Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-2264 SECTION: "R" (5)
October 16, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion by defendants, the Rouse Company and Rouse Oakwood Shopping Center, for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mary Singleton filed this lawsuit after she was fired from her job with Rouse Oakwood Shopping Center, Inc. ("Oakwood"). From 1988 until 1999, Singleton worked as a custodian for the Rouse affiliated companies at the Riverwalk Shopping Center. During that time, Singleton was promoted to lead custodian and then to single-shift supervisor over maintenance and the food court. Her employment evaluations reflected that she met or exceeded company expectations for work quality, work quantity, reliability, and dependability, but she sometimes did not fully meet company expectations for effectiveness in dealing with people.
On November 9, 1999, Singleton was promoted to Maintenance Supervisor at Oakwood Shopping Center. In this position, she reported directly to Sherman Rogers, the operations manager. Singleton was responsible for supervising the activities of custodial and food court employees, which included creating schedules, ensuring cleanliness, and controlling daily operations. Singleton and Rogers reported to Melinda Benson, the general manager. Singleton had worked under Benson at Riverwalk Shopping Center.
Singleton's duties at Oakwood included motivating and developing personnel and maintaining close liaison with Rogers. Very soon after she began working at Oakwood, Singleton discovered that a co-employee, Gloria Martin, believed that Rogers had sexually harassed her. Pursuant to company policy, Singleton reported this allegation, but to the wrong person. Although she knew that she should bring the complaint to the general manager, she brought it instead to Sonny Mounicou, the security director. The security director took Singleton's and Martin's statements and began an investigation, which the general manager completed. The investigation revealed that Rogers and Martin often joked around with each other. Nonetheless, the general manager wrote a memorandum to Rogers, on which the home office manager was copied, expressly forbidding similar conduct in the future and requiring Rogers to review the workplace harassment policy and to watch a training video. After this, it appears that Rogers did not engage in the complained of conduct again.
Over the ensuing months, the general manager received a number of complaints about Singleton's conduct from other employees. In January 2000, one of Singleton's subordinates filed a report with the security office that Singleton physically intimidated her in Singleton's office and injured her shoulder in the doorway. As this employee made her report, Singleton entered the security office and engaged in a heated argument with her, to the point that the security officer had to demand that they calm down. Singleton denies having physically intimidated or hurt the employee.
In April 2000, another of Singleton's employees complained to the general manager that Singleton had physically pushed her into a chair while "hooping and hollering," and that Singleton had not allowed her to be paid for certain tasks she had performed.
On April 20, 2000, another employee complained to the general manager that Singleton had made demeaning comments about her in the presence of several coworkers. She said that she believed Singleton was using her authority over scheduling against her. Singleton admits to yelling at this employee, but she claimed this was in reaction to the employee's yelling and cursing at her.
Singleton admits that her relations with Rogers were always tense. She attributes this to differences in management style and personality. Many coworkers repeatedly witnessed arguments between Singleton and Rogers, which were sometimes very acrimonious. Singleton often complained to the general manager and the home office manager about Rogers. In the spring of 2000, the general manager scheduled weekly meetings with Singleton and Rogers in order to improve communications between them. Singleton admits that whenever the general manager met with Singleton and Rogers to discuss a problem, the general manager gave them both directives on how to proceed or improve.
The general manager wrote a memorandum to Rogers on March 8, 2000 insisting that he find ways to improve his relationship with Singleton. On July 17, 2000, the general manager wrote a memorandum to Singleton, informing her that the general manager had heard from several employees that Singleton was soliciting employees to complain about Rogers even if there were no grounds for a complaint. She also told Singleton that it had come to her attention that Singleton sometimes called employees "stupid." The general manager insisted that Singleton cease these acts. She also told Singleton that she had recently witnessed improvement in Rogers' attitude towards Singleton, but that Singleton had not reciprocated. The general manager informed Singleton that her job would be in jeopardy if she did not improve her relationship with Rogers and with other employees generally.
