Opinion
03-24-1914
SHOTWELL et al. v. STICKLE et al.
Thomas M. Kays and Henry Huston, both of Newton, for complainants. George M. Shipman and William H. Morrow, both of Belvidere, for defendants.
Bill by James S. Shotwell and others, against John A. Stickle and others. Bill dismissed, and decree rendered for defendants.
On final hearing on bill, answer, cross-bill, replication, and proofs.
This suit is brought for the partition of a farm near Johnsonsburg, in Warren county, formerly owned by one Isaac Stickle, who died in the month of May, 1900. He left a will, by which, among other things, he appointed his three sons, Joseph P. Stickle, Philip Stickle, and John A. Stickle, as executors thereof. He gave them power to make sale of his real estate, directing that such sale should be public, and should be advertised in the same manner as is required by law for sale of lands by order of any court. In pursuance of this direction, the executors advertised the premises for sale in December, 1900, in the manner prescribed by the will, but were unable to procure any bids. An agreement was subsequently reached that John A. Stickle, one of the executors, should purchase the property for the sum of $7,000, which agreement was reduced to writing, and was executed on March 6, 1901. It provided that the said John A. Stickle should pay totie executors of the will of Isaac Stickle the sum of $5,475.91, and assume a dower mortgage on the premises for the principal sum of $1,524.09; that the executors should advertise the farm at public auction for as soon a day as possible, and that at the sale the farm should be sold to such person as the said John A. Stickle should designate, at whatever price or amount the same should be bid up to, and, upon the delivery of the deed, the said John A. Stickle bound himself to pay the said sum of money, which was to be regarded as the purchase price, notwithstanding the sum or amount for which the said farm should be struck off and sold. Two of the executors, Joseph P. Stickle and Philip Stickle, covenanted that they would advertise the farm and sell the same to John A. Stickle for the sum above mentioned, and deliver to him, or to such person as he might designate, a good and sufficient deed for the price aforesaid, notwithstanding the sum or price at which the farm might be struck off at the sale. It was further provided that the share of John A. Stickle in his father's estate should be taken as a payment on account of the purchase money, and that, in case he neglected or refused to receive the deed and pay the purchase money, his said share should be forfeited to the executors; that the sale should be advertised for April 13, 1901; and the deed be delivered at the office of George A. Angle, at Belvidere, on Saturday, April 20, 1901.
The farm was advertised for sale as agreed. It was purchased in the name of Martha Stickle, the wife of John A. Stickle, and the deed was delivered at the office of Mr. Angle on April 20th following. The deed was taken by John A. Stickle to the office of the county clerk, and left there for record, he paying the clerk's fee therefor. At this time John A. Stickle and his wife were living on the farm in question as tenants of the father's estate. After the delivery of the deed, they returned home, continued their occupation of the premises until the death of Martha Stickle, which occurred on May 15, 1909. During all this period, the title to the farm remained in Martha Stickle, and she died without having made conveyance thereof to any one. She left as her heirs at law the persons named in that behalf in the bill of complaint, among the others, her brothers, James S. Shotwell and Ivan Shotwell, the complainants in this suit, who filed their bill for the purpose of obtaining partition of the said lands among the heirs at law of the said Martha Stickle.
John A. Stickle, her husband, alleges in his answer and in his cross-bill that, at the time of the sale of the farm and the delivery of the deed, he paid all the purchase money out of his own funds, and that his wife agreed that she would make a deed to him at any time when he might request it, or when it was convenient for the parties to transfer the title. He likewise says that he erected a new house and barn upon the premises, and repaired other buildings, which cost him in the aggregate over $5,000, and that he made other improvements on the farm sufficient to bring up his total expenditure for betterments to the sum of $6,000; that he paid the taxes, averaging $90 per annum, the insurance premiums, the interest on the dower mortgage to Mrs. Lang; and, that during the whole period of his possession, he conducted the business of farming on the said premises at his own expense, for his own account, and took the proceeds thereof as his own; that his wife not only contributed nothing to the purchase money, but that she had a separate estate of only about $1,600, no part of which he ever received, which was always invested by her for her own benefit and in her own way.
