Opinion
No. 05-14-01272-CR
01-28-2016
SOKHAN SIM, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 296-82427-2013
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
A jury convicted appellant Sokhan Sim of injury to a child by a reckless or criminally negligent act rejecting appellant's defense of reasonable parental discipline. In two issues on appeal, appellant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
The State indicted appellant for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and injury to a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011), § 22.04 (West Supp. 2014). Appellant pleaded not guilty and asserted the justification of reasonable parental discipline. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.61 (West 2011). At trial, appellant called two witnesses: appellant and his wife, Sarann Seun. Seun testified that, one evening while collecting dirty clothes to launder from her daughter C.S.'s backpack, she found school assignments C.S. had failed with Seun's forged signature on them and assignments C.S. had not turned in. Seun testified that C.S. had forged signatures at least three previous times, for which C.S. "wasn't really disciplined" except that they denied C.S. privileges. Seun also testified that C.S. had also attempted to steal nail polish from Target while with Seun. Seun testified that, after C.S. denied forging the signatures that evening, she disciplined C.S. by striking her with a hanger "probably [on] the arm or back." Seun then found school pictures in C.S.'s backpack that C.S. had not paid for and should have turned in at school.
Seun testified that, after she informed appellant—C.S.'s father—about the forged signatures and school pictures, appellant disciplined C.S. by slapping C.S. on the arm "[p]robably one, two, times." She also testified that appellant yelled at C.S. and threw a small toy chair because appellant was upset and "just to scare her for her to stop lying." Seun testified that she did not believe that appellant threw the chair at C.S. Seun testified that appellant then told C.S. to get a knife for him, and after she got a knife for appellant, he said, "if you won't stop lying, I'm going to cut off your tongue." Seun testified that she did not believe that appellant meant that he would cut out C.S.'s tongue nor did she believe C.S. was in danger. She felt that appellant's discipline of C.S. was necessary to try to teach her not to lie. Seun also testified that C.S. was a good student who was involved in extracurricular activities. On cross-examination, Seun testified that, when appellant hit C.S. one to two times on the arm, it was "reasonable under the circumstances." Seun testified that she was not sure how C.S.'s grades were "really good" even though she failed numerous assignments. She also testified that the chair that appellant threw bounced off a wall and hit C.S. probably on her feet or back while she was laying on the floor. Seun testified that appellant also threw a remote control to "get her attention" and that appellant's threat to cut out C.S.'s tongue scared her. When asked if he could have threatened C.S. without having her retrieve a knife, Seun testified, "I just believe, at that time, when you're just upset, you're disappointed at the same time, you just don't have common sense. You just don't think." She testified that appellant could have caused some bruises that were apparent in photographs of C.S. but that some of the bruises could have resulted "from him striking her" or from C.S. "playing with her brother." Seun also testified that she was not aware of bruises on C.S.'s back until trial and she did not believe that appellant caused bruising on C.S.'s back.
Seun testified that she "didn't see everything." In addition, on cross-examination, Seun testified that appellant struck C.S. on the "arm, shoulder[.]"
Seun testified that she found additional failed assignments and forged documents in C.S.'s school locker the following morning.
Appellant testified that—after Seun told him of C.S.'s "unfinished work, forged signatures," and "pictures that weren't turned into the school"—he struck C.S. with his left hand "across her upper body, shoulder, arm area" "several times[,]" although he was unable to say how many times. He testified that he struck her because their previous disciplinary measures of denying her privileges had not worked, so he "had to take some other course of actions to get [his] point across to her that" he was "serious at this point" that she needed to change her attitude and actions. He testified that he "kind of yelled" at C.S. and nudged her with his foot to have her obey his command that she get up, but that he did not kick her. He also testified that he threw a Fisher-Price chair "towards her direction." He testified, "I was frustrated and she was walking away. . . . [To get] her attention, I just grabbed the closest thing to me, which was the chair, and just flung it against the wall." When asked why he asked C.S. to bring a knife from the kitchen, he testified that it "was more of a scare tactic[] to her" and that "there's things that you probably said that you didn't mean to say just to kind of scare your kids." He testified that, when he said that he would cut off her tongue if she lied again, it was "a figure of speech more or less of an action that [he] was going to take" to "get [his] point across" that he was "serious" but that he "[a]bsolutely" did not intend to cut out her tongue if she lied again. Appellant testified that C.S. was a good student at the time of the incident, although her "behavior and her grades started falling right around" that year in school. Appellant also testified that he supported his daughter in her extracurricular activities and that he loves his daughter.
