Opinion
Civil Action No.: 1:18-cv-03549-JMC
09-10-2020
Jermaine Earl Singleton, Plaintiff, v. Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
ORDER
This matter is before the court for review of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("Report") filed on March 13, 2020. (ECF No. 15.) The Report addresses Plaintiff Jermaine Earl Singleton's ("Plaintiff") claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). (Id. at 1.) The Report recommends that the court affirm the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration ("the Commissioner"). (Id. at 52-53.) For the reasons stated herein, the court ACCEPTS the Report and AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Report sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards, which this court incorporates herein without a full recitation. (Id. at 1-40.) As brief background, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined Plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act ("the Act") and denied Plaintiff's claim for DIB. (ECF No. 6-2 at 24.) Although the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease, status post spinal cord stimulator, chronic kidney disease, congestive heart failure, diabetes mellitus, obesity, and right carpal tunnel syndrome (Id. at 17), the ALJ nonetheless concluded Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform sedentary work with additional restrictions (Id. at 21).
Thereafter, the Appeals Council ("the Council") denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Id. at 2.) Thus, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.) See also Meyer v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating an ALJ's decision was the final decision of the Commissioner when the Council denied a request for review); Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding the Commissioner's "final decision" includes when the Council denies a request for review). Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 21, 2018. (ECF No. 1.)
Subsequently, the Magistrate Judge issued the Report finding the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence and suggesting this case be affirmed. (ECF No. 15 at 52-53.) Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff's impairments and appropriately discounted Plaintiff's subjective complaints as "not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence of record." (Id. at 43.) The Magistrate Judge observed the ALJ "cited various evidence to support her partial rejection of his allegations," despite Plaintiff's claim to the contrary. (Id.) Next, the Magistrate Judge suggested finding no conflict between vocational expert testimony and the Dictionary of Occupancy Titles ("DOT") despite the fact the DOT was silent on a limitation (here, Plaintiff's use of a cane), and cited to several district courts within the Fourth Circuit for support. (Id. at 49.) Lastly, the Magistrate Judge explained that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's RFC formulation because Plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome showed improvement in the medical record. (Id. at 52.)
On March 13, 2020, the parties were apprised of their opportunity to file specific objections to the Report. (Id. at 54.) Plaintiff thereafter offered timely objections to the Report, including allegations that the ALJ misevaluated his impairments, failed to resolve a conflict between the vocational expert and DOT, and unsuccessfully accounted for limitations related to carpal tunnel syndrome. (ECF No. 18 at 2-6.) In response to Plaintiff's objections, the Commissioner asks the court to adopt the Report because Plaintiff's objections simply rehash arguments already considered and addressed by the Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 19 at 1-3.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge's Report is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to this court, and the recommendation has no presumptive weight. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. Id. at 271. As such, the court is charged with making de novo determinations of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). In the absence of specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report, the court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the Report. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Rather, "in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 72 advisory committee's note). Thus, the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. Id.
The Act provides that "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). While the court is free to conduct a de novo review of the Report, the court's review of the Commissioner's final decision is "limited to determining whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied." Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); Preston v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 988, 990 (4th Cir. 1985)). "Substantial evidence has been defined innumerable times as more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964). When assessing whether the ALJ possessed substantial evidence, the court may not "re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)). As such, the court is tasked with a "specific and narrow" review under the Act. Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff offers three objections to the Report: (1) "[s]ubstantial evidence does not support the ALJ's rejection of the evidence regarding [Plaintiff's] multiple impairments"; (2) "[t]he ALJ erred by failing to resolve the conflict between the [vocational expert] testimony and the [DOT]"; and (3) "[t]he ALJ failed to account for limitations arising from [Plaintiff's] Carpal Tunnel Syndrome." (ECF No. 18 at 2, 4, 6.) The Commissioner counters that the Magistrate Judge previously examined and addressed such arguments in the Report. (ECF No. 19 at 1-3.)
"The purpose of magistrate review is to conserve judicial resources." Nichols v. Colvin, 100 F. Supp. 3d 487, 497 (E.D. Va. 2015). Generally, a party's objection to a magistrate judge's report must be "specific and particularized" in order to facilitate review by a district court. United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 621 (4th Cir. 2007). "An 'objection' that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate's suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an 'objection' as that term is used in this context." Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Thus, a de novo review is unnecessary for a district court to undertake when a party seeks to rehash general arguments that were already addressed in a magistrate judge's report. See Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982); Christy S. o/b/o A.S. v. Saul, No. 7:18-CV-00191, 2019 WL 4306978, at *1 (W.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2019) (restating arguments "does not constitute an objection for the purposes of district court review") (citation and internal marks omitted).
Here, the court concludes Plaintiff's objections restate arguments that are adequately addressed by the Report. (See ECF No. 15 at 40-53.) Moreover, Plaintiff's objections substantively mirror the arguments raised in his prior briefing, including contentions with the ALJ's rejection of evidence regarding several of Plaintiff's alleged impairments (compare ECF Nos. 10 at 9-11; 13 at 2-4 with ECF No. 18 at 2-4); the ALJ's alleged failure to resolve a conflict between vocational expert testimony and the DOT (compare ECF Nos. 10 at 11-13; 13 at 5-6 with ECF No. 18 at 4-6); and the ALJ's RFC formulation addressing Plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome (compare ECF Nos. 10 at 13; 13 at 7 with ECF No. 18 at 6). Indeed, Plaintiff does not reference any finding by the Magistrate Judge in his objections, and instead solely targets the ALJ's decision.
A de novo review is thus unnecessary because Plaintiff has "failed to guide the [c]ourt towards specific issues needing resolution . . . ." Nichols, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (holding that a claimant failed to raise specific objections when he repeated arguments raised in his initial brief). The court declines to hear Plaintiff's reused arguments. Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47. The court finds the Report adequately addresses Plaintiff's objections, is well-reasoned, and properly analyzes the rehashed issues from Plaintiff. See Fray v. Berryhill, No. 6:16-2916-TMC, 2018 WL 1224687, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2018) (adopting a Magistrate Judge's report in which the court concurred "with both the reasoning and the result"). Therefore, the court adopts the Report herein. Plaintiff's objections are overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
After a thorough review of the Report and the record in this case, the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 15) and incorporates it herein. Therefore, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
United States District Judge September 10, 2020
Columbia, South Carolina