Opinion
No. NNH CV08 5025414 S
July 13, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT (#128)
FACTS
The plaintiff, Natalie Sigular, alleged that the decedent, William Gilson, negligently operated his motor vehicle at the intersection of Goffe Terrace and Winthrop Avenue in New Haven, Connecticut, and struck the front end of the plaintiff's vehicle. As a result of the automobile accident, the plaintiff sustained physical injuries, incurred financial obligations due to medical care and lost income.
Lorraine Gilson, Administratrix of the estate of William Gilson, was substituted for the decedent on June 7, 2011. Thus, William Gilson will be referred to as the decedent and Lorraine Gilson will be referred to as the defendant.
The case was tried by a jury on March 15-18, 2011. The jury was given instructions and provided with a defendant's general verdict form and a plaintiff's verdict interrogatory form. On March 18, 2011, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and initially awarded her $0 in economic damages and $5,000 in non-economic damages. After the plaintiff objected to the verdict because the jury did not award economic damages, the court vacated the verdict and instructed the jury to reconsider. The jury again returned with a verdict for the plaintiff, but did not award either economic or non-economic damages.
On March 24, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial. The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion and request for a defendant's verdict on March 28, 2011 and a supplemental brief on March 29, 2011. The plaintiff filed a reply memorandum on March 30, 2011. Oral argument was heard at a hearing on March 31, 2011.
Though the defendant frames its argument as a request for entry of defendant's verdict, the court concludes that she is, in essence, moving for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Since the defendant properly brought a motion for directed verdict during trial which was denied by the court, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is properly before the court. See Practice Book § 16-37.
DISCUSSION
The "standard of review for motions to direct a verdict, motions to set aside a verdict and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are the same." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Assn., Inc., 57 Conn.App. 12, 15 n. 2, 747 A.2d 532, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 923, 754 A.2d 797 (2000). "Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion." Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 702, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). "[Courts] must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury's verdict . . . In making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable . . . In other words, [i]f the jury could reasonably have reached its conclusion, the verdict must stand, even if this court disagrees with it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 704.
"Although the court has broad discretion in setting aside a verdict, its discretion is not boundless." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schettino v. Labarba, 82 Conn.App. 445, 449, 844 A.2d 923 (2004). "Limiting that discretion . . . is the litigants' constitutional right to have issues of fact determined by a jury where there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded jurors." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 107, 708 A.2d 937 (1998).
I Motion to Set Aside Verdict and New Trial
In her motion, the plaintiff seeks to have the court set aside the verdict on the grounds that the jury's verdict: 1) is inherently ambiguous and contrary to the law; (2) was governed by mistake, ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality; (3) is incomplete and incompatible with justice; and (4) shocks the conscience, is wholly inadequate, and manifestly unjust. In her memorandum, she additionally raises the ground that the verdict is patently against the evidence. The plaintiff argues that the court can set aside the jury's verdict for any of the above reasons because the jury failed to award any economic or non-economic damages after returning a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant counters that the jury's actions in failing to award damages does not lead to the conclusion that the jury's verdict was inherently ambiguous because a jury can find technical liability and find that damages were not sufficiently established to award monetary damages.
As a preliminary matter, the court notes that it may not consider the verdict form originally returned and vacated when ruling on the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict. "It is well established that evidence as to the expressions and arguments of the jurors in their deliberations and evidence as to their own motives, beliefs, mistakes and mental operations generally, in arriving at their verdict is excludable in postverdict proceedings as immaterial . . . That rule has been aptly described as applying the parol evidence rule to a jury's verdict, so that [the jurors'] outward verdict as finally and formally made, and not their prior and private intentions, is taken as exclusively constituting the act . . . [A]lthough it is understandable that the [trial] court [would want] to evaluate everything before it [in] deciding the motion to set aside the verdict, the court, in so doing, effectively consider[s] an aspect of the jury's deliberations . . . Consequently, the trial court [is] not free to consult the original verdict forms in determining whether to grant the plaintiff's motion." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Bergman, 296 Conn. 169, 179-80, 994 A.2d 666 (2010).
