Opinion
CV 21-3347-CJC (KK)
12-20-2021
LECIA L. SHORTER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL., Defendants.
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
HONORABLE KENLY KIYA KATO United States Magistrate Judge
This Final Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Cormac J. Carney, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
I. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Lecia L. Shorter (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) alleging violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and various state law claims. Defendants County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) have now filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Motion”) arguing Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata and the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons below, the Court recommends DENYING the Motion.
In addition to select documents in Amador v. Baca, CV 10-1649-SVW (JEMx) and Shorter v. Baca, CV 12-7337-DOC (GJS), the Moving Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of documents in other unrelated cases. Dkts. 16, 27. While the Court may take judicial notice of the existence of these unrelated court documents, the Court will not take judicial notice of such documents for the truth of the matter asserted therein. See Mejia v. EMC Mortg. Corp., CV 09-4701-CAS (Ex), 2012 WL 367364, at *6 n. 5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2012) (citation omitted). A court “may take judicial notice of matters of public record, ” including “proceedings and filings” in other cases and “in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, therefore, takes sua sponte notice of the documents in Amador v. Baca, CV 10-1649-SVW (JEMx) and Shorter v. Baca, CV 12-7337-DOC (GJS).
A. AMADOR V. BACA, CV 10-1649-SVW (JEMx) (“AMADOR”)
On March 5, 2010, plaintiffs Mary Amador and Lorna Mallyon filed a putative class action complaint against defendants County of Los Angeles; Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy Baca; deputy sheriffs Jones, Cornell, and Clark; and Doe defendants 1 through 10. Amador, dkt. 1. Plaintiffs Amador and Mallyon alleged the defendants implemented unconstitutional strip search policies at Century Regional Detention Facility (“CRDF”) in Lynwood, California. Id.
On November 18, 2016, the court certified two distinct classes: (1) women who were searched simultaneously in two lines directly facing each other from March 2008 to July 2011 at a CRDF bus bay and (2) women who were searched in two lines facing opposite walls from July 2011 to January 1, 2015 at a CRDF bus bay. Id., dkt. 327; see also id., dkts. 321, 323.
On December 19, 2016, plaintiffs Amador, Alisa Battiste, Felice Cholewiak, Evangelina Madrid, Myeshia Williams, and Nancy Briseño (collectively, “class plaintiffs”) filed a Fourth Amended Complaint pursuant to Section 1983 against defendants County of Los Angeles; Los Angeles County Sheriff Baca; deputy sheriffs Jones, Burns, Cornell, Cooper, Clark, Cruz, and Lee; and Doe defendants 1 through 10 (collectively, “Amador Defendants”). Id., dkt. 334. The class plaintiffs alleged degrading strip and body cavity searches violated their Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and their corollaries under the California Constitution. Id. The class plaintiffs further alleged the searches took place in group settings and in an outdoor area used to park buses at CRDF. Id. at 5-17.
On June 7, 2017, the court granted summary judgment in the class plaintiffs' favor on their Fourth Amendment claim against defendant County of Los Angeles. Id., dkt. 361. The court reached this conclusion “based on the invasiveness of the search (i.e., use of the ‘labia lift' despite less intrusive alternatives) . . ., the group setting of the search, in which inmates could not avoid viewing each other, the lack of privacy within that group setting, and-most importantly-the lack of a penological purpose or informed justification for not providing individualized privacy.” Id.
On March 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a notice of her intent to opt-out of settlement proceeds but not class membership status. Id., dkt. 429.
On August 11, 2020, the court approved the class plaintiffs' motion for final approval of a class action settlement and identified Plaintiff as both an “opt-out” and an objector. Id., dkt. 463; see also id., dkt. 465.
B. SHORTER V. BACA, CV 12-7337-DOC (GJS) (“SHORTER I”)
On August 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint arising out of her alleged mistreatment while she was incarcerated as a pre-trial detainee from November 15, 2011 to December 17, 2011 at CRDF. Shorter I, dkt. 3.