Appellant testified that he struck her with his left hand because he had recently had surgery on his right hand.
He testified that the knife that C.S. brought to him was a small steak knife.
Appellant testified that her falling grades included some grades in the lower 90's and a progress report that included a couple of B's.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that, although his usual mode of discipline was to deny her privileges, in this instance, he employed force. He testified that he was "very upset with her" and that he did not regret the things he said and what he did to her that evening. He also testified that he did not recall how many times he struck C.S., and that he struck her in the "upper body area" meaning "anything from waist up to your shoulder area" including her shoulder and back area. He also testified that he nudged C.S. with his foot to get her to stand up, and when she did not stand up, he "started hitting her across her body." He testified that he did not cause any injuries to C.S. when he nudged her with his foot. He also testified that, when he struck C.S., he caused the bruises on her arms, but that he did not cause two circle bruises on her back—which he stated that he saw for the first time at trial in photographs—because they were not "consistent with an open hand striking or hitting her across the back." In addition, he testified that he did not recall whether the chair that he threw "[o]ut of frustration" and "in her direction" struck C.S. after it bounced off a wall. He further testified that he did not expect C.S. to get a knife for him when he asked her to do so, but he acknowledged that she obeyed him when she brought it to him. He testified that he "held the knife" and "looked at" C.S. and stated, "If you're going to lie to me again, I'm going to cut out your tongue."
Appellant also testified that he truthfully stated to a CPS investigator that he "spanked" C.S. "all over[,]" meaning on her arm, buttocks, and back.
Testifying as a State witness, C.S. testified that, in May 2012 when these events occurred, she was ten years old and in fourth grade, did well in school, made good grades, and did not get in trouble in class. She testified that her mom became angry when she discovered incomplete homework in her backpack and informed her father. C.S. testified that she "had a lot of problems" and "some problems" with not completing her homework, but that she did not "ever get in trouble in school for that" and that she did "do her homework." C.S. testified that her father did not get angry often, and that, "[w]hen he was angry, he would just tell [her] not to lie to him again about incomplete homework." She testified that, on that evening, he became angry and hit her probably with his hands, although she did not recall where he hit her. She did not remember whether he hit her with an object or kicked her. She also testified that it hurt while her father hit her, and that she was not in pain for more than an hour, was not in pain when she went to bed that night, and was a little sore the following morning. She also testified that, while her father hit her, she blamed herself for lying about the incomplete homework. C.S. also testified that, after her father hit her, he threw "the chair at the wall, and it did not hit" her. She testified that then he told her "to get up and get a knife" and that she did so and handed it to her father, who said, "Come here. I'm going to cut your tongue off." She testified that she "was scared" but knew "that he wasn't going to hurt" her. She also testified that her father had never threatened her like that before. C.S. testified that, the following day, she did not remember being in pain, but recalled that she had a bruise on her arm and she thought she had a bruise on her back. She testified that the bruises were caused by "physical contact from [her] dad" from "the incident that had happened the day before[.]" She testified that the photographs in evidence showed bruising caused by her dad.
On cross-examination, C.S. testified that, the following morning, her mother found additional incomplete assignments with her mother and father's forged signatures on them in her school locker even though she had told her mother that she had not lied about anything else.
C.S. testified, "I don't remember most of it" and that she had tried to block out the events of that day from her memory.
On cross-examination, C.S. testified that the chair that her father threw was a "children's plastic picnic table chair[]" that was hollow inside. She also testified that she had signed her parent's signature on the teacher's notes accompanying her incomplete homework assignments and that she had previously been in trouble "for lying about stealing something at Target," but that her parents did not hit her "at that time[.]" She testified that her father struck her with his hand on the upper part of her body—her arm and back—but not in the face.
Six other witnesses for the State testified about the extent of C.S.'s injuries, C.S.'s character, and events during the day after the incident. The nurse at C.S.'s school, Shannon Hershberger, testified that C.S. came to her office the next morning complaining of "burning" in her shoulder. She testified that C.S. had a large bruise on her shoulder and down her arm and some bruising on her other arm. Hershberger testified that she was concerned and called C.S.'s parents. She spoke with appellant, explained what she saw, expressed her concern, and advised that the injuries needed a doctor's attention. When appellant asked to speak to C.S. and Hershberger handed the phone to C.S., the phone disconnected and no one answered the phone when Hershberger and C.S. called back. Hershberger testified that she contacted CPS and the police; both came to the school to investigate. The police took photos of her injuries, which were entered into evidence at trial. Hershberger testified that, during the police investigation, she saw multiple bruises on C.S.'s back and a knot on her head.