A Ground: Inherently Ambiguous Verdict
The plaintiff first argues that the verdict was inherently ambiguous. A verdict that is inconsistent or ambiguous should be set aside. Ginsberg v. Fusaro, 225 Conn. 420, 425-30, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993). "A verdict is not defective as a matter of law as long as it contains an intelligible finding so that its meaning is clear . . . A verdict will be deemed intelligible if it clearly manifests the intent of the jury." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tisdale v. Riverside Cemetery Assn., 78 Conn.App. 250, 257, 826 A.2d 232, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 909, 832 A.2d 74 (2003).
Connecticut courts have reached different conclusions when determining whether a jury finding for the plaintiff, but failing to award damages is inconsistent or ambiguous. In Malmberg v. Lopez, 208 Conn. 675, 546 A.2d 264 (1988), Ginsberg v. Fusaro, supra, 225 Conn. 240 and Hall v. Bergman, supra, 296 Conn. 169, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the failure to provide any damages when the jury has found in favor the plaintiff renders the conclusion that the verdict was inherently ambiguous. In Malmberg, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff in a wrongful death action, but awarded her no damages. Malmberg v. Lopez, supra, 208 Conn. 676. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the verdict. Id. On appeal, the Appellate Court found error in the trial court's denial and remanded the case for a hearing in damages only. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court overruled the Appellate Court's holding, reasoning that "neither the Appellate Court nor this court is in a position clearly to ascertain from the conflicting jury verdict how the members of the jury found on the underlying issue of liability. The Appellate Court therefore lacked the authority to substitute its finding on liability for that of the trial court." Id., 680. It further reasoned that "the jury's intent in finding the issues for the plaintiff, but awarding zero damages, is known only to the jurors, and this court's endorsement of one plausible explanation of the verdict over another would amount merely to speculation. Such ambiguity requires a rehearing in full, on both liability and damages." Id., 683.
In Ginsberg, two plaintiffs filed a debt collection action against the defendant who, in turn, filed a counterclaim for dental malpractice against the plaintiffs. Ginsberg v. Fusaro, supra, 225 Conn. 421. The jury found, by way of a general verdict, in favor of the defendant on both the complaint and counterclaim, but awarded zero damages as against one of the plaintiffs. Id., 421-22. The trial court granted a motion to set aside the verdict filed by the defendant as to that plaintiff and the plaintiff filed an appeal which was transferred to the Connecticut Supreme Court. Id., 422. The court reasoned that since the trial court had instructed the jury "that a finding for [the defendant] on the issue of liability included the issues of negligence, causation and damages . . . we can only speculate as to why the jury failed to award damages in her favor; therefore, the jury's verdict creates an ambiguity." Id., 425-26.
In Hall, the jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff who had alleged unjust enrichment and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, but awarded zero damages. Hall v. Bergman, supra, 296 Conn. 171. The trial court granted the motion to set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial after the plaintiff rejected the additur. Id. The defendant appealed to the Connecticut Appellate Court arguing that the trial court improperly set aside the verdict. Id. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision and the defendant appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court. Id., 171-72. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court, agreeing that "because multiple causes of action were submitted to the jury without interrogatories and the jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff, the general verdict rule applies . . . [U]nder that rule, we presume that the jury resolved every issue in the plaintiff's favor. Thus, we presume that the plaintiff proved every element of each of her claims." Id., 181-82. Since the court must presume that the plaintiff established damages from her injuries, it concluded that "this presumption is inconsistent with the jury's award of zero damages. Consequently, the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff is insolubly ambiguous." Id., 183. It further found that "it cannot be stated with certainty either that the jury found that the plaintiff had failed to prove any damages or that the jury was confused as to the correct interplay between damages and liability . . . The appropriate course of action when such an ambiguous verdict is [returned] is to order a new trial on all issues." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
There are also cases in which a verdict for the plaintiff without an award of damages is not inherently ambiguous. In Hughes v. Lamay, 89 Conn.App. 378, 380, 873 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 275 Conn.App. 922, 883 A.2d 1244 (2005), the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant for common-law negligence, negligence per se, common-law recklessness, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, violation of a statutory duty, nuisance and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act (CUTPA). The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff, but awarded no damages. Id., 380-81. Claiming that the jury's verdict was inherently ambiguous, the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial which was denied. Id., 381. She appealed to the Connecticut Appellate Court. Id. The court found that whereas in other negligence actions when it is necessary to find that the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries in order to find liability, with negligence per se, the jury need only find that the defendant violated the statute to find liability and return a verdict for the plaintiff. Id., 385-86. "Because of the speculative nature of the plaintiff's alleged injuries, the award of zero damages fell within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation . . . and the verdict, thus, lacks the inherent ambiguity present in . . . Malmberg." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 386.