On August 9, 2000 and on August 12, 2000, Rogers issued written reports stating that Singleton had failed to follow his instructions and to provide assistance in two separate incidents in the mall involving safety risks to customers. In the first report, Rogers recommended that Singleton be suspended without pay for five days and that any future violations result in her termination. In the second report, Rogers indicated that this would be Singleton's last warning. On August 10, 2000, Rogers wrote Singleton a memo indicating that her presence would not be required at the regular weekly staff meeting. When Singleton complained to the home office manager, he remedied the situation, and Rogers contacted her to invite her back to the meetings.
On August 25, 2000, a management employee, Paula Baldwin, filed a report with the security director in which she complained that Singleton had engaged in threatening, intimidating, and inappropriate behavior. The security director reported that Baldwin was visibly frightened and upset when she filed the report. Singleton, who had already received a gift certificate as a member of Oakwood's Premier Shoppers' Club, had contacted Baldwin and her assistant to acquire a second certificate to buy tennis shoes for her granddaughter. Baldwin reported that, when she explained to Singleton that it would violate Oakwood's ethics policy for her to receive another certificate, Singleton repeatedly harassed Baldwin about it in an intimidating and aggressive manner. Singleton asserts that she and Baldwin were simply joking around. Baldwin reported that this incident was not a matter of joking.
The security director conducted an investigation of the incident, which included taking the statements of Baldwin, her assistant, and Singleton. On August 29, 2000, the security director gave Singleton notice that she would be placed on paid suspension during the investigation. The security director conducted the investigation, and the general manager and home office manager, as well as The Rouse Company's counsel, reviewed it. On September 1, 2000, the security director and the general manager met with Singleton to terminate her employment, explaining to her that she was being terminated because (1) she sought to obtain an additional gift certificate to which she was not entitled with the knowledge that this was against company policy, and (2) she had a history of unacceptable, aggressive, and intimidating behavior toward with fellow workers, for which she was previously disciplined, which had surfaced again in the gift certificate incident.
Singleton filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on September 5, 2000. The EEOC issued a no cause determination and granted Singleton a right to sue notice. Singleton sued the defendants, claiming that they terminated her in retaliation for reporting Sherman Rogers' sexual harassment of Gloria Martin, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a). Defendants moved for summary judgment.
Plaintiff argues in her opposition brief that defendants' motion is premature because plaintiff had not yet taken the deposition of Melinda Benson. The Court has ascertained that plaintiff since decided not to take that deposition. ( See Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.)
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551 (1986). The court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993). A factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, LLC, 2001 WL 1650961 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted)
If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
The Fifth Circuit has "arguably articulated an even more element standard for summary judgment in certain nonjury cases." Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 273 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1987). In Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit explained:
If decision is to be reached by the court, and there are no issues of witness credibility, the court may conclude on the basis of the affidavits, depositions, and stipulations before it, that there are no genuine issues of material fact, even though decision may depend on inferences to be drawn from what has been incontrovertibly proved.
Therefore, in a nonjury case, such as this case, the Court is encouraged to draw inferences, even when they appear to be factual, if a "trial on the merits would reveal no additional data." Id. at 1124; see also Professional Geophysics, Inc. v. Placid Oil Co., 932 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1991)
B. Title VII Retaliation Claim
In Title VII retaliation cases, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing "(1) that he engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action." Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Raggs v. Miss. Power Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir. 2002). The requirement of a causal link does not rise to the level of a "but for" standard. Id. Once the plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendants to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose for the adverse employment action. Id.; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). If defendants satisfy this burden, then plaintiff must establish that the nondiscriminatory purpose asserted by defendants is "merely a pretext for the real, discriminatory purpose." Gee, 289 F.3d at 345; Rubinstein v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2000). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant need establish only that an issue of material fact exists as to whether the reason for the adverse employment action is merely a pretext. Gee, 289 F.3d at 345.
The first step is to determine whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of Title VII. The parties agree that Singleton has satisfied the first two prongs of her prima facie case. First, the parties agree that Singleton engaged in the protected conduct of reporting her supervisor's alleged sexual harassment of another employee to Oakwood's general manager. Second, the parties agree that Singleton suffered an adverse employment action in August 2000 when she was terminated.