Hershberger testified that Seun eventually returned Hershberger's call, and Hershberger communicated the same information to her.
Maureen Messner, a member of the McKinney Police Department and a resource officer for C.S.'s elementary school, testified that she saw a knot on C.S.'s head "about the size of a half dollar[,]" "discoloration on her face[,]" a mark on her right elbow "that she said hurt to touch[,]" "a large bruise on her left shoulder" that "continued across the arm" and that C.S. stated hurt when she lifted it prior to ninety degrees, "scratch marks" on her left and right sides, and a discolored mark on her tailbone area that was painful to her when touched. Messner also testified that C.S. complained of pain. When asked to compare C.S.'s injuries with other cases of suspected child abuse Messner had seen, Messner testified that C.S.'s case was "probably [Messner's] more worst-off case." Messner testified that the injuries did not reflect the results of a typical fall or scuffle because "there were so many of them" and they would not "hurt to the degree of pain that she was complaining of." On cross-examination, Messner testified that she was not aware of whether C.S. was examined by a doctor or sent to a hospital.
C.S.'s homeroom teacher, Michael Dey, testified that C.S. was a fourth grade student who he thought was ten years old at the time of these events. He testified that she was a good student with a good attitude who was trusted, very consistent in her work, well liked by her peers, and "a good all-around kid." He testified that he did not recall any problems with C.S. turning in her homework and, if she forgot an assignment—which "was rare"—she promptly asked for another copy and completed it. Dey testified that C.S. had a bubbly personality, but she was not overly dramatic and would not "make up things[.]" He also testified that, during that day at school, C.S. seemed very withdrawn and almost emotionless and that she did not seem like she was trying to get anyone in trouble. Dey testified that, when asked, C.S. did not want to discuss her injuries, but eventually she told him that "she had been hit with a chair" and, when asked to explain, C.S. thought and said, "No. I fell on a chair." He testified that she later told him that her father had hit her with a chair, kicked her, and hit her on the arm, that "there were marks on her arm from her dad hitting her with chopsticks[,]" and that she had marks on "other places[.]" On cross-examination, Dey testified that, when asked why her father hit her, "[i]nitially she said she didn't know, but then she said that her father had been drinking" and "he just seemed really angry."
Bridgette Blackwell, C.S.'s math and science teacher, testified that C.S. was responsible, hardworking, and happy and she was not a trouble maker or overly dramatic. Blackwell testified that C.S. "turned her assignments in on time" and she did not recall a "problem with her not turning in homework[.]" Blackwell also testified that C.S. was not the type of student to want to go to the nurse to get out of class. Blackwell testified that C.S. asked to see the nurse that morning, complaining that her arm "definitely hurt[,]" and Blackwell saw that there was "either a dark rash or bruise of some kind" on C.S.'s arm. Blackwell testified that C.S. did not seem angry or vindictive.
On cross-examination, Blackwell testified that she was not sure what was on C.S.'s arm, and that she "just knew that it was darker than" "the rest of her arm was."
A CPS investigator in C.S.'s case, Andy Mills, testified that he observed three horizontal marks on C.S.'s arm, bruises "on her left shoulder down to her elbow on her bicep area[,]" bruises on her back, including "one on her lower back, which was probably about the size of an apple[,]" and "some scattered bruises throughout probably about the size of a quarter." Mills testified that the bruising indicated that she had been hit by somebody and reflected what "seem[ed] to be excessive discipline." He testified that, after a forensic interview of C.S. and her brother and interviews of appellant and Seun and after observing C.S.'s injuries, he concluded that abuse had occurred. Mills testified that he reported in a CPS investigation report that the abuse was moderately severe. He also testified that he concluded through a risk assessment that (1) a caregiver significantly lacked the parenting skills needed to meet the child's behavioral and developmental needs, (2) behaviors or discipline practices seemed violent or out of control, (3) the discipline employed was disproportionately harsh compared to the misbehavior "due to the bruising" that C.S. "received on her arms and her back," "her making an outcry of the abuse[,]" and "the knife incident[,]" (4) the caregiver made or expressed a credible threat that might result in immediate danger or serious harm, (5) the maltreatment was premeditated, bizarre, or sadistic, and (6) the caregiver's explanations were inconsistent with the child's injuries or circumstances because appellant's statement that he only nudged C.S. with his foot contradicted C.S.'s description and the bruising on C.S.'s back was more consistent with striking than nudging. On cross-examination, he testified that—although CPS could have removed C.S. if they felt there was an immediate danger to C.S.'s physical or mental welfare—C.S. went home with her parents that day. Mills also testified that he did not believe that appellant meant to cut out C.S.'s tongue and that he was trying to scare her to prevent her from lying again. He testified that he understood that appellant "was pretty upset" although he did not know if appellant threw a chair at C.S. or if he threw a chair at a wall, which then hit her. Mills testified that appellant described problems with C.S. lying for about a year and that he was "fed up with all the lies." On redirect examination, Mills testified that he did not believe that "threatening to cut a ten-year-old's tongue out with a knife [wa]s a reasonable way to scare a child into not lying[.]" He also testified that he did not feel that C.S. was exaggerating or being overly dramatic or emotional, angry, or vindictive.
