Opinion
No. SA-01-CA-0875-RF
April 8, 2003
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court are Defendants Equilon Pipeline, Inc.'s ("Equilon Pipeline") and Equilon Enterprises, L.L.C.'s ("Equilon Enterprises") Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted on October 11, 2002 and filed on November 15, 2002, as well as Plaintiff Victor Sims's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October 28, 2002. After careful consideration of the arguments of the parties and of applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Motion should be GRANTED TN PART and DENIED TN PART.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an African American who began work as a Pipeliner Trainee for Texaco Pipeline, Inc. ("Texaco") in 1998. After Texaco formed Equilon Pipeline in April 1999, Plaintiff automatically became an employee of that company. Plaintiff filed this suit in September 2001, alleging several acts of racial animus, hostility and discrimination on the part of various Equilon Pipeline employees. As examples of these sentiments, Plaintiff cites comments by co-workers that Plaintiff's work was "nigger rigged" and that "it's about time that nigger was worked like a slave." Plaintiff asserts that he complained to the appropriate management personnel, but that the company failed to respond to his complaints. Plaintiff alleges that he was questioned at length by management, but no remedial steps were taken. At the same time, hostility and mistreatment by Plaintiff's peers and superiors escalated. Plaintiff's workload was significantly increased; unjustified disciplinary actions were initiated against him; his work was tampered with; and he was denied promotions. Plaintiff adds that bullets were left in his car seat, dead birds were placed at his pickup door, and he was closely monitored at work. Plaintiff further avers that Defendants failed to address this behavior, and those perpetrating the above acts were never penalized.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff states the following causes of actions: (1) racial discrimination in employment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"); (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (5) libel, slander and defamation. On November 19, 2001, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims for libel, slander, and defamation. Thus, only Plaintiff's other causes of action remain for purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment.
In their Motion, Defendants assert several grounds for summary judgment. First, Defendants argue that several of the underlying acts are barred from consideration by applicable statutes of limitations or other procedural restrictions. Second, Defendants claim that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish a claim of hostile work environment under Title VII and § 1981. Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not suffered an adverse employment action to support a claim for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and § 1981. Fourth, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's allegations do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, as required to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Fifth, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's negligence claims are barred by the exclusivity provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Sixth and finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff was never employed by Equilon Enterprises, so all claims against that Defendant should be dismissed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." To support its motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the "burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and for these purposes the material it lodge[s] must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party."
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).
Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608 (1970).
When a motion for summary judgment is properly made, the opposing party must then set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." However, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient" to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, unsubstantiated assertions of an actual dispute will not suffice. Rather, the non-moving party must present sufficient evidence such that a rational trier of fact could find in its favor. Thus, to grant a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine that, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the moving party is nevertheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).
Krim v. Banc Texas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1442, n. 4 (5th Cir. 1993).
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds. The Court will address each issue in turn.
I. Procedural Limitations
Defendants' first argument pertains to which facts and allegations the Court may consider in relation to Plaintiff's claims. Defendants argue that no acts before April 1, 1999 may be considered because there was no employment relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants before that time. Defendants also cite the procedural limitations of Title VII, which require a charge to be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 300 days of the alleged violation. Since Plaintiff filed his EEOC complaints on April 14, 2000 and August 21, 2001, Defendants argue that no acts occurring prior to June 17, 1999 — 300 days before Plaintiff filed his first EEOC complaint — can be considered. Moreover, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's § 1981 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, so conduct occurring before September 24, 1999 — two years before Plaintiff filed suit — are barred from consideration.
Plaintiff argues in response that discriminatory acts occurring outside the limitations period may be considered if additional discriminatory acts occurred within this time period. As Defendants correctly point out in their Reply to Plaintiff's Response, however, this issue is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan. In that case, the Court rejected the "continuing violations doctrine" suggested by Plaintiff, holding that "[e]ach incident of discrimination and retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable `unlawful employment practice.'" Thus, a plaintiff could only file a charge to cover discrete acts that occurred within the appropriate time period.
See Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1986).
536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (2002).
Id. at 2073.
Defendants fail to acknowledge, however, the distinction the Morgan Court went on to make. The Court found that "[h]ostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts," since they involve "repeated conduct" and are based "on the cumulative affect [sic] of individual acts." Since a hostile environment claim "is comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one `unlawful employment practice. . . . [i]t does not matter . . . that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time period." "Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability."
Id.
Id. at 2074.
Id.