In Froom Development Corp. v. Developers Realty, Inc., 114 Conn.App. 618, 623, 972 A.2d 239, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 922, 980 A.2d 909 (2009), the plaintiffs brought suit against the defendants for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of CUTPA, conversion and tortious interference with business relations. The jury returned a verdict in favor the plaintiffs only on the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and awarded no damages. Id. The plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that it was inconsistent, inherently ambiguous and contrary to the law and unsupported by the evidence was denied by the trial court. Id., 625. On appeal, the Appellate Court distinguished its case from Malmberg, finding that the award of zero damages was not inherently ambiguous. Id., 633. "The intent of the jury was not unclear. The jury's answers to the interrogatories indicated that it found that the plaintiffs proved that [the defendant] had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that the breach had caused the injury to the plaintiffs. The jury answered, `no,' in response to the question, `[d]id the plaintiffs prove the existence and amount of damages with reasonable certainty?'" Id. It noted that "[t]here was evidence provided throughout the opinion of the defendants' expert that the value of the lost opportunity claimed by the plaintiffs was zero. The jury was free to credit the defendants' expert and not to credit the plaintiffs' expert . . . The award of zero damages, therefore, was not inherently ambiguous." Id., 635.
A synthesis of these cases demonstrates that a plaintiff's verdict without an award of damages is inherently ambiguous if: 1) there is a general verdict and 2) either damages are a requirement for a finding of liability, such as in negligence actions, or the general verdict rule compels the conclusion, that the verdict is inconsistent. On the other hand, the jury's verdict is not inherently ambiguous if: 1) the jury's verdict is based on interrogatories that clearly establish liability or 2) a general verdict is returned, but the establishment of damages is separate from the elements required to prove liability, such as with negligence per se.
In the present case, the majority of evidence of injury and damages came from the two days of testimony by the plaintiff. On direct examination, she testified that at the time of the accident, she experienced a headache and burns to her arm and chin. Though she declined emergency transportation from an ambulance, her mother took her directly from the scene of the accident to the emergency room at Yale New Haven Hospital (YNHH). She did not go home, have dinner and watch television before going to the hospital. An x-ray of her head and arm returned normal and she was given a prescription. The plaintiff did not report any back pain at the time, but began experiencing it the day after the accident.
Five days after the accident, the plaintiff consulted with Dr. Luchini to follow up. As a result of her consultation, the plaintiff cancelled a work-related trip to California, was prohibited from traveling for two months and began a course of physical therapy which was located in Luchini's office. She testified that the burns resolved after two to three weeks and that the physical therapy was successful. The plaintiff remained symptom free for a period of time, but returned to Luchini in October 2009 because she again began experiencing back pain and the exercises and prescription medication were not helping. At an appointment in November 2009, Luchini ordered more physical therapy which lasted until the end of December 2009 and which was successful in relieving her back pain. The plaintiff additionally testified that she returned to Luchini in February 2011 as a follow-up to the physical therapy that she had received.
As to her condition at the time of trial, the plaintiff testified that she continues to experience back pain sporadically and that she will perform exercises, take her prescription medication and use a heating pad about once a month to alleviate the pain. She stated that she had no neck problems.