Mills testified that they signed a CPS safety plan which required that they not physically discipline C.S. Mills testified that appellant and Seun objected to the CPS requirement that they take parenting classes but that, after a court ordered them do so, they took parenting classes.
Mills also testified that C.S. did not mention the forged signatures or lying to her parents, but rather stated that she got into trouble for not doing her homework.
Natalie Irwin, a detective with the Crimes Against Children Unit of the McKinney Police Department, testified that she concluded that C.S. had been assaulted by her father based "on her statements, based on the location of her injuries, based on [the] corroborating forensic interview by her brother, based on witness statements." Irwin also testified that she takes the defense of a parent's ability to discipline a child into consideration when conducting her investigation and that, based on everything that she viewed in the case, she felt like the injuries C.S. sustained were excessive.
A jury convicted appellant of injury to a child by reckless or criminally negligent act. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04. In accordance with an agreement between appellant and the State, the trial court sentenced appellant to two years in state jail, but suspended the sentence and placed appellant on community supervision for four years. Appellant then filed this appeal. In two issues, appellant argues that the evidence is not legally or factually sufficient to support the finding that appellant did not reasonably believe that the force he used was necessary to discipline his child.
In his legal sufficiency argument, appellant argues that there was not legally sufficient evidence to support the finding that he did not reasonably believe that the force he used was necessary to discipline his child or to safeguard or promote her welfare.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict, we apply only one standard—the legal sufficiency standard—to evaluate whether evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). As a result, "when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360; see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ("The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."). The jury is the exclusive judge of witness credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). It is also the exclusive province of the jury to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. Id. Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
ANALYSIS
Appellant concedes that the evidence establishes that his actions caused bodily injury to C.S. and that a rational trier of fact viewing the evidence could have found that appellant's actions in striking C.S. were reckless or criminally negligent. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04. But appellant contends that his use of force was justified under the parental discipline defense in penal code section 9.61. Id. § 9.61. He argues that the evidence does not support the finding that appellant did not reasonably believe that the force he used was necessary to discipline his child or to safeguard or promote her welfare.
Appellant argues that the only evidence presented to support that finding is (1) evidence of the bruises or red marks on C.S. caused by his striking her with an open hand on her arm, shoulder, and back, (2) evidence that appellant was disciplining C.S. using force "when he struck her with his hand and foot" for "forging signatures, stealing school pictures, and lying[,]" and that C.S. previously "had issues with lying and stealing[,]" and (3) objective evidence of C.S.'s injuries in photographs. Appellant argues that, "in light of the disciplinary issues he was facing with his daughter"—including her "lying, stealing, and forging signatures on school assignments and progress report[s]"—a rational trier of fact could not find that it was unreasonable for appellant to hit her with an open hand and nudge her with his foot and cause marks on her body. Appellant contends that, because he did not use an instrument such as a belt or switch to strike C.S., he did not hit C.S. "for a lengthy period of time[,]" he did not "cause severe injury as evident in the pictures[,]" and C.S. did not need attention by a doctor or hospital, but only received ice from the school nurse, the evidence supports his position that he reasonably believed that his actions in disciplining his child were justified.
Appellant contends that there is no dispute concerning the evidence supporting each element of the offense with one exception: he argues that there is no probative evidence other than hearsay statements that appellant struck C.S. with a chair.
