Summary
In Singleton v. Hope Engineering Co., 223 Ala. 538, 540, 137 So. 441, 442-443, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the Alabama courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the identical Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act here in issue, on the grounds that the enforcement of the Georgia Act is vested exclusively in the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Summary of this case from Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co.Opinion
7 Div. 53.
November 5, 1931.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Calhoun County; R. B. Carr, Judge.
Chas. F. Douglass, of Anniston, for appellant.
The compensation laws are formed to serve a special purpose in connection with injuries sustained by the employee in the line of his duties as such, that is, provide a limited medical fee, fix a compensation for loss of time, and a death benefit. Within this scope they are exclusive; beyond this the common-law rights still subsist. Georgia Cas. Co. v. Haygood, 210 Ala. 56, 97 So. 87; Steagall v. Sloss-Sheffield S. I. Co., 205 Ala. 100, 87 So. 787; Garrett v. Gadsden Coop. Co., 209 Ala. 223, 96 So. 188; Sloss-Sheffield S. I. Co. v. Greek, 211 Ala. 95, 99 So. 791; Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Graham (Tex.Civ.App.) 279 S.W. 923, 926; Ashland I. M. Co. v. McDaniel, 202 Ky. 19, 258 S.W. 943; Trout v. Wickwire S. S. Corp. (Sup.) 195 N.Y. S. 528; Smith v. Int. High Speed Steel Co., 98 N.J. Law, 574, 120 A. 188; Nat. Biscuit Co. v. Litzky (C.C.A.) 22 F.(2d) 939, 56 A.L.R. 857. To provide medical attention for an injured employee is a legal duty of the employer, a breach of which gives a right of action under the common law for the resulting damages; it not being within the scope of the Compensation Law. Sloss-Sheffield S. I. Co. v. Maxwell, 20 Ala. App. 588, 104 So. 841; 6 R. C. L. 855; Birmingham, T. T. Co. v. Still, 7 Ala. App. 556, 61 So. 611; 26 R. C. L. 987; 36 C. J. 976. Though this cause of action arose in Georgia, it is transitory and maintainable in Alabama. Code 1923, § 5681.
Knox, Acker, Sterne Liles, of Anniston, for appellee.
The remedy provided by the Compensation Act is exclusive. The Georgia statute creates its own tribunal to adjudicate all rights granted by the statute. The Alabama court has no jurisdiction. 28 R. C. L. 824; Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 208 N.Y. 312, 101 N.E. 907; Georgia Cas. Co. v. Haygood, 210 Ala. 56, 97 So. 87; Steagall v. Sloss-Sheffield S. I. Co., 205 Ala. 100, 87 So. 787; State Ind. Comm. v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263, 42 S.Ct. 473, 66 L.Ed. 933, 25 A.L.R. 1013; Raymond v. Chicago, M. St. P. R. Co., 243 U.S. 43, 37 S.Ct. 268, 61 L.Ed. 583. When defendant failed to furnish a physician, plaintiff's remedy was to call in a physician the compensation for whom would have been recoverable under order of the Industrial Commission. Ga. Comp. Law, § 26. Plaintiff had the right to recover, in a proceeding before the Georgia commission, weekly compensation for the period of disability, although prolonged by failure to furnish medical treatment. O'Quinn v. Alston, 213 Ala. 346, 104 So. 653, 39 A.L.R. 1263; Forgues v. So. Pac. Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 964; Oniji v. Studebaker Corp., 196 Mich. 397, 163 N.W. 23; 15 N.C.C.A. 76, note; Johnson v. Sac. Sur. Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. (2d) 561; Mitchell v. Occidental F. Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 336; 11 N.C. C. A. 761, note; Sams v. Komas Darros, 2 Cal. I. A. C. 203; Pawlak v. Hayes, 162 Wis. 503, 156 N.W. 464, L.R.A. 1917A, 392, 11 N.C.C.A. 752; Bailey v. Int. Cas. Co., 8 App. Div. 127, 40 N.Y. S. 513; Id., 158 N.Y. 723, 53 N.E. 1123; Shirt v. Calico. Ptrs. Ass'n, 100 L. T. 740, 2 B. W. C. C. 342. The employee cannot recover at law on account of failure of the employer to furnish medical aid as required by statute. Rainey v. Tunnell Coal Co., 93 Conn. 90, 105 A. 333; Peris v. Wand, 1 Cal. I. A. C. 607; Hakala v. Jacobsen Co., 1 Cal. I. A. C. 164; Pampuro v. Murray Bros., 1 Conn. C. D. 674; Bossert Sons v. Piel Bros., 112 Misc. Rep. 117, 182 N.Y. S. 620; Poniatowski v. Stickley Bros. Co., 194 Mich. 294, 160 N.W. 569; 15 N.C.C.A. 77, note; Allard v. Browne, 2 Cal. I. A. C. 489; 11 N.C.C.A. 761, note; Marchi v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 N.Y. 606, 98 N.E. 1108; Leadbettor v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 179 Cal. 468, 177 P. 449.