On cross examination, the plaintiff admitted that her records from YNHH stated that she went home, developed a headache then reported to the hospital as well as the fact that her headache was a three out of ten. At trial, the defense also pointed to other inconsistencies. For example, Luchini's initial report stated that the plaintiff did not experience any pain in her legs while at her deposition, she stated that pain sometimes radiated to her legs; the plaintiff's responses to interrogatories indicated that she was not confined to her home due to the accident and that she did experience neck and back injuries while she testified that she could not travel for two months and that she did not experience any neck pain. She additionally admitted that Luchini's June 2008 and February 2009 reports indicated that the plaintiff's symptoms had been resolved.
Prior to deliberations, the jury received two verdict forms, one general verdict form for the defendant and one interrogatory form for a plaintiff's verdict. The plaintiff's jury interrogatory had separate questions for cause and damages as well as a detailed section to allow the jury to calculate the amount of damages that it felt the plaintiff had proven. After the deliberations, the jury found for the plaintiff. In doing so, the jury answered in the affirmative to the questions of whether the plaintiff suffered injuries and whether the decedent had caused the injuries. It, however, failed to award money damages for the injuries that the plaintiff received.
Rather than returning the defendant's general verdict form, the jury received and completed a detailed jury interrogatory in making its determination. Thus, this case is similar to Froom Development Corp. The jury was free to credit or not credit the testimony as to the amount and extent of damages that the plaintiff received and, in fact, heard conflicting evidence regarding the plaintiff's injuries and damages. Since the jury's intent was clear in finding that the decedent was liable and there was evidence such that the jury could draw a reasonable conclusion that the plaintiff did not sufficiently establish the amount of injuries and damages she received as a result of the accident, the court concludes that "the award of zero damages [falls] within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation," Hughes v. Lamay, supra, 89 Conn.App. 386, and is not inherently ambiguous. Thus, the motion is denied on this ground.
B
CT Page 15318
Grounds: Shocks the Conscience, Against the Weight of the Evidence, Inadequate Verdict and Manifestly Unjust
The other grounds that the plaintiff raises, that the verdict: 1) shocks the conscience such that one can conclude that the jury was influenced by partiality, mistake or corruption; 2) is against the weight of the evidence; 3) is inadequate; and 4) is manifestly unjust, are all grounded in the same concerns about the jury's verdict given the evidence presented at trial.As to the ground that the verdict shocks the conscience, "[t]he only practical test to apply to a verdict is whether the award of damages falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation in the particular case, or whether the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury were influenced by partiality, mistake or corruption." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v. Bridgeport, 216 Conn. 604, 611, 583 A.2d 124 (1990). "The existence of conflicting evidence limits the court's authority to overturn a jury verdict. The jury is entrusted with the choice of which evidence is more credible and what effect it is to be given . . . From the vantage point of the trial bench, a presiding judge can sense the atmosphere of a trial and can apprehend far better than [the appellate court] can, on the printed record, what factors, if any, could have improperly influenced the jury . . . If, on the evidence, the jury could reasonably have decided as they did, [the reviewing court] will not find error in the trial court's acceptance of the verdict . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 116-17, 663 A.2d 398 (1995).
When determining whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the jury simply because this court would consider or weigh the evidence differently. "A mere doubt of the adequacy of the verdict is an insufficient basis [to set aside a verdict] . . . A conclusion that the jury exercised merely poor judgment is likewise insufficient." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wochek v. Foley, 193 Conn. 582, 587, 477 A.2d 1015 (1984). The jury, moreover, is also "not obliged to believe that every injury causes pain or the pain alleged." Vajda v. Tusla, 214 Conn. 523, 538, 572 A.2d 998 (1990). "When damages are claimed they are an essential element of the plaintiff's proof and must be proved with reasonable certainty . . . Damages are recoverable only to the extent that the evidence affords a sufficient basis for estimating their amount in money with reasonable certainty . . . [D]amages often are not susceptible of exact pecuniary computation and must be left largely to the sound judgment of the trier . . . The determination of damages involves a question of fact that will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians v. Lorinsky, 116 Conn.App. 144, 163, 976 A.2d 723 (2009). "Speculative evidence is not sufficient evidence for the trier to make a fair and reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's damages . . . however, [m]athematical exactitude in the proof of damages is often impossible, but the plaintiff must nevertheless provide sufficient evidence for the trier to make a fair and reasonable estimate . . . Evidence is considered speculative when there is no documentation or detail in support of it and when the party relies on subjective opinion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In considering whether the verdict is inadequate, it "should be disturbed only by considerations of the most persuasive character, as where the verdict shocks the sense of justice or the mind is convinced that it is in fact entirely disproportionate to the injury . . . The evidence offered at trial must be given the most favorable construction to which it is reasonably entitled in support of the verdict . . . Only under the most compelling circumstances may the court set aside a jury verdict because to do so interferes with a litigant's constitutional right in appropriate cases to have issues of fact decided by a jury . . . The amount of damages to be awarded is a matter particularly within the province of the jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunte v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 68 Conn.App. 534, 541-42, 792 A.2d 132 (2002).
