Opinion
HHDCV165042662S
05-26-2017
Michelle Sims v. Judge Glenn A. Woods
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
Cesar A. Noble J.
This action, originally filed in small claims court by the plaintiff, Michelle Sims, was transferred on the motion of the defendant, Judge Glenn A. Woods, to the docket of the Superior Court. Thereafter, the defendant filed the timely motion to dismiss that is before the court. The court grants the motion to dismiss because, as best may be discerned, it is an action against a judicial defendant in his official capacity and, thus, the doctrines of sovereign immunity and absolute judicial immunity deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Facts and Procedural History
The first obligation of the court is to determine the nature of the plaintiff's claim. Our Supreme Court has instructed that the judges of the superior court " 'should be solicitous to [self-represented] petitioners and construe their pleadings liberally in light of the limited legal knowledge they possess . . . however . . . the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 129, 140, 7 A.3d 911 (2010). 'Additionally, we emphasize that our liberal policy toward pro se parties is severely curtailed in cases where it interferes with the rights of other parties.' Rosato v. Rosato, 53 Conn.App. 387, 390, 731 A.2d 323 (1999), [rev'd on other grounds, 255 Conn. 412, 766 A.2d 429 (2001)]." Markley v. Department of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 74-75, 23 A.3d 668 (2011). See also Flater v. Grace, 291 Conn. 410, 424, 969 A.2d 157 (2009).
Mindful of these principles the court addresses the plaintiff's pleadings. The plaintiff's original small claims complaint remains the operative document. The complaint requests damages in the amount of $5,000. The plaintiff's description of her claim is contained in two sentences on the first page of the Small Claims Writ and Notice of Suit, JD-CV-040, and two attached letters addressed to " Judge Glenn Woods, " which are identical with the exception that the first is deliverable at the " Housing Session Court @ New Britain" and the second at the " Housing Session Court @ Hartford." Paragraph 10 of the complaint alleges " Judge Woods request to hear by Eric Rogers were allowed to have all stolen property and personal belongings of mines. Also and to tell why nobody had gave me the pending new hearing can't say regarding this matter and need answers." The letters attached to the complaint lack any coherent sentence structure and are largely unintelligible. The subject matter of the letters appears to be an eviction proceeding in the Hartford housing court involving Judge Woods. The name Eric Rogers appears both in the final page of the letters and in the Small Claims Writ and Summons. Therefore, the court construes the allegations of the plaintiff such that the claim for damages flows from an eviction/summary process proceeding in the Judicial District Housing Session at Hartford before Judge Woods involving an Eric Rogers.
The defendant similarly construes the complaint and filed a timely motion to dismiss claiming the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because of the doctrines of sovereign immunity and absolute judicial immunity. Our Practice Book provides that a motion to dismiss shall be used to assert, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Practice Book § 10-30(a)(1). The motion was supported by the affidavit of Jeffrey Hammer, deputy chief clerk for housing matters, Superior Court Hartford Housing Session. A motion to dismiss " shall always be filed with a supporting memorandum of law and, where appropriate, with supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record." Practice Book § 10-30(c).
Hammer's affidavit references a summary process eviction involving the plaintiff entitled Eric Rogers v. Michelle Sims et al., No HDSP-17791 filed on February 27, 2015, in Hartford. The affidavit further discloses that the defendant, Judge Woods, issued judgment after trial in favor of Eric Rogers on April 17, 2015, a date which appears in the plaintiff's letters. Judge Woods also presided over hearings on an application for stay of execution and a motion to open judgment filed by the plaintiff in the present matter. The court additionally takes judicial notice of the foregoing facts as a result of its review of the court file, docket number HDSP-17791.
" The court's ability to take judicial notice of its own files is not subject to question. Jewett v. Jewett, 265 Conn. 669, 678 n.7, 830 A.2d 193 (2003)." Verkaik v. Scheno, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. 05-4004245-S (2006 WL 3759231, at *1) (December 7, 2006, Tobin, J.).
The plaintiff filed an objection which suffers from the same deficiencies as the letters attached to her complaint.
Standard
" A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). Once raised " it is [t]he plaintiff [who] bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction." Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Thompson, 163 Conn.App. 827, 836, 136 A.3d 1277 (2016); see also Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).
" When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). " In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint . . . Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651-52.
