Opinion
No. 01-CV-6187-CJS.
January 21, 2005
Robert Sims, pro se, Elmira Correctional Facility, Elmira, NY, for Plaintiff.
Gary M. Levine, Assistant Attorney General, New York State Office of the Attorney General, Rochester, NY, for Defendants.
DECISION ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Robert Sims, presently at Elmira Correctional Facility, file a pro se action against defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants have violated his constitutional rights by denying him access to the courts by tampering with his mail and depriving him of materials with which to write and do legal research. Further, he maintains the defendants have subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment on him in violation of the Eighth Amendment regarding the conditions of his confinement in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). The case is now before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion (# 12) is granted and the case is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
In an initial decision and order, entered on February 7, 2002, the Court dismissed plaintiff's claims against Goord, Bartley, LeClaire, Hopkins and Malone with prejudice and they were terminated as defendants in this case. The Court also directed plaintiff to file an amended complaint addressing specific issues as stated in the Court's order. On February 20, 2002, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, realleging his denial of access to the courts claim as well as Eighth Amendment claim pertaining to SHU. By a memorandum and order dated April 10, 2002, the Court accepted the amended complaint (# 8) and directed the remaining defendants to answer it.
The amended complaint contains two statements of claim. The first alleges that on August 18, 1998, plaintiff gave "legal mail" to the Elmira Correctional Facility correspondence office for mailing and that defendants Robert Guzman ("Guzman") and Candie Healy ("Healy") "denied plaintiff's postage advance, unlawfully removed the certified return receipt off each envelope and unlawfully withheld plaintiff's order to show cause and Article 78 petitions from going out the [sic] facility." Compl. at 3. As a result, plaintiff alleges that his State court petition was dismissed. Id. Also contained in his first statement of claim are allegations that between August 18, 1998 and November 17, 1999, "plaintiff was denied sufficient writing and carbon paper pens, books, case law cites and assistance from persons trained in law from the facility Elmira law library by defendants Bennett, Smith, Donam and Guzman, stopping plaintiff from appealing to the appellate court considering his two above said Article 78 petitions being dismissed." Compl. at 4. Additionally, plaintiff contends in this statement of claim that he was denied his "right to raise due process claims in the State court concerning his March 13, 1998 and March 25, 1998 disciplinary hearing violations at Eastern Correctional Facility. . . ." Compl. at 4. Finally, plaintiff asserts that he "is unlawfully confined to SHU for a period of 5 years, loss of commissary, telephone and packages for a term of 5 years, as a result of defendants' actions." Id.
Piecing together the story from the 500 loose pages of material appended to plaintiff's complaint, the Court ascertains that the legal correspondence consisted of a petition filed pursuant to New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules, Article 78, which plaintiff was required to serve on Commissioner Goord in order to obtain jurisdiction in the State court where the petition was pending. The petition was ultimately dismissed when plaintiff failed to prove he had successfully served the named respondents. See Sims v. Goord, No. 98-2293 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Jun. 16, 1999) (attached to Compl.).
Turning to plaintiff's second statement of claim, he asserts the following:
From September 10, 1998 to October 31, 1998 at Elmira Correctional Facility SHU plaintiff was deprive[d] of all his personal items as: a) bedding, b) toiletries, c) clothing, d) writing materials, e) back support, f) foot arch supports, g) normal meals, h) water, i) eyeglasses, j) correspondence, k) cell light, i) heat, m) [sic] outdoor exercise, and place[d] in full restraints and cell shield by defendants Bennett, Smith and Doane.
Compl. at 4. He further states that he received injuries "to his head, foots [sic], and back from the metal bed frame, stomach aches, chronic headaches, bones [sic] pain, loss of weight, loss of sleep, permanent black marks on ankles, mental pain and anguish as a result of defendants['] unlawful action. . . ." Id. Attached to the complaint are approximately 500 pages of exhibits consisting of memoranda, grievance forms, affidavits, and etc.
