Opinion
CV115015284S.
11-29-2012
Lauren SKAU v. John BEEBE, Jr.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETER EMMETT WIESE, Judge.
I
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, Lauren Skau, commenced a civil action against the defendant, John Beebe, Jr. The September 19, 2011 complaint alleges six causes of action: Counts 1, 2, and 3: breach of three loan agreement contracts; Count 4: malicious prosecution; Count 5: negligent misrepresentation; Count 6: abuse of process. In a pleading dated November 22, 2011, the self-represented defendant responded to the complaint with his answer and special defenses.
Briefly stated the special defenses generally alleged that no loan agreement existed and that Beebe had no involvement in the plaintiff's arrest by the Wethersfield Police Department for the alleged theft of his 1969 Corvette.
The case was tried to the court on September 11, 2012. Thereafter, the parties filed post-trial memoranda.
II
DISCUSSION
A.
Counts 1, 2, 3— Oral Loan Agreements
LAW
" The existence of a contract is a question of fact to be determined by the trier on the basis of all of the evidence ... In order for an enforceable contract to exist, the court must find that the parties' minds had truly met ... If there has been a misunderstanding between the parties, or a misapprehension by one or both so that their minds have never met, no contract has been entered into by them and the court will not make for them a contract which they themselves did not make ... [A]n agreement must be definite and certain as to its terms and requirements." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Germain v. St. Germain, 135 Conn.App. 329, 333, 41 A.3d 1126 (2012) (finding breach of oral contract).
FACTS
From the credible evidence presented, the court finds the following facts to have been proven.
Skau is employed as a speech pathologist in a public school system. Beebe was self-employed as a contractor in the flooring business. He is now employed by a construction company that performs concrete work. The parties formally had a romantic relationship, which lasted for approximately seven years. They cohabited at her home located at 405 Brimfield Road, Wethersfield, Connecticut for approximately six years. During this period of time, Skau made a number of loans to the defendant. The relationship ended in February 2010. However, the defendant continued to reside at her home until September 2010. In the latter part of 2010 and 2011, the relationship deteriorated to the point where it became very contentious and adversarial.
In April 2010, the parties decided to go on a vacation in Key West, Florida. They agreed to rent a condominium unit for $2000 and split the cost. Skau paid the condominium owner the rental charge in four separate checks of $500. (Plaintiff's Ex. 1.) In July 2010, the parties vacationed at the condominium in accordance with their agreement. The defendant has not fulfilled his obligation and reimbursed Skau for his one-half share of the rental cost, $1,000.
In years 2007 and 2008, the parties rented the same condominium unit and split the cost of the rental.
In August 2009, Beebe informed Skau that he wished to purchase a 1969 Corvette from his friend, Rob Point. The purchase price was $10,000; however, Beebe did not have money to make the purchase. Instead, Skau agreed to loan the funds to Beebe and he agreed to repay the debt within ninety days. In accordance with this agreement, the plaintiff executed a check dated August 20, 2009, in the amount of $10,000 payable to Rob Point. (Plaintiff's Ex. 2.) The Corvette was purchased and registered in Beebe's name as sole owner.
Beebe made two payments of $2,500, leaving a balance of $5,000. (Plaintiff's Ex. 3.) These payments were deposited in Skau's Webster Bank checking account on October 16, 2009 and December 2, 2009. (Plaintiff's Ex. 4.)
On July 31, 2010, Skau loaned Beebe $1,100 to enable him to pay taxes and insurance for his flooring business. This loan was made through Skau's personal checking account to Beebe. (Plaintiff's Ex. 5.) Beebe agreed to repay the loan in an unspecified short period of time. On August 15, 2010, Beebe made a $600 payment to the plaintiff on his various loans. (Plaintiff's Ex. 6.)
Commencing in November 2010, Skau permitted Beebe to store his personal property in her garage for a fee of $50 per month. Beebe made the first payment by personal check dated October 27, 2010. (Plaintiff's Ex. 7.) In the memo portion of the check it is written " Garage— Nov." Id. The defendant's property remained in the garage through June 2011; however, he unsuccessfully attempted to retrieve it in February 2011. Beebe did not make any additional rental payments beyond November. There is presently due and owing two month's rent totaling $100.
The court finds that Skau has proven that Beebe is indebted to her in a total amount of $6,600 for the loans discussed above.
B.