Based on Morgan, therefore, acts occurring prior to June 17, 1999 may not be considered for purposes of Plaintiff's discrimination or retaliation claims, but they may be considered for purposes of his hostile environment claims. In addition, the Court notes that, while acts occurring prior to April 1, 1999 — the date Equilon Pipeline assumed Plaintiff's employment — may have "no present legal consequences," they may nevertheless "constitute relevant background evidence" for Plaintiff's otherwise timely claims. Therefore, to the extent Defendants contend that acts occurring prior to June 17, 1999 may not be considered for purposes of Plaintiff's hostile environment claims, their Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Furthermore, to the extent Defendants argue that acts occurring prior to April 1, 1999 may not be considered as relevant background evidence for Plaintiff's hostile environment claims, their Motion is DENIED. With regard to pre-June 17, 1999 events in relation to Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims, however, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED. Finally, since Plaintiff does not contest Defendants' assertion of a two-year statute of limitations for § 1981 claims, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED with respect to this issue.
See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889 (1977).
II. Hostile Work Environment
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim based on hostile work environment. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not established that the harassment complained of "affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment." To satisfy this condition, the harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Defendants assert that Plaintiff's allegations do not meet this standard.
Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002).
Id. (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405 (2002)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has provided "no specific allegations of harassment" and that his "vague allegation of harassment cannot be the basis of a hostile work environment claim." Defendants submit that Plaintiff's claims describe "arguably rude behavior," but "do not as a matter of law amount to a hostile work environment." The Court disagrees.
Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 8 (Oct. 11, 2002).
Id. at 10.
The Court first reiterates that, in evaluating a hostile work environment claim, "all of the circumstances must be taken into consideration. . . . and [d]iscriminatory incidents outside of the filing period may be relevant background information to current discriminatory acts." Within that framework, Plaintiff has made extensive allegations of hostility in the workplace. Plaintiff has described comments by co-workers that his work was "nigger rigged" or that "it's about time that nigger was worked like a slave." In light of these comments, Plaintiff's further allegations that threatening objects were placed in or near his vehicle could certainly be interpreted as being motivated by racial animus. Plaintiff also states that, when he complained of this behavior, management was unresponsive and that Plaintiff's workload and working conditions subsequently exacerbated.
Ramsey, 286 F.3d at 268 (citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 1889).
These allegations, if true, belie Defendants' contention that Plaintiff complains only of "rude behavior." Nor is this a case, as Defendants suggest, in which Plaintiff provides "no concrete examples beyond mere conclusory assertions." Other circuits have held that Plaintiff's failure to specifically allege "each individual incident does not defeat his claim," particularly when the listed incidents are "simply examples of the offensive racial incidents [Plaintiff] has encountered during his career." Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that "if there was specific evidence of `routinely [made] racist remarks,' then a fact issue had been raised to prevent summary judgment." The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented such evidence. Additionally, Plaintiff's allegations refute any assertion-express or implied-by Defendants that they took prompt remedial action to address the complained-of behavior.
Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 10; see also Gazda v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., 10 F. Supp.2d 656, 667 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
Ramsey, 286 F.3d at 269.
Ross v. Douglas County, Nebraska, 234 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ways v. City of Lincoln, 871 F.2d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1989)); see also Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming judgment for plaintiff when use of "racially abusive language was `repeated,' `continuous,' and `prolonged' despite plaintiff's objections, making him feel unwanted and uncomfortable in his surroundings").
Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 626 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Wallace v. Texas Tech University, 80 F.3d 1042, 1049 (5th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original)).
See McCray v. DPC Indus., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 288, 293-94 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
Given the extent of Plaintiff's allegations, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that this behavior was neither threatening nor humiliating, nor that it did not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiff's work. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive work environment. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's hostile environment claims.
See Thompson, 214 F.3d at 626.
Id.
III. Discrimination and Retaliation
Defendants' next basis for summary judgment is that Plaintiff has not alleged an "adverse employment action" to support a claim of discrimination or retaliation. The parties do not appear to contest the requirement that a Title VII discrimination or retaliation claim must allege an "adverse employment action against the employee." They similarly agree that Fifth Circuit precedent defines "adverse" or "ultimate" employment decisions as including acts "such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating." Their disagreement is about whether Plaintiff has satisfied this requirement.
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).
Id. at 707 (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff refers to, without specifically citing, a "Dallas Court of Appeals" case, which he claims permits a retaliation claim based on a letter of reprimand. Defendants have elucidated Plaintiff's contention by identifying City of Dallas v. Rodriguez, the case to which Plaintiff apparently refers. Moreover, as Defendants correctly note, the retaliation claim in Rodriguez was based on a Texas statute, which the court found to be broader than the federal statute. The court explicitly recognized that Title VII provides a right of action "only when the retaliation results in `ultimate employment decisions.'"
