Opinion
No. 7:02-CV-037-R
March 14, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This is an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate confined in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Iowa Park, Texas. On February 21. 2002, questions were issued to Plaintiff; his answers to which were filed on March 11, 2002. Simmons alleges that, on February 9, 2001, he was subjected to the use of excessive force by prison guards. See Complaint ¶ V. As a result, he claims to have suffered mental anguish, emotional distress, bruised ribs, a bloody nose, swelling in the head area, lacerations, abrasions, pain and suffering. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 6.
"To prevail on an eighth amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must establish that force was not `applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, [but] maliciously and sadistically to cause harm' and that he suffered an injury." Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 601-02 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992)).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff concedes that force was used against him only after he refused to return a set of handcuffs to prison authorities. Complaint ¶ V; Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 1 8. Moreover, Plaintiff states no facts which would establish that the force used to retrieve the handcuffs was applied maliciously and sadistically in an effort to cause harm. See Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 4. Assuming the truth of Plaintiff's factual allegations, the use of force in this instance was justified. In situations such as this, "[prison officials] are entitled to wide-ranging deference" See Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that the use of mace to quell a disturbance caused by inmates on a bus did not constitute excessive force). "The amount of force that is constitutionally permissible . . . must be judged by the context in which that force is deployed." Id. (quoting Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996)). The use of force does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when reasonably necessary to subdue a recalcitrant prisoner. See Clemmons v. Greggs, 509 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 946, 96 S.Ct. 360 (1975); Williams v. Hoyt, 556 F.2d 1336, 1339-40 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 946, 98 S.Ct. 1530 (1978).
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any physical injury as a result of the use of force. See Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 6.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) provides that:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
Plaintiff's claims of bruising, bloody nose, swelling, lacerations and abrasions do not constitute "physical injury" as required under § 1997e(e). See Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a sore bruised ear lasting for three days did not constitute a physical injury as required to state a claim for excessive force); Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex 1997) (holding that sore muscles, scratches, abrasions and bruises do not constitute a "physical injury" within the meaning of § 1997e(e)). Simmons cannot prevail on this claim.
A district court may dismiss a complaint filed by a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis if it determines that the action is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i). An action is frivolous if' it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32 (1989); Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863 (1991). A complaint is without an arguable basis in law if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" Nietzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. The claims set forth in the case at bar have no arguable basis in law.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the complaint is hereby dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)i).
SO ORDERED this 14th day of March, 2002.