Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:03-CV-237-C.
September 24, 2004.
ORDER
Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the following Defendants: (1) Sgt. Taylor, (2) Lt. Kildow, (3) Capt. Stevens, and (4) Wilhemena Howard, Warden of the Daniel Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to protect him from an assault by his cell mate while he was incarcerated in the Daniel Unit.
The Court has considered Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the summary judgment evidence, Plaintiff's response, his sworn complaint, and his sworn testimony given at the evidentiary hearing held before the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Fifth Circuit summarized the summary judgment standard in Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1999):
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those parts of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If the moving party carries its initial burden, the burden then falls upon the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. This showing requires more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. While the party opposing the motion may use proof filed by the movant to satisfy its burden, only evidence — not argument, not facts in the complaint — will satisfy the burden.Burge, at 465 [internal citations and quotations omitted].
"A dispute about a material fact is `genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). "In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. (citation omitted).
"Disputed facts preclude summary judgment if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. In determining whether summary judgment was appropriate, courts must view the inferences to be reasonably drawn from the underlying facts in the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 1999) [internal citations omitted].
EXHAUSTION
A prisoner must exhaust prison grievance remedies before he can pursue a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) ("The PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong."); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n. 6 (2001) ("an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues"); Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2001) (A prisoner is required "to exhaust `available' `remedies', whatever they may be." A "failure to do so prevents him from pursuing a federal lawsuit at this time.").
Plaintiff's Step 1 and Step 2 grievances complained about the actions of Defendant Taylor, particularly Defendant Taylor's knowledge of the "perceived" threats made against Plaintiff by his cell mate and the failure of Defendant Taylor to take any action other than to talk to both Plaintiff and his cell mate. None of the other Defendants were named in the grievances as having been made aware that Plaintiff felt that he had been threatened by his cell mate.
"[T]he primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued. . . . But, at the same time, the grievance must provide administrators with a fair opportunity under the circumstances to address the problem that will later form the basis of the suit, and for many types of problems this will often require, as a practical matter, that the prisoner's grievance identify individuals who are connected with the problem."Johnson v. Johnson, ___ F.3d. ___, 2004 WL 1985441 at *9 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2004).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claims against Defendants Kildow, Stevens, and Howard. Id. at *10 (failure of grievances to name other officers and administrators did not alert them or give them an opportunity to remedy the problem).
SUPERVISORY OFFICIALS
Plaintiff has sued Defendants Kildow, Stevens, and Howard in their supervisory capacities. These Defendants were not personally involved in the alleged failure to protect Plaintiff from assault by his cell mate. Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kildow was in the same room with Plaintiff, his cell mate, and Defendant, according to Plaintiff, Defendant Kildow had her back to them. Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that Defendant Kildow heard Plaintiff's conversation with Defendant Taylor or that Defendant Kildow heard the "veiled" threats made by his cell mate."Supervisory officials may be held liable only if they (1) affirmatively participate in acts that cause constitutional deprivations; or (ii) implement unconstitutional policies that causally result in plaintiff's injury." Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Tex., 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992).
"Vicarious liability does not apply to § 1983 claims." Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, Inst. Div., 37 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994).
"Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action." Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983).
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendants claim they are entitled to qualified immunity. "The doctrine of qualified immunity serves to shield . . . government official[s] from civil liability for damages based upon the performance of discretionary functions if the official[s'] acts were objectively reasonable in light of then clearly established law." Thompson v. Upshur County, TX, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "The bifurcated test for qualified immunity asks whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established right and, if so, whether defendant[s'] conduct was objectively unreasonable." Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, when a defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment raising the defense of qualified immunity, a court must first determine whether the facts, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury," establish that the defendant officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 522 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
A prisoner-plaintiff bears the burden of defeating a defendant prison official's claim to qualified immunity. Al-Raid v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1995).