At issue here is whether plaintiff has established the third element of a prima facie case, that is, a causal connection between her protected conduct and the adverse employment action. The Fifth Circuit has found that a plaintiff can satisfy this element by showing that only a short amount of time lapsed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001). On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has held that a ten-month lapse between the protected conduct and adverse employment action "suggests that a retaliatory motive was highly unlikely." Grizzle v. The Travelers Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 1994). This Court recently found that a fifteen-month lapse made the causal connection "doubtful." Washington v. Park `N Fly, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20590, at *15 (E.D. La. 2001). In this case, Singleton's termination (August 29, 2000) took place nearly ten months after she engaged in protected conduct (early November, 1999). Thus, Singleton's case falls directly into the Grizzle model, rendering a retaliatory motive "highly unlikely."
In deciding whether a plaintiff has established an inference of a causal connection, a court should also consider the identity of the final decisionmaker. See, e.g., Mato v. Baldauf, 267 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 2001); Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1996). Circumstantial evidence of retaliation may include proof that the person whose practices were challenged by an employee was the same person who decided to take an adverse employment action against that employee. Fierros v. Texas Department of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 195-96 (5th Cir. 2001). That is not the case here, because the person whose practices were challenged by Singleton — Rogers — recommended Singleton's termination, but he was not the final decisionmaker. In Mato and Long, the Fifth Circuit expressly held that if a plaintiff's supervisor appeared to have retaliatory animus toward the plaintiff and recommended to the final decisionmaker that the plaintiff be fired, the supervisor's retaliatory animus would not be imputed to the final decisionmaker if the employer conducted an independent investigation before reaching a decision. See Mato, 267 F.3d at 450; Long, 88 F.3d at 306-07.
In this case, there is evidence that Rogers recommended that Singleton be terminated on a few occasions and that he twice documented this recommendation in her personnel file. ( See Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Exs. L, N, P.) There is also evidence that throughout Singleton's employment, the general manager independently reviewed Rogers' and Singleton's complaints about each another and sanctioned both Rogers and Singleton when appropriate. (See Dep. of Mary Singleton, attached to Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A at 90.) Moreover, the security director conducted an independent investigation of the last incident that defendants argue triggered Singleton's termination, concerning which Rogers had no involvement or input. (See Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Exs. Q-W.) Lastly, the general manager, the home office manager, and The Rouse's Company's counsel reviewed the security director's findings before deciding to terminate Singleton. (See Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. X.) Singleton has brought forth no evidence that Rogers had any influence or part in this investigation and decision. Hence, this Court finds that, if indeed Rogers did have retaliatory animus towards Singleton, Rogers' animus may not be imputed to the management of Oakwood or The Rouse Company.
The court should also consider whether the plaintiff has presented any direct evidence of retaliatory animus on the part of those with the authority to terminate her. See Mato, 267 F.3d at 452. The Court finds that Singleton has not presented any direct evidence of retaliatory animus on the part of the general manager who was in charge of handling the conflicts between Singleton and Rogers. In fact, the Court finds that the evidence manager who was in charge of handling the conflicts between Singleton and Rogers. In fact, the Court finds that the evidence is to the contrary. For example, the general manager responded promptly and effectively to Singleton's initial report of Rogers' alleged sexual harassment of an employee. ( See Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ, J. Ex. F; Dep. of Mary Singleton, attached to Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A at 70-72.) She also did not discourage Singleton from reporting similar future allegations. ( See Dep. of Mary Singleton, attached to Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A at 71.) Her only criticism of Singleton was that Singleton had brought the complaint to the wrong superior, the security director, rather than to her. ( See Dep. of Mary Singleton, attached to Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A at 139, 153, 168, 170.) Moreover, throughout Singletons employment, the general manager dealt with Rogers and Singleton evenhandedly, and there is no evidence that she favored Rogers or sanctioned Singleton based on Singleton's protected conduct. ( See Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A at 164.)
Based on a combined analysis of the time lapse between the plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse employment action, the identity of the final decisionmaker, and the lack of direct evidence of retaliatory animus by the final decisionmaker, this Court finds that the plaintiff has not made out a prima facie
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.