Opinion
No. 91-01412.
Decided May 14, 1992.
Bruce H. Meizlish, for plaintiff.
Lee Fisher, Attorney General, and Stephanie D. Pestello-Sharf, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
On May 29, 1989, plaintiff, Eddie Sizemore, was arrested in Warren County, Ohio for operating his motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (OMVI). He was subsequently convicted in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas on August 10, 1989. Because plaintiff had ten prior OMVI convictions, he was sentenced to six months in the county jail and his driver's license was suspended for ten years.
At the time of this incident, plaintiff was employed as a corrections officer at the Lebanon Correctional Institution ("LCI"). On April 27, 1989, LCI had issued a rule requiring all corrections officers on active duty to have a valid Ohio driver's license. The reasons given for such a rule were that it is necessary for corrections officers to be able to transport prisoners to such places as hospitals, courts and other prisons; and in emergency situations, such as a prison break or escape, it is necessary that corrections officers be able to drive.
Prisoners at LCI read of plaintiff's eleventh OMVI conviction in the local newspaper. This item was widely discussed by the prison population and the local community.
LCI discharged plaintiff from his employment on December 20, 1989. The reasons given for the discharge were that plaintiff did not have a valid Ohio driver's license as required for his position, and that plaintiff violated its Standard of Conduct that required employees not to take actions that could compromise or impair their ability to effectively perform their job functions.
Plaintiff filed this action seeking back pay and reinstatement. The matter came on for trial regarding the sole issue of liability on March 9, 1992.
During the course of trial, plaintiff contended that he was discriminated against by LCI because he was discharged as a result of his handicap (alcoholism) and that LCI failed to reasonably accommodate his handicap. Defendant contests such contentions and asserts that plaintiff was lawfully discharged.
Plaintiff's first contention is that he was discriminated against by LCI because he was discharged as a result of his handicap, alcoholism. The law in Ohio regarding what constitutes an unlawful discriminatory practice is found in R.C. 4112.02. The section of R.C. 4112.02 pertinent to this case is R.C. 4112.02(A), which provides in part:
"It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
"(A) For any employer, because of the * * * handicap * * * of any person, to discharge without just cause * * * or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to * * * tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment."
Thus, in order for plaintiff to prevail in his first contention, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was handicapped, and that he was discharged as a result of his handicap.
In Ohio, alcoholism is a handicap. Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 279, 25 OBR 331, 496 N.E.2d 478. In order to prove that a person is an alcoholic, there must be more than the self-serving statements of the person claiming the handicap. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1989), 58 Ohio App.3d 20, 567 N.E.2d 1325. At a minimum, there must be medical evidence to support a finding that a person is an alcoholic. Id. In the case at bar, plaintiff did not present evidence outside his own testimony to support a finding that he was an alcoholic. The mere fact that plaintiff violated the OMVI law of this state on eleven separate occasions does not prove plaintiff is alcoholic. Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is an alcoholic and thus handicapped. The failure of plaintiff to prove that he is handicapped precludes the court from finding that he was discriminated against. Accordingly, plaintiff's action must fail.
Even if this court were to assume that plaintiff proved he was an alcoholic, the court would still find that the discharge of plaintiff was not discriminatory. Plaintiff can prevail only if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discharged as a result of a handicap, not for just cause. For the reasons set forth below, the court concludes that plaintiff was discharged for just cause, not because of a handicap.
The failure of a handicapped employee to fulfill all the requirements for his job gives the employer just cause to discharge the employee. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1989), 58 Ohio App.3d 20, 567 N.E.2d 1325. In the case at bar, LCI required all corrections officers to have a valid Ohio driver's license. When plaintiff's driver's license was suspended for ten years as a result of his eleventh OMVI conviction, he no longer satisfied this requirement for his job. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff's failure to have a valid Ohio driver's license was just cause for his removal.
In addition, LCI argued that it had just cause to discharge plaintiff because he violated its Standard of Conduct that required employees not to take actions that could compromise or impair their ability to effectively perform their job functions. The gravamen of LCI's argument is that since the prison community was aware of plaintiff's conviction and incarceration for his eleventh OMVI, his credibility with the prisoners was nullified, and thus his ability to effectively perform his job was compromised or impaired. The court finds LCI's argument to be credible. Hence, the court adopts said argument in finding that plaintiff violated its standard of conduct for its employees, and that this was just cause for his removal.
Plaintiff's second contention is that LCI had a duty to reasonably accommodate his handicap, and that it breached this duty. The court finds that plaintiff has not proved he was handicapped. There was, therefore, no handicap for LCI to accommodate.
Even if we assume that plaintiff proved he was handicapped, the court would still not find that LCI had a duty to reasonably accommodate his handicap. Where a handicapped employee is discharged from his employment for just cause, not because of a handicap, the employer has no duty to reasonably accommodate a handicap of the employee. Salazar v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm. (1987), 39 Ohio App.3d 26, 528 N.E.2d 1303. Since plaintiff was discharged for cause, the court finds that LCI had no duty to reasonably accommodate his handicap.
The court further finds that LCI did take steps to accommodate plaintiff in the past when it approved a thirty day leave in 1987 so that plaintiff could enter an alcohol treatment program.
Plaintiff asserts that discharging him because he did not have a valid driver's license was unnecessary, because LCI could have accommodated him by either not putting him in a position where he would be required to drive, or teaming him with other corrections officers who could drive for him. In effect, plaintiff is not requesting that LCI accommodate his handicap, alcoholism, but rather that LCI accommodate a sanction, the suspension of his driver's license. This is not a situation where an individual cannot obtain a driver's license because of a medical condition, where such accommodation proposed by plaintiff might be reasonable. This is a situation in which plaintiff lost his driver's license because of his repeated violations of the law. Plaintiff did not lose his license because he was alcoholic, but because he broke the OMVI statute of Ohio on eleven separate occasions. Therefore, the court finds that accommodation for plaintiff's actions to be inappropriate.
Nevertheless, the court will analyze plaintiff's assertions as if he were requesting LCI to accommodate a handicap. To determine whether an accommodation is reasonable, the court must weigh the accommodation against the hardship it imposes on the employer. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., supra. The burden of showing that an accommodation is unreasonable is on the employer. Id. LCI argues that the accommodations proposed by plaintiff would impose undue hardship so as to be unreasonable. More specifically, LCI asserts that such accommodations would create scheduling problems, require realignment of employees' duties, open the floodgates as to other employees requesting similar accommodations, and expose LCI to potential civil liability. The court finds that when viewing these aforesaid problems in their totality, LCI has met its burden in showing that the accommodations proposed by plaintiff would be unreasonable.
The court is especially concerned with the potential civil liability that LCI would face if it were required to accommodate and thus retain plaintiff. If some emergency occurred, such as a prison break, where the need for plaintiff to be driving a motor vehicle would be unavoidable and plaintiff were involved in some personal injury or property damage accident as a result of his actions, LCI would be subject to civil liability. Such a burden will not be imposed on LCI by this court.
In view of the above, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has a right to relief. Accordingly, the court hereby renders judgment for defendant.
Judgment for defendant.