Opinion
C/A No. 6:20-1825-JMC-KFM
08-17-2020
Randall Loyis Simpson, Plaintiff, v. Ryan White, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on May 11, 2020 (doc. 1). By order filed June 22, 2020, the plaintiff was informed that his complaint was subject to summary dismissal because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that he could attempt to cure the defects identified in his complaint by filing an amended complaint within 14 days (doc. 17). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his case be dismissed (id. at 9-10). On July 13, 2020, the plaintiff's amended complaint was entered on the docket (doc. 23). On August 3, 2020, the plaintiff filed a letter purporting to be additional allegations in both this case and another case brought by the plaintiff (doc. 29). Nevertheless, because the plaintiff's amended complaint likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the case.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee in the Florence County Detention Center ("the Detention Center"), brings this § 1983 action alleging that the defendant has violated his constitutional rights (doc. 23). As an initial matter, the court takes judicial notice of the plaintiff's proceedings in the General Sessions Court of Florence County. See Florence County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Florence/Publiclndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2018A2110200886, 2018A2110200887, 2018A2110200888, 2018A2110200889) (last visited August 10, 2020).
Phillips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record."); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that '[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'").
The plaintiff alleges that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated by the defendant because he has been denied a preliminary hearing even though he submitted a timely request for one (doc. 23 at 4, 5, 6). He contends that he asked his public defender about having a preliminary hearing, but she indicated that his request was filed too late (id. at 11). The plaintiff contends that he has exhausted his appeals of the matter within the state court system, but has not received relief (id.).
For injuries, the plaintiff alleges that his rights have been violated and he has not been provided a preliminary hearing (id. at 7). For relief, the plaintiff seeks the scheduling of a preliminary hearing and monetary damages (id. at 7, 8).
Three weeks after filing his amended complaint, the plaintiff submitted a letter with additional allegations, which he submitted in this matter and in Case Number 6:20-cv-02036 (doc. 29). In that document, the plaintiff alleges interference with his mail and retaliation by Teresa Cunningham and Rachel Flowers (id. at 1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This case is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendant. However, the plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
As an initial matter, the court notes that the plaintiff has been warned in prior cases here that, absent extraordinary circumstances, this court will not interfere with his pending state criminal charges. See Simpson v. Florence Cty. Complex Solicitor's Ofc., C/A No. 6:19-cv-03095-JMC (D.S.C.); Simpson v. Johnson, C/A No. 6:20-cv-02552-JMC-KFM (D.S.C.). Thus, this matter is patently frivolous, as the plaintiff again seeks federal interference with his pending state criminal charges. See Harley v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (finding that a complaint is frivolous when it raises a meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions). Younger Abstention
With respect to the plaintiff's request that the court require the Florence County General Sessions Court schedule a preliminary hearing on his charges, the plaintiff is requesting, for the third time, that this court interfere with or enjoin the pending state criminal prosecutions against him (see generally doc. 23). As noted above, the plaintiff has four pending charges in the Florence County Court of General Sessions: one count of possession of a weapon by a person convicted of a violent felony, one count of armed robbery (with a deadly weapon), one count of first degree burglary, and one count of assault/attempted murder. See Florence County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2018A2110200886, 2018A2110200887, 2018A2110200888, 2018A2110200889) (last visited August 10, 2020). Because a federal court may not award injunctive relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this court should abstain from interfering with it. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
See Simpson v. Johnson, C/A No. 6:20-cv-02552-JMC (D.S.C.); Simpson v. Florence Cty. Complex Solicitor's Ofc, et al., C/A No. 6:19-cv-03095-JMC (D.S.C.).
Here, the first criterion is met, as the plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. As for the second criterion, the Supreme Court has stated that the "States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting "'that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'" Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Here, as noted above, there are no allegations against Sol. White; however, presuming the claim involves the plaintiff's request for a preliminary hearing, the plaintiff has the opportunity to address this matter in the state court proceedings. Additionally, contrary to the plaintiff's allegations, correspondence with his attorney and the solicitor do not "exhaust" his available state court remedies. Nevertheless, the plaintiff has not made a showing of "extraordinary circumstances" justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) ("A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where 'extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm."). Therefore, because the plaintiff requests that this court interfere in state criminal proceedings against him, this court should abstain from hearing this action.
As for the plaintiff's damages claims, federal courts typically stay rather than dismiss claims for money damages during the pendency of the state court proceedings. See Wallace v. Cato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007). However, here, the plaintiff's damages claims are subject to summary dismissal and appear unrelated to his challenge to his criminal charges; thus, the court finds it appropriate to address the plaintiff's claims.