On November 1, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against defendants County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff Baca, and deputy sheriffs Jacqueline Ortiz and Alejandra Avalos (collectively, “Shorter I Defendants”). Id., dkt. 8. Among other things, Plaintiff alleged during a thirty-two-day period at CRDF, the Shorter I Defendants conducted invasive searches. Id. at 16-18. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged on multiple occasions, deputies had taken Plaintiff to a cell, conducted a strip search, and subsequently chained Plaintiff to the door of her cell without providing Plaintiff's clothes. Id. Plaintiff alleged violations of her First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and state law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, assault and battery, negligent hiring and supervision, and negligence. Id. at 7-31.
Plaintiff also named defendants Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Gloria Molina, Mark Ridley-Thomas, Zev Yaroslavsky, Don Knabe, and Michael Antonovich in their official capacity. Shorter I, dkt. 8.
On April 10, 2019, following a jury trial, the jury issued a verdict in favor of the Shorter I Defendants. Id., dkts. 336, 338. With respect to Plaintiff's unlawful search claim, the jury found the Shorter I Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id., dkt. 338. The court, therefore, entered Judgment dismissing the action on the merits. Id., dkt. 345.
On May 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial (“JMOL Motion”). Id., dkt. 350. On September 13, 2019, the court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's JMOL Motion. Id., dkt. 369. With respect to Plaintiff's unlawful search claim, the court denied the JMOL Motion and, thus, upheld the jury's verdict in favor of the Shorter I Defendants. Id.
The court also (a) denied Plaintiff's JMOL Motion with respect to her claims for improper classification without due process, inadequate medical care, and conditions of confinement claim regarding meals and shower, and (b) granted Plaintiff's JMOL Motion with respect to her conditions of confinement claim regarding recreation. Shorter I, dkt. 369 at 27-28. The court further denied in part Plaintiff's request for a new trial “due to clear weight of the evidence, defense counsel conduct, and evidentiary rulings, ” but conditionally granted a new trial on her conditions of confinement claim regarding recreation time. Id. at 28.
On October 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Id., dkt. 374. On October 26, 2021, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part Plaintiff's JMOL Motion. Id., dkt. 408. With respect to the denial of Plaintiff's JMOL Motion on her unlawful search claim, the Ninth Circuit reversed under de novo review, held Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and remanded to the district court for adjudication of damages. Id. at 2-3, 6-7. The Ninth Circuit reasoned, “CRDF failed to provide any penological justification for leaving inmates unclothed and unchained for any period of time after their clothes had already been searched” and “the jail had an alternative, less abusive means of obtaining contraband from inmates[.]” Id. at 2-3.
With regard to Plaintiff's inadequate sanitation claim, the Ninth Circuit also found the district court erred in denying Plaintiff's JMOL Motion, Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and remanded to the district court for adjudication of damages. Dkt. 408 at 3, 6. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Plaintiff's JMOL Motion as to her deprivation of meals, inadequate medical care, and improper classification claims. Id. at 4-5. Finally, the Ninth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Id. at 6-7.
C. SHORTER V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CV 21-3347-CJC (KK) (“INSTANT ACTION”)
On April 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint pursuant to Section 1983 against defendants County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and Does 1 through 10. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff states the action is “brought in direct relation to Amador, ” a class action “wherein a summary judgment Monell liability determination under the Fourth Amendment as to [] Plaintiff class was entered on June 6, 2017.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff explains she opted out of the Amador class plaintiffs' settlement agreement and filed the Instant Action “solely on the issue of damages.” Id. at 4.
Plaintiff alleges while she was a pre-trial detainee at CRDF, she was “repeatedly subjected to extremely humiliating and degrading group and individual strip and body cavity searches in 2010, 2011, and 2013[.]” Id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges she was searched alongside other women in groups as large as fifty inmates and in an outdoor area used to park buses. Id. Plaintiff alleges the searches violated her Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and state law claims pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, and Article 1, §§ 1, 7, and 13 of the California Constitution. Id. at 10-15.
On June 7, 2021, Moving Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint. Dkt. 11.
On September 14, 2021, Moving Defendants filed the instant Motion on the grounds Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata and the applicable statute of limitations. Dkt. 15. On September 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion. Dkt. 25. On September 30, 2021, Moving Defendants filed a Reply. Dkt. 26.
