Opinion
No. CV05 400 65 24 S
May 17, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Siriwat Singhaviroj, the plaintiff, filed this action against the defendants, the town of Fairfield, the Fairfield board of education (board), Howard Zwickler, the business director for the board and Margaret Mary Fitzgerald, the assistant superintendent of human resources for the board. The complaint alleges that Singhaviroj was an employee of the board which wrongfully discharged him. The discharge, he alleges, denied him of his due process rights of fair notice and hearing, as well as violated his right to equal protection. The discharge is said to violate the constitution of Connecticut, article first, §§ 8 and 20, the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff began employment in the board's information technology department in 1996. On May 16, 2003, the board conducted an investigation into computer network problems. As a result of the investigation, the board requested that the plaintiff resign or the board would terminate him from his employment because he failed to adequately explain the problems with the computer network. On September 22, 2003, the board informed the plaintiff that his termination of employment was under consideration and that a hearing was scheduled to address his pending termination. The hearing was thereafter held and on April 8, 2004, the plaintiff was terminated.
The plaintiff alleges, in the first count of his revised complaint, dated August 25, 2005, that he had a property interest in his employment because the board represented to him that he would only be discharged for cause. The plaintiff believes that the discharge violated his due process rights and that he was denied a fair hearing because the board had decided, prior to the hearing, to terminate his employment if he did not resign. In addition, since the board acted as the investigator and adjudicator in the termination, this violated due process. He also alleges that the board's actions violated his equal protection rights because the accusations against him were made in an irrational and wholly arbitrary manner without a rational basis or proper investigation. Finally, it is alleged that as a result of the board's actions, the plaintiff was deprived of a liberty interest which affected his ability to seek other employment. The second count is an indemnification count against the town under General Statutes § 7-465.
In a previous decision, both counts of the complaint were stricken. Singhaviroj v. Fairfield Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV05 4006524 (August 10, 2005, Skolnick, J.).
General Statutes § 7-465(a) provides, in relevant part: "Any town, city or borough . . . shall pay on behalf of any employee of such municipality . . . all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for infringement of any person's civil rights or for physical damages to person or property, except as set forth in this section, if the employee, at the time of the occurrence, accident, physical injury or damages complained of, was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, and if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was not the result of any wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge of such duty . . . As used in this section, `employee' includes (1) a member of a town board of education and any teacher, including a student teacher doing practice teaching under the direction of such a teacher, or other person employed by such board . . ."
The defendants have moved to strike both counts. They argue that the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that he had a property interest in his continued employment. If he did not have a property interest, the manner in which he was terminated need not comport with due process. If he did sufficiently allege a property interest, the procedure followed did comply with due process. They also argue that the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged an equal protection violation because he has not alleged that the defendants acted out of ill will or bias against the plaintiff in terminating him. The plaintiff argues that he has properly pleaded both a due process and equal protection violation.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 275 Conn. 105, 154, 881 A.2d 937 (2005). "A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992).
The fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution and article one, section eight of the Connecticut constitution both require "that an individual be given the opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest . . ." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). "A claim for due process protection must possess a property or liberty interest that is somehow jeopardized by governmental action, necessitating a pre- or post-deprivation hearing as a safeguard . . . [P]roperty interests are more than abstract needs, desires or unilateral expectations of benefits or privileges. Rather, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit or privilege to have a property interest in that benefit . . . Property interests are not created by the Constitution, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Singhaviroj v. Fairfield Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV05 4006524 (August 10, 2005, Skolnick, J.).
The plaintiff alleges that he was denied due process because the defendants agreed not to discharge him without cause. He does not allege that there was any written contract or other express agreement not to discharge him. He argues that an implied contract was created not to discharge him without cause and this implied contract gave him a property right in his continued employment. In Fennel v. Hartford, 238 Conn. 809, 681 A.2d 934 (1996), however, the court stated "that implied contract claims in the public sector . . . would only invite endless litigation over both real and imagined claims of misinformation by disgruntled citizens [and employees], imposing an unpredictable drain on the public fisc." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 816. That case involved construing an implied contract out of language from the state's pension manual but the court also applied the principle to the contents of employee manuals. Id. In this case, the plaintiff does not even have written language to construe, just allegations that an oral promise was made to him. The plaintiff claims that he had a property interest in his employment, even though there was no actual employment contract ever adopted between the parties.
The plaintiff relies on the decision in Biello v. Watertown, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV99 0155286 (Jan. 30, 2004, Leheny, J.) ( 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 479) in which the court distinguished the holding in Fennel v. Hartford, supra, 238 Conn. 809, and found that there could be an implied contract with the town to pay the plaintiff additional pay. The court, however, noted that the plaintiff had made claims in the nature of quasi contract or unjust enrichment. No such claims are made here.
"The implied contract of a municipal corporation ordinarily rests upon the theory that it is unjust and inequitable for the corporation to accept and retain benefits without assuming concomitant obligations . . . and generally recovery may not be had under an implied contract where the corporation received no benefits." 10A E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 1999) § 29.114, p. 120. "Under such circumstances, by reason of benefits received, the liability of the municipal corporation may be based upon a quantum meruit . . . or a like doctrine. On the other hand, where no benefit is received by the municipality, there is no liability under any theory of implied contract." Id., § 29.111, p. 111.
No quantum meruit or unjust enrichment theory is pleaded and the plaintiff can not argue that the town somehow received a benefit by not discharging him other than for cause. As such, he has not adequately pleaded that he had a property interest in his continued employment. Because the plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that he had a property interest, the court need not determine whether the procedures afforded complied with due process.
In the earlier decision striking the plaintiff's first complaint, the court did note that "[a]lthough the hearing [given to the plaintiff] might not have been as elaborate as the plaintiff expected, he was given a pretermination hearing prior to termination." Singhaviroj v. Fairfield Board of Education, supra, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV05 4006524 (August 10, 2005, Skolnick, J.).
The plaintiff also claims that his termination affected his "liberty interest" because it "detrimentally affected his freedom to seek and take advantage of other employment opportunities." Lastly the plaintiff alleges that his termination violated his "equal protection rights" because it was "irrational and wholly arbitrary without any proper basis" or "proper investigation."
These conclusory statements contain no factual basis on which to base claims of denial of equal protection or interference with a liberty interest. See Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., supra, 224 Conn. 210, 215. Therefore, the allegations of the first count fail to state any claim upon which relief can be granted and are stricken. The motion to strike is granted as to the second count as well because the second count is merely an indemnification count dependent on liability in the first count.