Section 1983 Claims
Solicitor Ryan White
The plaintiff's claims against Sol. White are subject to summary dismissal based upon prosecutorial immunity. Other than being named as a defendant, Sol. White is not included in the amended complaint (see doc. 23). However, liberally construed, it appears the plaintiff names Sol. White as a defendant because he is the prosecutor assigned to the plaintiff's pending criminal charges and has not sought a preliminary hearing. Nevertheless, prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings such as criminal trials, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial motions hearings. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 267-71 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff's allegations involve actions connected with judicial proceedings (criminal charges). The plaintiff's bare allegations, including no personal allegations regarding Sol. White, are insufficient to overcome the immunity afforded to Sol. White; as such, he should be dismissed from this action.
Denial of Access to the Courts Claim
The plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights have been violated because he has been prevented from accessing the courts—although his amended complaint appears to omit allegations regarding access to the courts (see doc. 23). Such a claim for denial of access to the courts must be pled with specificity. Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996). Moreover, to maintain a valid constitutional claim for denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must show actual injury. Cochran, 73 F.3d at 1317; see Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). The plaintiff has not plausibly alleged actual injury. Indeed, the plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional injury with respect to his pending state criminal charges because, although dissatisfied, the plaintiff concedes that he is represented by the public defender's office (doc. 23 at 6, 11). See Holcomb v. Greenville Cty. Clerk of Court, C/A No. 6:17-cv-02001-MGL-SVH, 2017 WL 4023128, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 23, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 4012389 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2017) (noting that "representation by counsel negates a prisoner's claim of inadequate access to the courts" (citing Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1084 (4th Cir. 1993)). Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the plaintiff's denial of access to law library claim is subject to dismissal.
Retaliation and Mail Interference Claims
To the extent the plaintiff's letter regarding retaliation and mail interference asserts claims that can be construed to be included in his amended complaint, such claims should be dismissed because the plaintiff is pursuing them in another case. See Simpson v. Cunningham, C/A No. 6:20-cv-02036-JMC-KFM (D.S.C.). Efficient judicial administration generally requires the federal courts to avoid duplicative federal legislation. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). Generally, a case pending in federal court "may be dismissed for reasons of wise judicial administration whenever it is duplicative of a parallel action already pending in another federal court." Nexsen Pruet, LLC v. Westport Ins. Corp., C/A No. 3:10-cv-00895-JFA, 2010 WL 3169378, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Motley Rice, LLC v. Baldwin & Baldwin, LLP, 518 F. Supp. 2d 688, 697 (D.S.C. 2007)). Suits are considered parallel if "substantially the same parties litigate substantially the same issues in different forums." New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 946 F.2d 1072, 1073 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing LaDuke v. Burlington N. R.R., 879 F.2d 1556, 1559 (7th Cir. 1989)). In the above-referenced case, the plaintiff is seeking relief against Ms. Cunningham and Ms. Flowers for retaliation and interference with his mail. See Simpson v. Cunningham, C/A No. 6:20-cv-02036-JMC-KFM, at doc. 15 (D.S.C.). As such, judicial efficiency supports dismissal of these claims in this action.
Abandoned Claims
As noted above, the plaintiff's amended complaint appears to abandon claims against Teresa Cunningham and Rachel Flowers—naming only Ryan White as a defendant (see doc. 23). Additionally, the amended complaint appears to abandon the plaintiff's claims regarding access to a law library in the Detention Center (docs. 18; 21; 23). The plaintiff was warned that an amended complaint replaces the complaint and "should be complete in itself" (doc. 17 at 9 (citing Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001)). As such, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the plaintiff's abandoned claims/defendants. To the extent the plaintiff did not intend to abandon his claims regarding access to the law library, for the reasons set forth in the court's prior order, the claims would still be subject to summary dismissal (see doc. 17 at 7-8).
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued June 22, 2020, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment. Despite filing an amended complaint, the plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the order dated June 22, 2020 (doc. 17). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court decline to give the plaintiff further leave to amend his complaint and dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (in a case where the district court had already afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, the district court was directed on remand to "in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order") (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)); see also Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2020). Additionally, as outlined above, because the plaintiff continues to file duplicate actions, name parties not amenable to suit, and to request federal court interference with his pending criminal charges, it is further recommended that this action be designated as a "strike" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge August 17, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).