On October 27, 2021, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending the instant Motion be denied. Dkt. 30. On November 24, 2021, Moving Defendants filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation. Dkt. 34. On December 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Response. Dkt. 35.
The Court issues the instant Final Report and Recommendation addressing Moving Defendants' Objections in Section IV.A.2. and footnotes 5 and 8 below.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 12(c)”), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Dworkin v. Hustler Mag., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir 1989). A Rule 12(c) motion is properly brought “after the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); Dworkin, 867 F.2d at 1192.
A court may grant judgment on the pleadings “when, taking all allegations in the pleading as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996). A court must assume the truthfulness of all material facts alleged and construe all inferences reasonably to be drawn from the facts in favor of the responding party. Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989). “It is well-settled that materials properly attached as exhibits to the complaint and matters that are subject to judicial notice may . . . be considered in evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Shame On You Prod., Inc. v. Elizabeth Banks, 120 F.Supp.3d 1123, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. MOVING DEFENDANTS FAIL TO DEMONSTRATE RES JUDICATA BARS THE INSTANT ACTION
1. Applicable Law
“Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997)). Res judicata applies to bar an action when there is: (1) “identity or privity between parties”; (2) “an identity of claims”; and (3) “a final judgment on the merits.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court has made clear there is no “principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata.” Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981). The party asserting res judicata “must carry the burden of establishing all necessary elements.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008) (quoting 18 C. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4405, at 83 (2d ed. 2002)).
2. Analysis
Here, neither party disputes the first element of res judicata - identity or privity between parties - has been satisfied because there is identity or privity between the parties in the Instant Action and those in Shorter I. In both actions, Plaintiff sues defendants County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. It is, however, unclear whether the third element of res judicata - a final judgment on the merits - has been satisfied in light of the Ninth Circuit decision reversing the denial of Plaintiff's JMOL Motion on her unlawful search claim in Shorter I. See Shorter I, dkt. 408. Nonetheless, as discussed below, because it is clear the second element of res judicata - an identity of claims - has not been met, res judicata does not preclude the Instant Action.
In their Objections, Moving Defendants argue “[Plaintiff] cannot offensively use collateral estoppel after opting out of the class.” Dkt. 34 at 10. The issue of whether Plaintiff can offensively use collateral estoppel, however, is immaterial at this stage of the proceedings and does not dispose of Plaintiff's claims. See generally Grisham v. Philip Morris, Inc., 670 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1028-29 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (stating the legal standard for non-mutual offensive issue preclusion); Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 362 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Someone who opted out could take his chances separately, but the separate suit would proceed as if the class action had never been filed.”).
The second element of res judicata is whether there is an “identity of claims” between the present dispute and the prior case. Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956. In considering whether a present dispute concerns the same claims as a prior case, the Ninth Circuit considers:
(1) Whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. The last of these criteria is the most important.Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982)).
“Whether two suits arise out of the ‘same transactional nucleus' depends upon ‘whether they are related to the same set of facts and whether they could conveniently be tried together.'” ProShipLine Inc. v. Aspen Infrastructures Ltd., 609 F.3d 960, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting W. Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (June 23, 1992)). “In most cases, ‘the inquiry into the “same transactional nucleus of facts” is essentially the same as whether the claim could have been brought in the first action.'” Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep't of State, 673 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Liquidators of Eur. Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011)). “[W]here claims arise from the same factual circumstances, a plaintiff must bring all related claims together or forfeit the opportunity to bring any omitted claim in a subsequent proceeding.” Id.
Here, the complaints in Shorter I and the Instant Action both involve Plaintiff and allege violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights arising from strip and visual body cavity searches. However, an identity of claims does not exist because although the searches alleged in Shorter I and the Instant Action took place at CRDF, the strip searches in the Instant Action were conducted in a different time, place, and manner. In Shorter I, Plaintiff alleged on multiple occasions during a thirty-two-day period in 2011, the deputies had conducted a strip search of Plaintiff in a cell and chained Plaintiff's right hand to the door of her cell without providing her clothes. Shorter I, dkt. 8. In contrast, in the Instant Action, Plaintiff alleges on multiple occasions in 2010, 2011, and 2013, she was searched alongside other women in groups as large as fifty inmates and in an outdoor area used to park buses, as alleged in Amador. Dkt. 1. The difference in the time, place, and manner in which the strip and visual body searches were conducted in Shorter I and the Instant Action shows the two suits arise out of a different transactional nucleus of facts. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1399 (9th Cir.1992) (holding the defense of res judicata did not apply because the present action challenged conduct that was different in substance from the conduct challenged in the previous action).
