Summary
observing that "[t]here is a strong argument that the ‘class of workers’ to which [plaintiff] belongs is ‘all Uber drivers in the United States’ " because all "Uber drivers perform the same job for the same company pursuant to the same agreement"
Summary of this case from Osvatics v. Lyft, Inc.Opinion
Case No. 17-CV-4489 (PJS/HB)
05-16-2019
Joseph SIENKANIEC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and Rasier, LLC, Defendants.
Charles D. Moore and Christopher J. Moreland, HALUNEN LAW, for plaintiff. Andrew J. Voss and John H. Lassetter, LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., for defendants.
Charles D. Moore and Christopher J. Moreland, HALUNEN LAW, for plaintiff.
Andrew J. Voss and John H. Lassetter, LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., for defendants.
ORDER
Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Joseph Sienkaniec is a driver for defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. and Rasier, LLC (collectively "Uber"). Sienkaniec brings various statutory and common-law claims on behalf of himself and a putative class, all of which are premised on his allegation that Uber wrongfully treats its drivers as independent contractors rather than employees.
This matter is before the Court on Uber's motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. The Court held a hearing on Uber's motion on May 15, 2019. Having considering the parties' arguments, the Court concludes that it would benefit from the development of a factual record and from additional briefing.
Whether Sienkaniec can be compelled to arbitrate largely turns on whether the parties' arbitration agreement is exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act under what is known as the "transportation worker" exemption. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 ("nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"). Uber primarily argues that the exemption is inapplicable because Sienkaniec transports only people, not goods. The Court agrees with Sienkaniec, however, that the exemption applies to the interstate transport of both goods and people, and does not read Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams , 532 U.S. 105, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001), McNamara v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. , 570 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2009), or Lenz v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. , 431 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 2005), to hold otherwise. As a result, if Sienkaniec transported people across state lines, the Court would find that he is within a "class of workers engaged in ... interstate commerce" and that the transportation-worker exemption applies. Cf. Lenz , 431 F.3d at 351 ("Indisputably, if Lenz were a truck driver, he would be considered a transportation worker under § 1 of the FAA.").
The difficulty in this case is that, as both sides agree, Sienkaniec has personally never transported a customer across a state line during his career as an Uber driver. Yet, as both sides also seem to agree, there is no question that some Uber drivers (in Minnesota and elsewhere) do transport customers across state lines. As a result, whether Sienkaniec belongs to a "class of workers engaged in .. interstate commerce" depends on at least two questions:
First, what is the "class of workers" to which Sienkaniec belongs? There is a strong argument that the "class of workers" to which Sienkaniec belongs is "all Uber drivers in the United States." After all, Uber drivers perform the same job for the same company pursuant to the same agreement. Notably, in Lenz , the Eighth Circuit seemed to treat the relevant class as consisting of all of those who performed the same job for the same employer. See id. at 353 ("a strike by commercial service representatives, while inconvenient for Yellow, would not disrupt interstate commerce or halt trucks from delivering the general commodities").
Second, how many of those within the class must transport goods or people across state lines—and how often must they do so—before the class is deemed to be "class of workers engaged in .. interstate commerce "? Is it sufficient if one member of the class has transported goods or people across a state line on one occasion? That seems unlikely. But what then is sufficient?
Lenz does not answer this question, as it appears that no member of the class of customer-service representatives had ever transported goods or people across a state line. Sienkaniec cites International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC , 702 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2012), in which the Seventh Circuit held that the transportation-worker exemption applied to truckers whose interstate deliveries comprised only a small proportion of their total workload. Id. at 958. So far as appears from the Seventh Circuit's opinion, however, all of the employer's truckers occasionally engaged in interstate transportation; at a minimum, the Seventh Circuit was not asked to distinguish between truckers who crossed state lines and truckers who did not.
This case appears to fall within a gap in the case law—a gap between cases in which no member of a class transported goods or services across a state line and cases in which all members of a class did so. In addressing this issue, the Court would benefit from additional briefing, as the parties said almost nothing about this issue in their original briefs (which focused on the question of whether a worker who transports people—but not goods—across state lines is "engaged in ... interstate commerce"). Moreover, the Court would also benefit from the development of a factual record. In particular, it would be helpful to have record evidence concerning at least the following:
1. the total number of Uber trips nationwide, and the number of such trips that cross state lines;
2. the total number of Uber drivers nationwide, and the number of such drivers who have transported a passenger across state lines;
3. the total number of Uber trips that originate in Minnesota, and the number of such trips that cross state lines; and
4. the total number of Uber drivers in Minnesota, and the number of such
drivers who have transported a passenger across state lines.
The Court therefore directs the parties to contact the chambers of Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer to schedule a status conference at which the parties, with Judge Bowbeer's assistance, can develop a discovery plan and a briefing schedule. To be clear: The Court has in mind a very limited period of discovery (in the neighborhood of three to six months). Any discovery must be directly related to the question of whether the transportation-worker exemption applies to Sienkaniec's claims—a question that this Court must "decide for itself ... before ordering arbitration." New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537, 202 L.Ed.2d 536 (2019) (emphasis added). Discovery on any other issue (such as the broader question of whether Uber drivers are employees or independent contractors) must await the Court's decision regarding arbitration.
The Court will decide whether to schedule another hearing after it receives and reviews the supplemental briefs.
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SO ORDERED.