Opinion
16-P-1103
06-12-2017
BODHISATTVA SKANDHA v. WILLIAM BATES.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, a pro se litigant presently incarcerated at M.C.I., Norfolk, is a practicing Pure Land Buddhist who, since 2010, has received religious vegan meals from a special menu. He alleges that, beginning in 2010, in accordance with that menu, he was provided with fresh, chemical-free fruit juice for breakfast, lunch, and dinner, but that beginning in February, 2013, the defendant began substituting a certain powdered drink mix for the fresh juice at the lunch and dinner meals. Objecting on religious grounds to some of the ingredients in the powdered drink mix, the plaintiff commenced this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to curb the defendant's use of the mix in the plaintiff's meals.
By supporting affidavit, the plaintiff avers that he does not eat or drink anything that is "contaminated by animal beings."
The defendant averred that inmates on the halal, vegetarian, kosher, and vegan diets are served the powdered drink beverages at lunch and dinner, and that the powdered drink mix is certified as halal, kosher, and vegan and selected by the Department of Correction's director of food services for use in all prison facilities.
On March 4, 2016, after hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding under the familiar standard set forth in Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 615-616 (1980), that the plaintiff had not met his burden of establishing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The plaintiff sought reconsideration and, on April 13, 2016, the judge denied his motion. The plaintiff did not appeal from either order.
On July 8, 2016, the plaintiff refiled virtually the same motion for a preliminary injunction. By order entered on July 15, 2016, a second Superior Court judge denied the motion as having been both originally denied, and denied upon reconsideration, by the first judge. The plaintiff now appeals from the order of the second judge only. By refiling or renewing the same motion in substance, the plaintiff essentially was again seeking reconsideration of the first judge's rulings. As such, the second judge did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief in these circumstances. See McGrath v. McGrath, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 670, 671-672 (2006) (appeal under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., from denial of reconsideration of earlier interlocutory order from which no appeal was taken not properly before appellate court).
Order entered July 15, 2016, affirmed.
By the Court (Meade, Hanlon & Sacks, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: June 12, 2017.