Appellant argues that, if a reasonable trier of fact could find that the discipline in this case was unreasonable, then any parent who uses their hand to strike their child and causes bruises or marks could be convicted of a felony. In addition, appellant argues that the jury's verdict was irrational because the jury did not find appellant guilty of aggravated assault by threat—which he argues reflects that the jury must have found that appellant acted reasonably in disciplining C.S. by threatening to cut her tongue out—and yet found that he was guilty of injury to a child by a reckless or criminally negligent act because he hit her with an open hand and nudged her with his foot. --------
The State argues that the jury had "ample basis" to reject appellant's parental discipline defense because (1) the severity of the injuries were not consistent with a reasonable belief that the injuries were necessary to discipline a ten-year-old child, as evidenced by testimony and photographs, and (2) testimony reflected that appellant's actions were excessive and that his explanation was inconsistent with C.S.'s injuries and statements. The State argues that a rational jury could have reasonably concluded that an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as appellant would not believe that the force appellant used against C.S. was necessary to discipline her or to promote or safeguard her welfare. The State also argues that appellant's arguments seek to supplant the jury's findings of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence.
Section 9.61 of the penal code provides in relevant part:
(a) The use of force, but not deadly force, against a child younger than 18 years is justified:
Id. Reasonable discipline of a child is a justification, and, as a result, the State is not required to affirmatively produce evidence refuting the claim, but rather the State has the burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Goulart v. State, 26 S.W.3d 5, 10 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref'd); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.02 (West 2011). A jury's finding that a defendant is guilty is an implicit finding against the defensive theory. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).(1) if the actor is the child's parent . . . ; and
(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to discipline the child or to safeguard or promote his welfare.
"The use of force under section 9.61 is not justified simply because of a parent's subjective belief that the force is necessary; rather, the use of force is justified only if a reasonable person would have believed the force was necessary to discipline the child or to safeguard or promote the child's welfare." Quattrocchi v. State, 173 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Assiter v. State, 58 S.W.3d 743, 748 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.)). The "reasonable belief" standard is an objective standard. Quattrocchi, 173 S.W.3d at 122; Assiter, 58 S.W.3d at 748; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (West Supp. 2014) (defining "[r]easonable belief" as "a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor").
The jury viewed photographs of the bruising on C.S.'s arms, shoulders, and back, and heard Hershberger, Messner, Dey, Blackwell, and Mills testify to the extent of C.S.'s injuries. Messner described a knot on C.S.'s head "about the size of a half dollar[,]" "discoloration on her face[,]" a mark on her right elbow "that she said hurt to touch[,]" "a large bruise on her left shoulder" that "continued across the arm" and that she stated hurt when she lifted it prior to ninety degrees, "scratch marks" on her left and right sides, and a discolored mark on her tailbone area that was painful to her when touched. Mills testified that he observed bruises "on her left shoulder down to her elbow on her bicep area[,]" bruises on her back, including "one on her lower back, which was probably about the size of an apple[,]" and "some scattered bruises throughout probably about the size of a quarter." C.S., Hershberger, Messner, and Blackwell testified that C.S. was in pain. Messner testified that C.S.'s case was "probably [Messner's] more worst-off case." Mills testified that the bruising reflected what "seem[ed] to be excessive discipline."
Appellant testified that he struck C.S. repeatedly with his hand, threw a chair in her direction, and asked her to retrieve a knife and—after she did—he held the knife and told her that he would cut her tongue out if she lied again. Although appellant testified that he did not intend to cut C.S's tongue out if she lied again and Seun and Mills testified that they did not believe that he intended to cut her tongue out, appellant testified that it was a "scare tactic[]" and Seun testified that appellant's threat scared C.S.
Appellant and Seun testified that appellant struck C.S. to discipline her for lying and to prevent her from lying in the future because C.S. had forged signatures on incomplete homework and otherwise lied and attempted to steal in the past. But C.S.'s teachers—Dey and Blackwell—testified that they did not recall any problems with C.S. turning in her homework. Dey testified that C.S. was a good student with a good attitude who was consistent in her work. Blackwell testified that C.S. was responsible, hardworking, and happy. CPS investigator Mills testified that he concluded that the discipline appellant used was disproportionately harsh compared to the misbehavior. In addition, Detective Irwin testified that she considered the parental discipline defense as part of her investigation and concluded that the injuries C.S. sustained were excessive.
It is the exclusive province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and the jury is the exclusive judge of witness credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 111. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and thereby rejected appellant's justification of the use of force by a parent for discipline or to safeguard or promote his child's welfare. Consequently, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. See Goulart, 26 S.W.3d at 10-12 (evidence, including photographs and testimony concerning strikes given, was sufficient to sustain verdict and rejection of parental discipline justification); Assiter, 58 S.W.3d at 748-51 (evidence, including testimony concerning bruising after spanking, was sufficient for trier of fact to reject appellant's parental discipline justification).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/
ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) 141272F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 296-82427-2013.
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, Justices Bridges and Schenck participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 28th day of January, 2016.