No. 94-11770-E, 1999 WL 689615 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
Id. at *7.
Id. (quoting Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707).
Plaintiff's position is further diminished by another Texas Court of Appeals decision, which recognized the Title VII standard and found that "ultimate employment decisions" did not include "disciplinary filings, supervisor's reprimands, poor performance reviews[,]. . . . hostility from fellow employees, verbal threats to fire, reprimands, criticism of the employee's work, and negative employment evaluations. . . ."
Elgaghil v. Tarrant County Junior College, 45 S.W.3d 133, 143 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (citing Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 140 (5th Cir. 1997) and Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707-08).
Defendants concede that Plaintiff's claims based on alleged denials of promotion identify an adverse employment action. Defendants contend however that, of the four complained-of occasions on which Plaintiff was not promoted, two are procedurally barred. The Court agrees. The denials allegedly occurring on April 1, 1999 and May 1, 1999 fall outside the 300-day window for Plaintiff's Title VII complaints and the two-year statute of limitations for his § 1981 claims. Defendants also argue that the two other occasions did not actually amount to denials of promotion. On one occasion, Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his application. On the other, the position applied for was not a "promotion," since the position actually paid less than Plaintiff's present salary. Plaintiff has not responded to these claims, nor has he presented any evidence to refute them.
See Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 13.
Id.; see also Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that "employment actions are not adverse where pay, benefits, and level of responsibility remain the same").
The Court finds, therefore, that Plaintiff's conclusory assertion that he suffered an adverse employment action on the theory that his "position, remuneration, and status in the workplace was [sic] affected" is insufficient to create a question of fact on this issue. Since Plaintiff cannot establish that he suffered an ultimate employment decision to support a Title VII claim for retaliation or discrimination, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
IV. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendants' next argument is that Plaintiff has not alleged conduct that is "extreme and outrageous," as required to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants assert that this standard connotes behavior that is "regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Defendants add that "`[o]rdinary employment disputes' will not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress." Plaintiff responds that the vulgar racial epithets, offensive jokes, intolerable work conditions, and threatening acts amount to "extreme and outrageous" conduct.
Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1172, 122 S.Ct. 1196 (2002) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bertrand, 37 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000)).
Id.
Id. (quoting GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1999)).
See Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 7 (Oct. 28, 2002).
The Court notes that, despite the reprehensible nature of the behavior alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, the Court cannot conclude that all objectionable conduct necessarily rises to the level of "extreme and outrageous." Indeed, the cases cited by Plaintiff include a "pattern of grossly abusive, threatening, and degrading conduct," including a supervisor who "physically and verbally threatened and terrorized" his employees, and a man who persistently cut off a woman on the highway and refused to let her pull away despite her repeated pleas to leave her alone. The behavior alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint is not on a comparable scale with this type of conduct.
Bruce, 998 S.W.2d at 613.
Morgan v. Anthony, 27 S.W.3d 928, 930 (Tex. 2000).
Texas law holds that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress "does not lie for ordinary employment disputes," and the requisite conduct to support such a claim in the workplace "exists only in the most unusual of circumstances." The Fifth Circuit has found that even conduct involving racist remarks over a period of time may not rise to the level of "extreme and outrageous" conduct necessary to support such a claim. State appellate courts have held that even conduct which may be illegal — including a "constant barrage of racial slurs, jokes, insults, and harassment" — may not be "the sort of conduct constituting extreme and outrageous conduct." The court in Thomas rejected the plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even though it found the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of employment-related racial discrimination. Additionally, the Bruce court noted that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress "cannot be maintained when the risk that emotional distress will result is merely incidental to the commission of some other tort."
City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Bruce, 998 S.W.2d at 612-13).
Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1993).
Thomas v. Clayton Williams Energy, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 734, 740-41 (Tex.App.-Houston 1999, no pet.).
Id. at 739.
Bruce, 998 S.W.2d at 611 (quoting Standard Fruit Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 68 (Tex. 1998)).
Based on this precedent and the evidence before the Court, although Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of fact with regard to his hostile work environment claim, he has not alleged conduct sufficiently "extreme and outrageous" to support a separate claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
V. Texas Workers' Compensation Act
Defendants' next argument is that Plaintiff's claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention are barred by the Texas Worker's Compensation Act ("TWCA"). The TWCA "provides the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by an employee in the course of his employment as a result of his employer's negligence." Plaintiff responds that he is not seeking workers' compensation benefits for an on-the-job physical injury, and therefore Plaintiff's claims are outside the ambit of the TWCA. Plaintiff further argues that the TWCA provides an exception for injuries resulting from intentional or willful acts of employers.
Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1997).
