Opinion
Record No. 0527-93-3
March 15, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY KENNETH I. DEVORE, JUDGE.
Clifford L. Harrison (Stone, Hamrick, Harrison Turk, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Max Jenkins (Jenkins and Jenkins, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Benton, Koontz and Willis.
Argued at Salem, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Thomas Webb Simpson (Thomas) appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarding permanent spousal support to Glenna Burgess Simpson (Glenna) incident to the couple's divorce. Thomas contends that the chancellor erred in determining that Glenna was entitled to spousal support. He further contends that in making that determination, the chancellor failed to consider the enumerated factors of Code § 20-107.1 and improperly considered factors not found in that statute. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the chancellor's award of spousal support.
The parties are familiar with the facts of this case. Accordingly, we restate only those facts necessary to explain our holding. Thomas and Glenna have two minor children. The couple separated on January 24, 1991. Glenna thereafter filed for divorce on the grounds of desertion, adultery and cruelty. Thomas filed an answer denying Glenna's grounds and a cross-bill asserting as his grounds for divorce constructive desertion and mental cruelty on Glenna's part.
At that time, Thomas was an employee of the Commonwealth of Virginia earning fifty-three thousand six hundred dollars ($53,600) per year. He subsequently took a position with the State of Maryland earning seventy thousand dollars ($70,000) per year.
Following the initial support hearing on April 17, 1991, the chancellor in a decree dated May 28, 1991 awarded Glenna temporary spousal support of eight hundred dollars ($800) per month and temporary child support of nine hundred forty dollars ($940) per month.
Subsequent to that award, Glenna began teaching full-time for the Montgomery County school system, earning approximately twenty-four thousand six hundred dollars ($24,600) per year.
In a hearing held October 22, 1992 testimony was presented concerning Glenna's living expenses. Hugh L. Sawyer, a certified public accountant, testified for Thomas concerning his analysis of Glenna's finances and claims of expenses made during a deposition from the previous year. Based upon this testimony and the testimony of the parties, the chancellor, in his final decree granting the divorce, set spousal support at six hundred dollars ($600) per month and child support at one thousand twenty-five dollars and sixty-five cents ($1,025.65) per month. The decree states that the award of child support was made according to the statutory guidelines, but does not reference the corresponding statute in making the spousal support award. Child support is not an issue in this appeal.
The decision to award spousal support rests within the sound discretion of the chancellor and will not be overturned unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. Via v. Via, 14 Va. App. 868, 870, 419 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1992). Although a party's financial condition after divorce may demonstrate in the abstract the ability of self-support, the chancellor must consider the subjective needs of each spouse in relation to each party's ability to provide for those needs and the other spouse's ability or resources to provide for those needs.Williams v. Williams, 4 Va. App. 19, 24, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1987). The station to which a party may have grown accustomed during marriage is to be considered in determining the need for support. Keyser v. Keyser, 7 Va. App. 405, 415, 374 S.E.2d 698, 704 (1988). Thus, the need of one spouse for support cannot be limited to an arithmetic evaluation of that spouse's current income and expenses. Accordingly, we reject Thomas' contention that the chancellor erred in awarding spousal support because evidence suggested that Glenna was able to meet her current expenses.
Having determined that an award of spousal support was appropriate, the chancellor was required to consider the enumerated factors of Code § 20-107.1 in setting the amount of that support. However, it is not necessary for the chancellor to recite specific findings on the statutory factors relating to the determination of support found in Code § 20-107.1.Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986). Here, the record shows that evidence pertinent to the factors to be considered was received and that evidence supports the chancellor's award.
Finally, Thomas, relying on Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va. App. 472, 375 S.E.2d 387 (1988), contends that the chancellor erred in considering the amount of temporary support as a factor in determining permanent support. Holmes, however, is inapplicable to this case. In Holmes, we held that where an award of permanent support was a substantial increase over temporary support, it was not error for the chancellor to fail to consider that fact in making his determination. Id. at 484, 375 S.E.2d at 394. We did not hold that it would have been error for him to do so. Thus, when a chancellor considers the level of temporary support in making an award of permanent support, he merely considers one of the "other factors . . . necessary to consider the equity between the parties." Code § 20-107.1(9).
For these reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.