Judge Woods has, in the present case, raised sovereign immunity as a defense. " [T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic R.R. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). " Claims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 4-165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009). Regarding the common-law exceptions to sovereign immunity, " [i]n the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 301 Conn. 56, 66, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).
Finally, absolute judicial immunity is properly considered in a motion to dismiss because it shares with sovereign immunity the same purpose of protection against having to litigate at all. Damato v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 09-5030385-S (2010 WL 2817260, at *1) (June 2, 2010, Peck, J.) .
Analysis
A. Sovereign Immunity
" The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law . . . It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law . . . Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allen v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 324 Conn. 292, 298-99, 152 A.3d 488 (2016). " The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects state officials and employees from lawsuits resulting from the performance of their duty. The doctrine protects the state against lawsuits as well as protecting against liability, and in effect, it protects against having to litigate at all." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 620, 787 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002). In the present case, the state is not named as a defendant. A court does not determine " [w]hether a particular action is one against the state . . . solely by referring to the parties of record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenney v. Weaving, 123 Conn.App. 211, 215-16, 1 A.3d 1083 (2010). Instead, courts are instructed to employ the following four-part test for determining whether a suit against an individual is in effect " one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568, 362 A.2d 871, 875 (1975). The application of this test to the present case yields the conclusion that the suit against Judge Woods is in effect one against the state and is thus barred.
The complaint specifically identifies the defendant as a judge and provides addresses for him at both the housing court in New Britain and in Hartford. Therefore, the first criterion is met. The suit clearly concerns a matter in which Judge Woods represented the state, a judicial case, and therefore the second criterion is satisfied. The third criterion is also met because damages are sought against the defendant " for performing or not performing acts that are part of his official duties." Kenney v. Weaving, supra, 123 Conn.App. 217. Finally, the fourth criterion is met because exposing a judge of the superior court to liability for a judgment exercised in this capacity not only implicates the independent exercise of this important sovereign function but also subjects the state to liability on the basis of statutory indemnification. General Statutes § 5-141d. For these reasons, unless the plaintiff has pleaded an exception to, or waiver of, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the doctrine bars the exercise of the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
" The principles governing statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are well established. [A] litigant that seeks to overcome the presumption of sovereign immunity [pursuant to a statutory waiver] must show that the . . . legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity . . . In making this determination, [a court shall be guided by] the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed . . . [W]hen there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity . . . Furthermore, because such statutes are in derogation of the common law, [a]ny statutory waiver of immunity must be narrowly construed . . . and its scope must be confined strictly to the extent the statute provides." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allen v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra, 324 Conn. at 299-300.
There are three recognized exceptions to sovereign immunity. These are: " (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Traylor v. Gerratana, 148 Conn.App. 605, 610, 88 A.3d 552, cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 444, 190 L.Ed.2d 336 (2014). The latter two are not applicable in the present case because the plaintiff is not seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. The only statutory waiver potentially applicable, albeit not cited by the plaintiff, is General Statutes § 4-165, which provides in relevant part: " (a) No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment." The plaintiff has neither specifically pleaded wanton, reckless or malicious conduct nor provided the court with any allegation from which an inference of such may be reasonably made. " [E]ven a [self-represented] litigant must allege 'wanton, reckless or malicious conduct' . . . in order to bring a complaint within an exception to sovereign immunity." Lemoine v. McCann, 40 Conn.App. 460, 465, 673 A.2d 115, cert. denied, 237 Conn. 904, 674 A.2d 1330 (1996). The plaintiff's complaint, having failed to allege an exception provided for by § 4-165, does not invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiff's complaint does not contain any reference to having filed a claim with the claims commissioner. General Statutes § 4-142.
B. Judicial Immunity
As an alternate ground for asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant asserts the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. " Absolute judicial immunity bars the plaintiff's state law claims against the judicial defendants in their official capacities. It is a long-standing doctrine that a judge may not be civilly sued for judicial acts he undertakes in his capacity as a judge." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Traylor v. Gerratana, supra, 148 Conn.App. 613. The court has already determined that the plaintiff's claim is against Judge Woods in his official capacity. Therefore, the claim is barred by absolute immunity.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's action due to the bars of sovereign immunity and absolute judicial immunity, and the action is dismissed.