The appeal is from a judgment sustaining demurrers to the complaint, declaring for damages resulting from an injury in Georgia.
The respective theories of the parties are that the employer of appellant was, at the time, place, and manner of the injury, operating under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1920, p. 167 as amended), and that appellant received such compensation as the Georgia law provided; that this suit was for damages not covered by said law and based on the alleged negligent failure to promptly provide appellant with medical attention; and that the action is transitory and maintainable in Alabama. Section 5681, Code; Weir v. Brotherhood, 221 Ala. 494, 129 So. 267; Hall v. Milligan, 221 Ala. 233, 128 So. 438, 69 A.L.R. 618.
Appellee's theory, in short, is that there was no other and additional duty resting on the employer under the common law, and, if so, was imposed by the force of the Georgia Workmen's compensation statute, that had been compensated.
The demurrer points out that the courts in this state have no jurisdiction because the several litigable issues of fact arising under the Georgia statute are vested exclusively under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Commission. This court has generally declared that all rights and remedies granted by our statute are exclusive in causes coming within the influence thereof. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Haygood, 210 Ala. 56, 97 So. 87; Sloss-Sheffield Steel Iron Co. v. Greek, 211 Ala. 95, 99 So. 791; Steagall v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel Iron Co., 205 Ala. 100, 87 So. 787. The express terms of the Georgia statute exhibited are to like effect. Sections 12, 26, 27, and 64. Neither the common law nor other statute placed upon defendant the duty to furnish plaintiff with medical attention. The right sought to be enforced had its origin and existence in the Georgia Workmen's compensation statute. The remedies for its breach are recoverable in the manner provided by proper pleadings and procedure before the Industrial Commission of our sister state.
If such remedies are exclusive, there was no error in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint, which exhibited the Georgia statute. We may note appellant's argument or inquiry is: Does that statute, not having provided for damages for failure of alleged duty, or for compensation for pain and permanent disability, leave such suffering employee without a legal right to recover therefor? We answer that such is the result, if such did not exist under the common law or statute. The case of Sloss-Sheffield Steel Iron Co. v. Maxwell, 20 Ala. App. 588, 104 So. 841, is not in point, since the duty to furnish medical attention arose, not out of our compensation statute, but by contract between the employer and employee — on consideration of the deduction of sums weekly from the employee's wages earned.
Plaintiff had the right to recover in a proceeding before the Georgia Compensation Commission weekly compensation for the period of disability which resulted from this accident, though there were complications which prolonged the period of disability, and though medical treatment might have shortened the period. From the time he received the injury until the time he was relieved or cured of its consequences, whether extraneously aggravated or not, he was entitled to compensation under the statute as it provided. That is to say, when an employee sustains an injury, and through lack of treatment or unskillful treatment his trouble is aggravated, the consequent or proximate result is chargeable to the original accident, unless the person is himself guilty of negligence in that behalf or the lack of ordinary care. The rule is thus stated in O'Quinn v. Alston, 213 Ala. 346, 104 So. 653, 39 A.L.R. 1263, where the plaintiff was injured by the fall of an elevator, and it was contended that his injury was aggravated and his suffering prolonged by unskillful medical treatment. This court used the following language: "Where one is injured by negligence or wrongful act of another, and uses ordinary care in endeavoring to be healed, and in selection of medical and surgical help, but his injury is aggravated by negligence or unskillfulness of the latter, party causing original injury will be responsible for resulting damage to its full extent."
See the many authorities collected by Mr. Justice Sayre on this point. O'Quinn v. Alston, supra.
The same principle is enunciated by the courts of other states with reference to compensation cases. Bossert Sons v. Piel Bros., 112 Misc. Rep. 117, 182 N.Y. S. 620; Oniji v. Studebaker Corp., 196 Mich. 397, 163 N.W. 23; Booth Flinn v. Cook, 79 Okl. 280, 193 P. 36.
The ruling of the circuit court is free from error, and is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
ANDERSON, C. J., and BOULDIN and BROWN, JJ., concur.