At the time of the death of Mrs. Stickle, she left no children. However, a child was born to them on September 21, 1891. The defendant John A. Stickle says that this child was born alive. This is denied by the complainants and the other defendants, who allege that the child was born dead, and that no rights whatever can be predicated on this event. It likewise appears, and is undisputed, that John A. Stickle, subsequently to the death of his wife, purchased the interests of James I. Shotwell and Dellie Shotwell, a brother and sister of Mrs. Stickle, for the sum of $2,200.
The questions arising are whether John A. Stickle paid all the purchase money for the said premises, whether the circumstances show that a trust resulted from the wife to him, growing out of the payment of such purchase money, and whether, in case a resulting trust is not so found, the said John A. Stickle, by virtue of his marriage, the seisin of the wife of the lands in question, and the birth of a child alive had conferred upon him a right of curtesy in the said lands.
Thomas M. Kays and Henry Huston, both of Newton, for complainants. George M. Shipman and William H. Morrow, both of Belvidere, for defendants.
HOWELL, V. C. (after stating the facts as above). Before reaching the merits of the controversy, it is necessary to determine a preliminary question relating to the admissibility of certain evidence which was offered on the part of the defendant John A. Stickle. The offer was to introduce by him statements made by, and transactions had with, Martha Stickle, his wife. This offer was objected to, upon the ground that its reception would be a violation of the fourth section of the evidence act of March 23, 1900 (P. L. p. 363), for the reason that the heirs at law of Martha Stickle were her representatives in the suit, within the meaning of the statute. The evidence offered was received subject to be stricken out if the court upon consideration should concludethat it was Incompetent. Upon consideration of the circumstances, and the examination of the authorities, I have reached the conclusion that the evidence was properly admitted, and I reach this conclusion upon the ground that there is no representative relation in the case which can be held to bring it within the statute. The parties here represent no one; they are each and all litigating concerning his and their own individual rights; what they shall take by the final decree they will take, not as anybody's representatives, but for themselves individually, and in their own right. Such was the holding of the Court of Errors and Appeals in Smith v. Smith, 52 N. J. Law, 207, 19 Atl. 255, which was an action for dower brought by the widow against the lessees and devisees of the husband; and in McKinley v. Coe, 66 N. J. Eq. 70, 57 Atl. 1030, which was an application by the payee of a note given by the testatrix, whose will charged her debts on her lands for a direction that the proceeds of sale of land sold in partition proceedings should be applied to the payment of her note; followed in Cowdrey v. Cowdrey, 71 N. J. Eq. 353, 64 Atl. 98, the latter case having been affirmed on appeal in 72 N. J. Eq. 951, 67 Atl. 111, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1176. The precise question was decided by Vice Chancellor Emery in the case of Small v. Pryor, 69 N. J. Eq. 606, 61 Atl. 564, a case in which the circumstances closely resemble those before the court in the case at bar. There the complainant filed a bill for partition. The widow of the decedent filed a cross-bill, claiming the property under a resulting trust, on the ground that, although she had furnished the purchase price, the title was taken in the name of her husband. The evidence of the widow to show the circumstances was admitted upon the authority of the cases above cited. It was held, however, that the weight of the evidence was insufficient to establish the trust I therefore conclude that the testimony in this case was properly admitted, and the motion to strike the same from the record is denied.
There is yet another matter to be examined before we reach the merits. The objection is made that John A. Stickle ought not to receive any relief from this court, because he has come into court with unclean hands; that is to say, that, by making the agreement of March 6, 1901, with his brothers and coexecutors, Joseph P. Stickle and Philip Stickle, touching the disposition of the lands of which his father died seised, he committed a fraud upon his brothers and sisters, and that this was intensified by "the provision in the agreement that he should only pay $7,000 for the farm, no matter what the highest bid was. It may well be that, under certain circumstances, ho might have been called to account for these irregular transactions; the principle being that no trustee shall be allowed to purchase at his own sale. Smith v. Drake, 23 N. J. Eq. 302: Marr v. Marr, 73 N. J. Eq. 643, 70 Atl. 375, 133 Am. St. Rep. 742. But it will be observed that this is not a proceeding on behalf of the devisees under the will of Isaac Stickle, but is an entirely separate and distinct cause of action. Possibly the heirs of Isaac Stickle might have set aside the transaction, but it appears by the evidence that they knew all about it, acquiesced in it, and accepted their respective shares of the purchase money. This is a condonation of the maxim of equity appealed to, and estops them from obtaining any decree adverse to the transaction; but the maxim does not reach so far. It must be understood to refer to willful misconduct in regard to the matter in litigation, and not to misconduct, however gross, which is unconnected therewith, and with which the opposite party in the cause has no concern. 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 399; Smith Man. of Eq. § 39; Williamson v. Fowkes, 9 Hare, 592; Gibson v. Goldsmid, 5 D. G., M. & G. 757. It is obvious that the cause of action to which that maxim might apply is a cause of action in favor of the Stickle heirs and devisees, and not a cause of action which relates to the estate of which Martha Stickle died seised; hence the maxim has no application to the case in hand.