In its memorandum and order of April 10, 2002, the Court construed plaintiff's amended complaint to raise Eighth Amendment claims pertaining to his treatment in SHU, and a claim challenging the alleged denial of access to the State courts to challenge disciplinary proceedings. Memorandum and Order, 01-CV-6187(CJS) (Fe) (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2002) at 2.
STANDARDS OF LAW
A. Motion to Dismiss
To prevail on a motion for dismissal under Rule 12, a defendant must show that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989); see also 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 12.34[1][a] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). "In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a district court must limit itself to facts stated in the complaint or in documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in the complaint by reference." Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991). The Court must view the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.; see also 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 12.34[1][b] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (court must accept plaintiff's factual allegations as true). Under the modern rules of pleading, a plaintiff need only provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), and that "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice," FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the issue before the Court "is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim." Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995).
Finally, while the plaintiff need not set out in detail the facts upon which he bases a claim, he must provide the "defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests." Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1140 (2d Cir. 1986) ( quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 [1957]). Where the allegations are so baldly conclusory that they fail to give notice of the basic events and circumstances of which the plaintiff complains, they are meaningless as a practical matter and legally insufficient to state a claim. Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987) ( citing Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 [2d Cir. 1977]; Koch v. Yunich, 533 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1976); Powell v. Jarvis, 460 F.2d 551, 553 [2d Cir. 1972]).Parisi v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 995 F. Supp. 298, 300-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). Inasmuch as plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this Court must follow the requirements of the Second Circuit, which, in a recent opinion, held:
A pro se complaint should not be dismissed unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claims which would entitle [them] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). When considering motions to dismiss a pro se complaint such as this, "courts must construe [the complaint] broadly, and interpret [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggests." Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is especially true when dealing with pro se complaints alleging civil rights violations. See Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the plaintiffs' allegations in this case must be read so as to "raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 145-146 (2d Cir. 2002).
B. Civil Rights Claims
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1993). In evaluating the complaint, the Court must accept as true all factual allegations and draw all inferences in plaintiff's favor. See King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). Dismissal is not appropriate "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). "This rule applies with particular force where the plaintiff alleges civil rights violations or where the complaint is submitted pro se." Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998).
DISCUSSION
Defendants' motion seeks dismissal of plaintiff's claims of denial of access to the State courts on the theory that he has no constitutional right to certified mail and that he failed to send his papers by ordinary mail as required by a court order. Alternatively, defendants claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. With regard to the Eighth Amendment claims, defendants assert that plaintiff's claim of being deprived of various personal items is barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to civil rights lawsuits. Further, defendants argue that plaintiff's complaint is insufficient because it does not "contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning." Defs.' Mem. of Law at 5 (quoting Barr v. Adams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987)).
A. Denial of Access to the Courts by Mail
The law is settled that, "[p]risoners must be afforded meaningful access to the courts to challenge unlawful confinement and constitutional violations." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974). Additionally, "[i]t is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977); accord Chandler v. Coughlin, 763 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff's complaint contains a copy of Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") Directive 4421 (Apr. 27, 1993), entitled Privileged Correspondence. Directive 4421 states that DOCS inmates receive a weekly allowance of free postage equivalent to "five domestic first class one ounce letters to pay for first class postage on outgoing privileged correspondence. This allowance may not be used to pay for any special handling charges such as for certified, return-receipt, express mail, etc. unless such mail services are required by statute or court rule." DOCS Directive 4421 (Apr. 27, 1993) Ill.A.3.b. Additionally, the same Directive permits advances for legal mail if a letter "is addressed to a judge, clerk of court, attorney, or authorized legal representative; or is related to a potential or ongoing legal matter." Id. at Ill.A.3.c.1. The advance is not to exceed $20.00, unless "the inmate can show by court rules, a statute of limitations, or other legal deadline applicable to his or her individual circumstances that the legal mail must be sent prior to receipt of the next week's free postage allowance." Id. at Ill.A.3.c.3.
