Opinion
Civil No. 3:03-CV-0740-H
September 10, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed June 23, 2003; Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue, filed June 23, 2003; and the responses thereto. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the motion to dismiss should be DENIED in part, that the motion to transfer venue should be GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and that the case should be TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division.
I. Background
On April 10, 2003, Plaintiff James C. Simmang ("Simmang") filed the instant action against the Texas Board of Law Examiners ("TBLE"), as well as its individual members in their official capacities, for declaratory and injunctive relief relating to Simmang's efforts to take and to pass the Texas bar examination. In applying to sit for the bar examination, Simmang requested testing accommodations due to an alleged learning disability. Although Simmang alleges that he requested an accommodation of "double time" in which to take the bar examination, TBLE alleges that Simmang only requested "time and a half" in which to take the bar examination. According to TBLE, it granted Simmang's request for a "time and a half accommodation and allowed Simmang to take the bar examination with the "time and a half accommodation for the July 1999, February 2001, and July 2002 sittings. Simmang failed the bar examination all three times. On February 6, 2003, TBLE held a hearing to consider Simmang's contention that he had passed the bar examination because he had passed all three sections of the bar examination, although not all in the same sitting. TBLE denied Simmang's request to be granted a passing score, and the instant action ensued. In this action, Simmang seeks declaratory and injunctive relief that he passed the bar examination or, in the alternative, that he is entitled to a "double time" testing accommodation for the July 2004 sitting of the bar examination. Simmang brings suit pursuant to Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 121.010 of the Texas Human Resources Code, and the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Defendants now seek to dismiss the suit on a variety of grounds, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (D.s' MTD at 3-5.) In the alternative, Defendants seek to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division. (D.'s Mot. to Trans. Ven. at 4.) Before addressing the motion to transfer venue, the Court must first determine whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Exparte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868), that "[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause").
II. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that "federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts." Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Leidthe v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)). The Fifth Circuit has extended the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "to deprive the federal district courts of jurisdiction over the claims of individuals who are aggrieved by the judicial acts of state agencies controlled by state courts and who deliberately bypass available channels of state court review." Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing the effect of its holding in Thomas v. Kadish, 748 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1984)). In the instant case, it is clear that Simmang did not "deliberately bypass available channels of state court review." As noted by the parties, the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar do not provide an express right to appeal the actions of TBLE in state court, except actions relating to character and fitness. (D.s' Br. at 4; P.'s Resp. at 5.) See also TEX. R. GOVERN. BAR ADMIS. XV (West 2003). Furthermore, although Defendants contend that Simmang could have brought this case in state court pursuant to Rule XV of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar, they cite to no authority for their contention. Because this case does not involve an action of the TBLE regarding Simmang's character or fitness, Simmang did not "deliberately bypass available channels of state court review" with respect to his claims against Defendants. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case, and Defendants motion to dismiss is DENIED to that extent.
The Court need not decide whether Rule XV of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar actually provides a "channel of state court review" with respect to Simmang's claims against Defendants because, even if it does, the lack of an express right to do so in the rule and the lack of any precedent for such a suit establish that Simmang did not " deliberately bypass [an] available channel of state court review."
III. Motion to Transfer Venue
Having concluded that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case, the Court will now address Defendants' motion to transfer venue. Defendants seek to transfer venue to the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, on the basis that venue is not proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). (D.s' Mot. to Trans. Yen. at 4.) Plaintiff contends that venue is proper in this district because at least two of the named defendants reside in this district and a substantial part of the acts giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in Dallas. (P.'s Resp. at 2, 3.) The Court need not address whether venue is proper in this district under § 1391(b) because, even if it is, the Court concludes that transfer of venue is appropriate under § 1404(a) for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. See Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 39 F. Supp.2d 1008, 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (transferring a case sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
Section 1404(a) provides that "[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (West 1993). Because the plaintiff has the privilege of determining venue, the burden is on the defendant "to demonstrate why the forum should be changed." Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1966). In determining whether a transfer of venue is appropriate under § 1404(a), a district court should consider:
the convenience of the parties and witnesses, the availability of process to compel the presence of unwilling witnesses, the cost of obtaining the presence of witnesses, the relative ease of access to sources of proof, calendar congestion, where the events in issue to place, and the interests of justice in general.Burlington Northern Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Herzog Services, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 503, 504 (N.D. Tex. 1998). Transfer of venue pursuant to § 1404(a) is within the discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989). In the instant case, the Court must first determine whether the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, is a forum in which the action "might have been brought" within the meaning of § 1404(a). See In re Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2003). According to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b), venue is proper in "a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (West 1993). Defendant TBLE is headquartered in Austin, Texas. In addition, each of the individual defendants, who are members of TBLE and who are sued in their official capacities only, are considered residents of Austin for purposes of venue because they perform their official duties in Austin. See Florida Nursing Home Ass'n. v. Page, 616 F.2d 1355, 1360 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds 450 U.S. 147 (1981) (recognizing that state officials might have more than one residence for purposes of venue, although the general rule remains that officials who are sued in their official capacities reside where they perform their official duties). Thus, the instant action "might have been brought" in the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, within the meaning of § 1404(a).
As a final matter, the Court must determine whether a transfer of venue would be convenient for the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (West 1993). As discussed above, all ten defendants reside in Austin, Texas, for purposes of venue. In addition, Defendants maintain their records and make their official policies and decisions in Austin, including the records, policies, and decisions at issue in this case. Thus, the cost to Defendants of defending this suit in this district significantly outweighs the cost to Simmang of prosecuting the suit in the Western District of Texas, Austin Division. Finally, the Court notes that if Simmang had been required to bring this suit in state court under Rule XV of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar, he would have been required to do so in the courts of Travis County. See TEX. R. GOVERN. BAR ADMIS. XV (West 2003). Accordingly, Simmang is no more disadvantaged by a transfer to the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, than he would have been if he had been required to bring this suit in the courts of Travis County. For all of the above reasons, the Court concludes that transfer of venue to the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, is appropriate pursuant to § 1404(a) and must outweigh Simmang's privilege to bring suit in the venue of his choice.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and Defendants' motion to transfer venue is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Accordingly, the case is hereby TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division.
SO ORDERED.