The first question pertaining to the merits of the controversy is whether John A. Stickle paid to his brothers all the purchase money for the said premises. Deducting the dower mortgage, $1,524.09, there remained to be paid $5,475.91. This was done in the following manner: There was first the check of Mrs. Stickle for $4,375.91; check for milk which Mr. Stickle carried with him for $155.34; his interest in his father's estate, $949.44. This left him short, as his story is, $49.54, which amount was advanced by his brother Philip, to whom he afterwards repaid the amount. These figures overrun the amount of the payment, and the discrepancy is not explained, but, while they do not exactly coincide, I am satisfied that the payment was made substantially in the way just mentioned. I am likewise satisfied that the money for which Mrs. Stickle gave her check, viz., $4,375.91, was wholly the money of John A. Stickle. It was made up in this manner: He had on deposit in the Merchants' National Bank of Newton $1,209.94; he sold a mortgage which he held on the Andover Methodist Church for $1,872; he collected from Prank Carr $420; borrowed from Isaac Carr $400, and from his wife $60; deposited check for $155.34; had his note discounted at the bank, and obtained as proceeds $258.63. This money was transferred to the credit of Mrs. Stickle, and her check was thereupon drawn against it. It seems very clear that the whole fund was provided by John A. Stickle, and that his wife paid no portion of it whatever. Infact, it appears that she had no separate estate of her own, excepting about $1,600, and that no portion of that went into the purchase of the farm.
Did a trust result in favor of the husband from the circumstances appearing in evidence? Ordinarily it is presumed that, when a husband voluntarily transfers property to his wife, he does it by way of gift or settlement. This, however, is a mere presumption, and is rebuttable if facts exist sufficient for the purpose. In my opinion, the facts do exist, and the presumption is rebutted, and a resulting trust has been established in favor of the husband. It is very plain that on March 6, 1901, when the agreement was made between John A. Stickle and his brothers, that John A. Stickle intended to become the purchaser and the owner of the farm. The agreement was with him and for his benefit, but, inasmuch as he was one of the executors, and had been advised that he could not appear in the transaction, the agreement provided that the property should be knocked off and sold to such person as the said John A. Stickle should designate. He did designate his wife. The property was struck off to her, and the deed made to her. The delivery of the deed took place in the office of Mr. Angle, one of the solicitors of this court, and in his presence it was stated by Mrs. Stickle that, while she was the purchaser of the farm, she wanted to deed it to her husband; that the making of the deeds to transfer the property to the husband was talked over, and that, when they found it would require the preparation of two deeds, they put the matter off, because of the limited time before them. His recollection is that they said it was getting late, that they had a long distance to drive, and that they would drop into his office some time when they came to Belvidere and have the deeds made later on; and he finally says that Mrs. Stickle told him that she came along with her husband on that day for the purpose of deeding the place back to him.
It is in evidence that Mrs. Martha Stickle stated to Laura M. Stickle, Martha Emmons, Maud Wildrick, and Minnie Messier, respectively, at various times, that she had no money in the farm, that it all belonged to her husband, and that she intended to deed it to him. In addition to this is the testimony of Mr. Stickle himself, in which he sets out the conversation that took place between him and his wife on this point, to the effect that his wife agreed to convey the property to him whenever it became convenient to have the proper conveyances prepared.
This view of the case entitles the defendant John A. Stickle to the title to and possession of the premises in question, and disentitles the complainants to a partition, as prayed by the original bill. It likewise makes it unnecessary to consider the questions concerning the birth of the child, and whether it was born alive or dead. The decree will therefore dismiss the original bill, and provide that the heirs at law of the said Martha Stickle hold the said lands and premises in trust for the defendant John A. Stickle, and that they execute a proper deed or deeds of conveyance to the said John A. Stickle in accordance with the prayer of his bill.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, I do not think that either party should recover costs or counsel fees against the other.