Counts 4, 5, 6
Count 4— Malicious Prosecution
LAW
" An action for malicious prosecution against a private person requires a plaintiff to prove that: (1) the defendant initiated or procured the institution of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff; (2) the criminal proceedings have terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the defendant acted without probable cause; and (4) the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhatia v. Debek, 287 Conn. 397, 404, 948 A.2d 1009 (2008).
Count 5— Negligent Misrepresentation
LAW
" Traditionally, an action for negligent misrepresentation requires the plaintiff to establish (1) that the defendant made a misrepresentation of fact (2) that the defendant knew or should have known was false, and (3) that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation, and (4) suffered pecuniary harm as a result." Nazami v. Patrons Mutual Ins. Co., 280 Conn. 619, 626, 910 A.2d 209 (2006). " [N]o special relationship is required to state a claim of negligent misrepresentation ... [but] the plaintiff must allege and prove that the reliance on the misstatement was justified or reasonable. We have consistently held that reasonableness is a question of fact for the trier to determine based on all of the circumstances." Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 579-80, 657 A.2d 212 (1995).
Count 6— Abuse of Process
LAW
" An action for abuse of process lies against any person using a legal process against another in an improper manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed ... Because the tort arises out of the accomplishment of a result that could not be achieved by the proper and successful use of process, the Restatement Second (1977) of Torts, § 682, emphasizes that the gravamen of the action for abuse of process is the use of a legal process ... against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed ... Comment b to § 682 explains that the addition of ‘ primarily’ is meant to exclude liability ‘ when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant.’ " (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 494, 529 A.2d 171 (1987).
FACTS
In the present case, Beebe's 1969 Corvette was stored in Skau's garage along with a significant amount of various items of his personal property. The car was placed on an automobile lift in an elevated position. The wheels had been removed from the Corvette. Skau testified that they had been stored in her basement to make room in the garage. Skau indicated that in the months of January and February 2011, she made it known to Beebe that he had to remove his property from her garage. She indicated that she gave him thirty days to accomplish this task. Skau testified that she offered Beebe $6000 for the Corvette and car lift.
On April 27, 2011, Skau was arrested by the Wethersfield police for larceny, pursuant to a warrant for the theft of the Corvette. Skau was processed following her arrest and released on a $25,000 surety bond. The criminal larceny charges were subsequently dismissed.
The arrest warrant and affidavit were not made a part of the evidence. Additionally, no member of the Wethersfield Police Department testified about the events surrounding the arrest warrant.
At the time of her arrest, Skau was aware that the Corvette was registered in Beebe's name. However, on or about that point in time, Skau had commenced prejudgment remedy proceedings to collect the monies owed to her including the car loan.
Skau asserts that Beebe falsely accused her of larceny in retaliation for the debt collection action. Skau claims damages: attorneys fees: $1,500; surety bond cost: $1,000; stress and humiliation: $10,000.
Beebe's recollection of the events is diametrically opposed to Skau's. He testified that he attempted to retrieve his property in February 2011, but Skau obstructed his efforts. In February 2011, he requested the assistance of the Wethersfield police. Beebe wanted a police officer to accompany him to Skau's residence when he removed his property from the garage. During this period of time, the police warned Skau that she would be arrested if the property was not returned. Beebe contends that as of the time of the trial, a quantity of his property remains in the garage. Beebe denies that was his intent to have Skau arrested, and it was not done at his insistence. However, he acknowledges that he contacted the police on several occasions.
The burden is on Skau to prove her three claims outlined as outlined above. The court finds that Skau has not sustained the burden of proof on Counts 4-6. Specifically, the court rules this way because no evidence regarding the circumstances of the arrest was presented at trial beyond Skau's conclusory assertions. As a result, Skau has failed to demonstrate that she was arrested at the insistence of Beebe, and that he acted with malice; that Beebe used legal process against Skau primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed; nor that Beebe negligently misrepresented any statements to the Wethersfield Police Department. The court simply cannot speculate regarding these matters. Accordingly, the court finds that Skau has failed to sustain her burden of proof on these issues.
III
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Skau has sustained her burden of proof on Counts 1-3, but not Counts 4-6. Accordingly, judgment shall enter in favor of Skau as against Beebe on Counts 1-3 in the total amount of $6,600 plus taxable costs. Judgment shall enter in favor of Beebe on Counts 4-6.
SO ORDERED.