Additionally, "[a] trial court may set aside a verdict on a finding that the verdict is manifestly unjust because, given the evidence presented, the jury mistakenly applied a legal principle or because there is no evidence to which the legal principles of the case could be applied." Card v. State, 57 Conn.App. 134, 138, 747 A.2d 32 (2000). "[I]f there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury's verdict, unless there is a mistake in law or some other valid basis for upsetting the result other than a difference of opinion regarding the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, the trial court should let the jury work their will." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 189, 745 A.2d 789 (2000).
As discussed above, there was conflicting testimony regarding the extent and amount of the plaintiff's injuries and damages after the accident. The plaintiff did not present, nor did the court see, any factors that could have improperly influenced the jury such that the verdict would shock the conscience. Moreover, the disputed evidence weighs against a finding that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or inadequate. "Damages are recoverable only to the extent that evidence affords a sufficient basis for estimating their amount in money with reasonable certainty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians v. Lorinsky, supra, 116 Conn.App. 163. The jury did not have to believe that the decedent caused all of the injuries that the plaintiff alleged. In fact, there was evidence for the jury to come to the reasonable conclusion that the decedent did not cause all of the injuries complained of or that the plaintiff should receive a damages award for the injuries from which she did suffer.
Additionally, unlike in Sepe v. Deemy, 9 Conn.App. 524, 533, 520 A.2d 237 (1987), where the court found that the "jury's failure to award any damages to the plaintiff . . . compels the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice or mistake" because a correct interpretation of the law would have led to the awarding of some damages, in the present case, there is no indication that there was a mistake in law such that the court could conclude that the verdict was manifestly unjust. Because the jury is "not obliged to believe that every injury causes pain or the pain alleged," Vajda v. Tusla, supra, 214 Conn. 538, and "is entrusted with the choice of which evidence is more credible and what effect it is to be given," (internal quotation marks omitted) Childs v. Bainer, supra, 235 Conn. 116, this court will not set aside the verdict except "under the most compelling circumstances . . . because to do so interferes with a litigant's constitutional right . . . to have issues of fact decided by a jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunte v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 68 Conn.App. 542. Thus, the court concludes that the verdict will not be set aside on the above raised grounds and denies the plaintiff's motion.
II Request for Defendant's Verdict
In addition to arguing that the jury's verdict should not be set aside, the defendant additionally requests that the court enter a verdict for the defendant. "[A] motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not a new motion, but the renewal of a motion for a directed verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 400, 766 A.2d 416 (2001). Practice Book § 16-37 states in relevant part: "Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at any time after the close of the plaintiff's case in chief is denied or for any reason is not granted, the judicial authority is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion . . ." The court "must consider the evidence, and all inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, in a light most favorable to the party that was successful at trial." Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 635, 791 A.2d 518 (2002). "Judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted only if [the court] find[s] that the jurors could not reasonably and legally have reached the conclusion that they did reach . . . If the jury, however, without conjecture could not have found . . . an element of the claim, the verdict on the claim cannot withstand a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict . . . Consequently, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to remove the jury's function from the realm of speculation." (Citation omitted.) Id., 636.