See Ajaz v. Continental Airlines, 156 F.R.D. 145, 148 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
Plaintiff's first argument is easily dismissed, since Texas courts have recognized no such restriction. In Chime v. PNC Bank Corp., the court found that the TWCA barred the plaintiffs negligence claims, which were identical to those stated here: negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention. Similarly, in Walls Regional Hospital v. Bomar, the plaintiffs' negligence claims arose out of complaints of sexual harassment, not physical injury. The court found that the plaintiffs' injuries occurred in the course of their employment and were therefore covered by the TWCA. It is undisputed in this case that Plaintiff's alleged injuries occurred in the scope of his employment. To the extent his case is based on Defendants' alleged negligence, therefore, recovery is foreclosed by the TWCA.
1998 WL 51285 *8 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
9 S.W.3d 805, 806 (Tex. 1999).
Id. at 808.
See Ward, 102 F.3d at 204.
Plaintiff's second argument is also without merit. Plaintiff has neither stated nor supported any allegations of intentional or willful conduct by Defendant. Indeed, Plaintiff's causes of action expressly state a claim based on negligence. To the extent Plaintiff suggests Defendants' conduct rises to the level of willful negligence, the Court finds that this "is not enough to avoid the [TWCA's] bar." Therefore, the Court rejects Plaintiff's contention that he is entitled to the exception based on an employer's willful conduct.
Bomar, 9 S.W.3d at 807.
See TEX. LABOR CODE § 406.032(1)(C) (Vernon 1996).
Finally, the Court rejects Plaintiff's contention that Defendants have not adequately established their participation under the TWCA at the time of Plaintiff's injuries. Defendants have submitted the sworn, uncontroverted statement of their human resources consultant that Defendants have participated under the TWCA since January 1998. Plaintiff's unsupported assertions to the contrary do not suffice to raise a question of fact on this issue. The Court holds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claims of negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention.
See Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1 at ¶ 22.
VI. Equilon Enterprises
Defendants' final basis for summary judgment is that Plaintiff was never employed by Equilon Enterprises, so all claims against that Defendant should be dismissed. Defendants assert that Equilon Enterprises was never responsible for Plaintiff's work environment, did not prepare his work schedules, did not establish his daily duties, did not issue a paycheck or provide any benefits to Plaintiff, and did not participate in any employment decisions regarding Plaintiff.
See Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 17-18.
Plaintiff argues that the "integrated enterprise" test applies in this case. The Fifth Circuit has identified a rule "that superficially distinct entities may be exposed to liability upon a finding that they represent a single, integrated enterprise: a single employer." The test looks at four factors to determine "whether distinct entities constitute an integrated enterprise . . .: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) centralized control of labor relations; (3) common management; and (4) common ownership or financial control." The second factor traditionally has been considered the most important, "such that courts have focused almost exclusively on one question: which entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters relating to the person claiming discrimination?"
Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id.
Skidmore v. Precision Printing and Pkg., Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 617 (5th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff cites to company policies originating from Equilon Enterprises, with which he was required to comply. He also argues that he received checks from Equilon Enterprises. Finally, he asserts that in-house counsel from Equilon Enterprises represented Equilon Pipeline during Plaintiff's EEOC process.
However, these allegations do not suffice to establish that Equilon Enterprises and Equilon Pipeline are merely "superficially distinct entities." As in Skidmore, the record in this case establishes that Equilon Pipeline hired, fired, promoted, and demoted its own employees without consulting Equilon Enterprises. Furthermore, the checks submitted as evidence by Plaintiff show that the funds were remitted by Equilon Pipeline. Finally, the summary judgment evidence submitted by Defendants reveals that Equilon Enterprises did not participate in any of the labor decisions of Equilon Pipeline.
Trevino, 701 F.2d at 404.
See Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. K.
See Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1 at ¶ 8.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact about whether the "integrated enterprise" principle should apply in this case. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED on this issue, and Plaintiff's claims against Equilon Enterprises should be DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact with regard to his hostile work environment claims under Title VII and § 1981. Additionally, for purposes of these claims, Plaintiff may refer to acts occurring prior to June 17, 1999. Plaintiff may also cite acts occurring prior to April 1, 1999 as relevant background evidence for these claims. Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact, however, with regard to: (1) his discrimination or retaliation claims under Title VII and § 1981; (2) his claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress; or (3) his claims of negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, and these claims will be DISMISSED. Finally, Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of fact that he was employed by Equilon Enterprises, so that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment and dismissal with respect to all claims.
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention are DISMISSED.
It is further ORDERED that all claims against Defendant Equilon Enterprises, L.L.C. are DISMISSED.