The Court, thus, finds an identity of claims does not exist between Shorter I and the Instant Action. Accordingly, Moving Defendants fail to demonstrate res judicata bars the Instant Action.
B. MOVING DEFENDANTS FAIL TO SHOW THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS THE INSTANT ACTION
1. Applicable Law
The applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims brought in California is two years. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (holding the state personal injury limitation statute governs Section 1983 claims); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (noting a two-year personal injury statute of limitation). A Section 1983 “cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action. Thus, ‘[a]n action ordinarily accrues on the date of the injury.'” Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 109, reh'g denied, 137 S.Ct. 489 (2016) (citing Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (holding federal law determines when a cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run for a Section 1983 claim). “In a traditional Fourth Amendment case, the plaintiff is placed on constructive notice of the illegal conduct when the search and seizure takes place.” Klein v. City of Beverly Hills, 865 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 2017).
The commencement of a class action, however, tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class. Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). “When certification has been granted, the statute begins running anew from the date when the class member exercises the right to opt out because before this time, the class member is deemed to be actively prosecuting her rights.” Id.
2. Analysis
Plaintiff's Section 1983 causes of action arise from the “humiliating and degrading group and individual strip and body cavity searches” she experienced in 2010, 2011, and 2013. Dkt. 1 at 2. Assuming Plaintiff's claims accrued on the date of the strip and body cavity searches in 2010, 2011, and 2013, the statute of limitations as to Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims, absent any tolling, would have expired two years after each search. See Lopez v. City of Santa Ana, No. CV 14-01369 SVW (RAO), 2015 WL 9918408, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 14-01369-SVW (RAO), 2016 WL 344501 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016), aff'd, 698 Fed.Appx. 401 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]ach discrete act gives rise to a separate constitutional claim for purposes of the statute of limitations.” (citing Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2003)).
The commencement of the Amador class action, however, tolled the statute of limitations from the date the action was filed, March 5, 2010, until the date Plaintiff opted out, March 6, 2020. See Tosti, 754 F.2d at 1488. Plaintiff subsequently filed the Instant Action on April 17, 2021, approximately a year after she opted out of Amador. The Instant Action was, thus, filed within the two-year statute of limitations. See dkt. 1.
Notably, Moving Defendants fail to address the impact a class action has on the applicable statute of limitations. To the extent Moving Defendants might seek to challenge whether the claims in the Instant Action were addressed in Amador, Plaintiff specifically states the action is “brought in direct relation to Amador, ” dkt. 1 at 3. Moreover, both cases are premised on claims that inmates at CRDF were subjected to unlawful group searches in outdoor areas used to park buses. See id. at 2-3 (“The unconstitutional group searches occurred in an outdoor area used to park buses.”); Amador, dkt. 334 at 5-11 (alleging searches took place in group settings and in an outdoor area used to park buses at CRDF).
Moving Defendants incorrectly state Plaintiff opted out on March 6, 2019, dkt. 26 at 2.
Accordingly, Moving Defendants fail to show the statute of limitations bars the Instant Action.
While it is not entirely clear from the Complaint whether the Amador class action involved every search alleged in the Instant Action, Moving Defendants have not differentiated the searches alleged in the Instant Action. To the extent Moving Defendants now argue the reference in the Complaint to a 2013 individual search was not part of the Amador class action, dkt. 34 at 20, Plaintiff clarifies in her Response that the Instant Action is solely to pursue the group claims from Amador, dkt. 35 at 2. Moreover, the Court declines to consider new arguments raised for the first time in objections. See United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 831 (2001).
V. RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) accepting this Final Report and Recommendation; and (2) DENYING defendants County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.