Reading plaintiff's pro se complaint liberally, it would appear that he attempted to mail legal correspondence out on August 18, 1998, and the correspondence was returned to him because of insufficient funds to pay for his requested certified mailing. See Letter from Floyd G. Bennett Jr., Superintendent, to Robert Sims, 90-T-2814 (Jan. 6, 1999) (attached to Compl.) at 1. In the memorandum, Bennett states that the court order, to which plaintiff was responding when sending out his legal correspondence, required plaintiff to send his mail by ordinary first class, whereas plaintiff was trying to send it certified. Id. Clearly the case law does not require access to certified mail, and in the event that he was required to use certified mail, Directive 4421 would have permitted it. However, plaintiff's complaint does not allege that he was required to send the correspondence by certified mail.
Furthermore, the memorandum submitted by plaintiff reveals that his State court proceeding was dismissed after that court received an unsworn reply from plaintiff, to which New York State Supreme Court Justice Bernard J. Malone, Jr., did not give any weight, since it was unsworn. Id. at 2. Moreover, in a decision and judgment dated June 16, 1999, Justice Malone wrote that he had ordered plaintiff to serve his Article 78 petition on Goord on or before August 31, 1998. Sims v. Goord, No. 98-2293 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Jun. 16, 1999) (attached to Compl.) at 2. If plaintiff's mail was returned to him on August 18, 1998, as stated in the decision, then his failure to make any factual allegations pertaining to his inability to timely serve the Article 78 petition as a result, leads to the conclusion that the complaint fails to state a cause of action for denial of access to the courts. Consequently, since plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief, this claim must be dismissed. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
B. Eighth Amendment Denial of Access to the Courts Through Deprivation of Paper, Pen and Legal Research Claims
Plaintiff's original complaint, filed on April 12, 2001, did not raise any Eighth Amendment issues, aside from a mention that, when he was found in violation of disciplinary rules, he was placed on a restricted diet, and that he lost his telephone, commissary, and package privileges as a result of being placed in SHU. Orig. Compl. ¶¶ 6-7. This Court's Decision and Order of February 7, 2002, specifically stated that plaintiff would be permitted to replead his Eighth Amendment complaints. Decision at 6. Defendants invoke the three-year statute of limitations for civil rights complaints, arguing that since the amended complaint was not filed until February 13, 2002, the Eighth Amendment complaints are untimely. However, since the Court previously read plaintiff's original complaint to include allegations of cruel and unusual punishment arising under the Eighth Amendment, defendants' statute of limitations argument is unpersuasive. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) clearly applies here and the more specific Eighth Amendment allegations in the amended complaint relate back to the date of the original complaint. See Villante v. Dept. of Corrections of City of New York, 786 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Because the claim did relate back, it clearly was not barred by the statute of limitations applicable to actions brought under section 1983.").
Plaintiff's amended complaint states that between August and November 1999, he was denied "sufficient writing and carbon paper pens, books, case law cites and assistance from persons trained in law from the facility Elmira law library" and as a result was unable to appeal the dismissal of his Article 78 petition. He also alleges a long list of personal items defendants' deprived him of and injuries resulting therefrom.
The Second Circuit has established that "complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning." Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987). In Barr, the plaintiff,
Barr charges that the Assistant Attorneys General violated his rights in that they threatened witnesses, unlawfully seized property, submitted false statements to courts, told persons that he had engaged in fraud and sham, and illegally conspired with the Internal Revenue Service. These claims were properly dismissed for vagueness.Barr, 810 F.2d at 362-63.
Here, the Court agrees with the defendants that plaintiff has failed to submit specific allegations of fact pertaining to his Eighth Amendment claim, but rather, like the plaintiff in Barr, has submitted merely a laundry list of alleged violations. In this regard, plaintiff has alleged only that he was "deprived" of a various items and that he suffered injuries. These allegations are insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. Id. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss the deprivation of materials and legal support claim and his claims in "Statement of Claim 2" is granted.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion [#12] is granted, the complaint is dismissed and the case is closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.