"If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. If the plaintiff has established the violation of a constitutional right, however, a court must then determine whether the right was "clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendant was objectively unreasonable in light of that then clearly established law." Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d at 351. This second inquiry "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. . . ." Saucier v. Katz, 522 U.S. at 201. See Pierce v. Smith, 177 F.3d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the first inquiry "will generally involve analysis at a higher level of generality than the second, which focuses not only on the state of the law at the time of the complained of conduct, but also on the particulars of the challenged conduct and/or of the factual setting in which it took place").
"`Clearly established' means that `the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates'" the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Thompson v. Upshur, 245 F.3d at 457 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). "If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 202.
A defendant official's "acts are held to be objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in the defendant's circumstances would have then known that the defendant's conduct violated the United States Constitution or the federal statute as alleged by the plaintiff." Thompson v. Upshur, 245 F.3d at 457 (emphasis in original). "The `defendant's circumstances' includes [sic] facts know[n] to the defendant," but "because qualified immunity turns only upon the objective reasonableness of the defendant's acts, a particular defendant's subjective state of mind has no bearing on whether that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity." Id. (emphasis in original). "The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law." Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000). "The issue of whether and when a right is clearly established is typically treated as a matter of law." Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d at 871. "Likewise, to the extent that the relevant discrete, historic facts are undisputed, . . . the question of the objective reasonableness of a defendant's conduct, — i.e., whether at the time and under the circumstances all reasonable officials would have realized the particular challenged conduct violated the constitutional provision sued on — is also a question of law." Id.
Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 241 (1986).
FAILURE TO PROTECT
Plaintiff alleges a failure-to-protect claim, claiming that his cell mate, inmate Martinez, threatened him, Plaintiff notified Defendant Taylor of the threat, and Defendant Taylor failed to protect him from a subsequent assault, resulting in injuries.
"To establish a failure-to-protect claim under § 1983, [plaintiff] must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection." Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995). However, "not every injury suffered by a prisoner at the hands of another rises to the level of a constitutional violation." Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, a prison official may be held liable "only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
An official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived, but did not, cannot be condemned as an infliction of punishment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.
"Prison officials are not, however, expected to prevent all inmate-on-inmate violence." Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003).
"[T]he `failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the official] should have perceived, but did not' is insufficient to show deliberate indifference." Domino v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir 2001) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 838). Further, "negligence is insufficient to support a finding of liability." Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d at 514.
"Under Farmer, prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment only if they are both aware of a substantial risk to inmate safety and fail to respond properly." Johnson, 2004 WL 1985441 at *13. [emphasis in original]. "[T]here is no liability if the official responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Id. at *12 [internal quotations and citation omitted].
After Plaintiff notified Defendant Taylor of the alleged threats made by his cell mate, Defendant Taylor instructed Plaintiff to wait in the infirmary until Defendant Taylor could address the issue, instead of sending Plaintiff back to his cell. Defendant Taylor then discussed the situation with both Plaintiff and his cell mate and they both indicated that they could resolve their differences. Plaintiff states in his complaint that inmate Martinez told Defendant Taylor that he was not threatening Plaintiff; however, Plaintiff believed Martinez made a "veiled threat" toward him. Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Taylor was aware of a substantial threat to Plaintiff's safety.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that
(1) Plaintiff has failed to establish that any of the Defendants acted with "deliberate indifference" to his safety and therefore he has failed to demonstrate a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to protect.
(2) Even if Plaintiff had satisfied his burden of proving deliberate indifference, the action taken by Taylor was a proper and reasonable response to Plaintiff's perceived "veiled threats" made by his cell mate; therefore, Defendant Taylor is entitled to qualified immunity.
(3) Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants Kildow, Stevens, and Howard were personally involved in the alleged failure to protect him from an assault by his cell mate.
(4) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to Defendants Kildow, Stevens, and Howard.
It is, therefore, ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff shall take nothing on his claims against the Defendants.
All relief not granted and any pending motions are denied.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
The trial setting for October 4, 2004, is vacated.