The standard of review governing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as that governing a motion for a directed verdict because it is a renewal of the motion for directed verdict. Gagne v. Vaccaro, supra, 255 Conn. 400. "A directed verdict is justified if, on the evidence the jury could not reasonably and legally reach any other conclusion . . . or if the evidence is so weak that it would be proper for the court to set aside a verdict rendered for the other party." (Citations omitted.) Boehm v. Kish, 201 Conn. 385, 389, 517 A.2d 624 (1986).
In arguing for a defendant's verdict, the defendant maintains that since the jury determined that the plaintiff had not proven damages, the court should "correct the clerical anomaly in the verdict and enter a defendant's verdict to make the record conform with the evidence and to what actually took place at trial." The defendant relies on Right v. Breen, 277 Conn. 364, 890 A.2d 1287 (2006) to support her position. In Right, the defendant admitted liability for a motor vehicle accident, but denied that her actions caused injuries to the plaintiff. Id., 365. After hearing evidence, the trial court provided the jury with a plaintiff's verdict form and explained to them that it was providing that form because the defendant had admitted that she had negligently caused the accident. Id., 367 n. 3. The court also instructed the jury that if they wanted to find for the defendant, they could do so by awarding no damages to the plaintiff. Id. The jury returned a verdict with no damages and the court accepted it. Id., 367. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed motions to set aside the verdict and for additur. Id., 368. After the court granted the plaintiff's motions and awarded her nominal damages and costs, the defendant appealed. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the concept of a "technical injury" does not apply in negligence actions. Id., 370. As actual injury is an element of negligence, "[w]ithout proof of each of these elements, a plaintiff's cause fails entirely, and he is not entitled to have the question of damages considered." Id., 377. Since the jury had essentially directed a verdict for the defendant by its omission of a damages award, the court remanded the case to the trial court and ordered a judgment for the defendant. Id.
First, the circumstances in Right are factually distinguishable from the present case. In Right, the jury only received the plaintiff's interrogatory and instructions on how to convert it to a defendant's verdict. Since the jury followed those directions, the Supreme Court directed the trial court to enter the verdict that the jury had clearly intended. In the present case, the jury was presented with both a defendant's and plaintiff's jury form. The jury chose the plaintiff's form and indicated that the decedent's negligence caused the accident and the plaintiff's injuries. "The verdict must contain an intelligible finding so that its meaning is clear." Kilduff v. Kalinowski, 136 Conn. 405, 409, 71 A.2d 593 (1950). The jury's verdict contains an intelligible finding and the defendant has presented no argument that "the jurors could not reasonably and legally have reached the conclusion that they did reach." Boehm v. Kish, supra, 201 Conn. 389.
Additionally, the court in Right distinguished between establishing an actual injury and establishing the amount of damages that a plaintiff incurred as a result of the injury. See also Hall v. Bergman, supra, 296 Conn. 183 (noting difference between a jury finding that plaintiff failed to prove damages and jury not understanding difference between finding liability and awarding damages); Froom Development Corp., supra, 114 Conn.App. 633 (plaintiff's verdict stands where jury indicated that defendant caused plaintiff's injuries, but plaintiff did not prove amount of damages of injuries). The jury was unequivocal in finding that the decedent caused the plaintiff's injuries. But, as the defendant noted in its opposition to the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, the issue in dispute was the amount of damages that the plaintiff incurred. As discussed above, there were questions regarding when the plaintiff developed some of her injuries and proceeded to the hospital, which injuries she received as a result of the accident and whether she continues to experience any pain from those injuries. These disputes do not speak to the decedent's liability to the plaintiff for her injuries, only whether she adequately proved damages for the injuries. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the accident caused the plaintiff some injuries and, thus, found for the plaintiff. Indeed, during cross examination, the defense did not contest the plaintiff's testimony regarding the burns that she received on her chin and arms. The majority of the examination focused on the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's allegations of a headache and back pain. The jury's verdict was not only unambiguous, it was clearly for the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court denies the defendant's motion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. Further, the court denies the defendant's request for a defendant's verdict.