his or her injury. Wofford, 2015 IL App (2d) 141220, ¶ 35 n.7 (citing Schusse, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 970). As stated above, the discovery rule is not at issue in this case. In any event, the record shows that the destruction of Fanara's vehicle
occurred seven weeks after the accident, and plaintiff had two full years after that event in which to discover any spoliation injury.
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.
¶ 22 Affirmed.