Opinion
No. 29439.
May 12, 1931.
1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. Circuit court had jurisdiction on appeal in justice court action for loss of mule, where there was evidence that value was within justice's jurisdiction.
Where a suit was instituted in a justice of the peace court for the loss of property value in such suit at one hundred and fifty dollars, and where, on appeal, the plaintiff testified that the property was worth more than two hundred dollars, but that he filed the suit in deference to a member of the board of supervisors and because he desired to suffer a part of the loss, and where there is other testimony at which the property was valued in the circuit court at two hundred dollars, the circuit court is not defeated of its jurisdiction, as there is testimony that the property was of value which conferred jurisdiction on the justice court, and there is no proof of a fraudulent intent to defeat jurisdiction of another court.
2. ANIMALS. Property owner could sue county for value of live stock injured through dipping for eradication of cattle tick, though supervisors took no part in dipping ( Code 1930, section 265).
Under section 265, Code of 1930, section 3807a, Hemingway's Code Supp. 1921, providing that any person in any court of this state shall be entitled to recover from such county reasonable compensation for live stock owned by such person that may have been killed or permanently injured as the result of dipping for the eradication of cattle tick where such dipping was done under the supervision of the board of supervisors or the live stock sanitary board, the property owner is entitled to sue the county for the value of the property so injured done under the supervision of the live stock sanitary board, although the board of supervisors took no part in the conduct of the dipping.
3. ANIMALS. Legislature may impose liability upon county for property injured by dipping for eradication of cattle tick ( Code 1930, section 265).
It is competent for the legislature to impose liability such as is provided in section 265 of the Code of 1930 upon a county in favor of a citizen of a county whose property is injured in carrying on public health work for the eradication of cattle tick.
APPEAL from circuit court of Simpson county; HON.W.L. CRANFORD, Judge.
A.M. Edwards and W.D. Hilton, both of Mendenhall, for appellant.
We wish first to call the court's attention to assignment No. 7, in which we raised the point, that the suit was brought in justice court for one hundred and fifty dollars, when the testimony of appellee shows that the mule was worth two hundred and fifty dollars at the time the mule was dipped.
Section 2071 of the Code of 1930, sets out the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, and clearly states that actions for the recovery of the value of the personal property shall not exceed two hundred dollars.
Betts v. Falgo, 126 Miss. 262, 88 So. 636; Askew v. Askew, 49 Miss. 301.
No connection with the dipping of the mule was shown on the part of appellant county. Indeed none was charged in the declaration, or attempted to be proven.
It will be observed that a motion was made to exclude the testimony of the plaintiff, because the rules and regulations of the Live Stock Sanitary Board were not introduced in the evidence, as was necessary, if it was the purpose to hold appellant for the dipping of the mule, under the regulations and rules of the Live Stock Sanitary Board.
When regulations promulgated by the Live Stock Sanitary Board are relied on in any suit for any purpose they should be proven like ordinances.
Covington County v. Pickering, 123 Miss. 20, 85 So. 114.
J.P. A.K. Edwards, of Mendenhall, for appellee.
This court held in J.B. Ross v. Natchez, Jackson Columbus Railroad Co., 61 Miss. 12 as follows: "The test of the jurisdiction of the justice's court in an action for the value of property is the sum sued for, unless the court or jury is satisfied that the amount has been intentionally diminished for the purpose of giving the court jurisdiction.
Fenn v. Harrington, 54 Miss. 733.
Here we see that the plaintiff must not purposely demand less in order to get jurisdiction in the justice court.
There was no need to introduce the rules and regulations of the Sanitary Board for the reason that we were proceeding under the sections of the Code 1930 which was the same law at the time of the dipping. This county was required by law to assist in this tick eradication program.
Section 5425, Code 1930.
This aid on the part of the county was mandatory.
Section 5427.
It was a violation of the law for the appellee not to dip his mules before carrying them out of this county.
Section 5436.
The board of supervisors were required by law to furnish these vats.
Section 5428, Code 1930.
Hearsay evidence is competent where no objection is made and it is considered by the jury.
New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Maudlin, 103 Miss. 244, 60 So. 211.
Appellant contends under his first assignment of errors that this peremptory instruction should have been granted for the reason working mules of Simpson county were not being dipped and that said mule was dipped at the request of plaintiff, etc. The law required all animals to be dipped before being transported out of Simpson county and the law was followed in voluntary submission of the mule for the purpose of dipping as this was compulsory in order to take the mule out of the county. If the mule had stayed in the county there would have been no dipping. But appellant had the right to take the mule out of the county for any purpose not in violation of law. The evidence in this case is conclusive and makes a case beyond every reasonable doubt and we maintain that the court was correct in refusing the peremptory instruction.
A.H. Ball brought suit against Simpson county for the loss of a mule, placing the value thereof in his demand against the county at one hundred fifty dollars. He recovered judgment in the justice of the peace court for that amount, which was appealed to the circuit court. On that appeal the plaintiff testified as to the value of the mule, saying it was worth two hundred twenty-five dollars to him. He stated that he paid two hundred ten dollars each for four mules, one of which was the one sued for, and that he sold two of them for two hundred dollars each, and that the mule sued for was a better mule than the two sold. He said he placed the value thereof at one hundred fifty dollars because he wanted to share part of the loss. The person in charge of the dipping vat who dipped the mule sued for testified that, in his judgment, the mule was worth two hundred dollars. A jury, by their verdict in the circuit court, found the value to be one hundred dollars.
On appeal, it was first contended that the justice of the peace court had no jurisdiction, and that, consequently, the circuit court had none, because the plaintiff's testimony showed the mule to be worth more than two hundred dollars.
It is sufficient to say there was evidence as to the value of the mule being within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court; and it does not appear there was any fraudulent purpose to obtain jurisdiction in the justice of the peace court, but that such value was placed at one hundred fifty dollars out of deference to the judgment of a member of the board of supervisors.
It is only where property is undervalued for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction that the court will dismiss a suit upon that ground. Ordinarily, the court assumes that suits are brought in good faith; and the question of value varies so much in the minds of different men, and there is such room for arriving at different opinions as to the value of personal property, that the court will only decline jurisdiction where it is manifest that the suit was not brought in good faith for the real value, but was brought for the purpose of either obtaining or defeating jurisdiction of a particular court.
It is next contended that the county is not liable because the proof shows that the mule was dipped under the authority and direction of the state live stock sanitary board, and not under the jurisdiction of the board of supervisors. In other words that, under a particular order of the board of supervisors, mules engaged in plowing were not required to be dipped, and that the county was not in charge of the dipping as such, although it had prepared the vats in which the dipping was done.
We think it is clear that this case shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the dipping was done under the provisions of the live stock sanitary board, and that property owners were required to dip their stock. By section 265, Code of 1930, section 3807a, Hemingway's Code Supp. 1921, it is expressly provided that: "Any person in any county in this state shall be entitled to recover from such county reasonable compensation for any live stock owned by such person that may have been killed or permanently injured, or that may hereafter be killed or permanently injured in the process of dipping or as a result of such dipping for the eradication of the cattle tick, where such dipping was done under the supervision of the board of supervisors or the live stock sanitary board."
It is, of course, competent for the legislature to impose liability of this character upon the counties. This was held in Hancock County v. Shaw, 120 Miss. 48, 81 So. 647, in which opinion the court cited the case of New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 24 L.Ed. 521, where the Supreme Court of the United States held to like effect.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, and the judgment of the court below will be affirmed.
Affirmed.