Opinion
No. CV 07 4022631 S
March 25, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO DISMISS #102
The plaintiff filed an Application for Temporary Injunction and Order to Show Cause dated October 23, 2007 seeking an order from this court, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-471 compelling the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles to not continue past February 2008, the term of the plaintiff's driver's license suspension. The plaintiff's license suspension is her third suspension for drunk driving and is pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b, the administrative implied consent law for the testing of a motor vehicle operator's blood, breath or urine to detect the presence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.
Sec. 52-471. Granting of injunction.
(a) Any judge of any court of equitable jurisdiction may, on motion, grant and enforce a writ of injunction, according to the course of proceedings in equity, in any action for equitable relief when the relief is properly demandable, returnable to any court, when the court is not in session. Upon granting of the writ, the writ shall be of force until the sitting of the court and its further order thereon unless sooner lawfully dissolved.
(b) No injunction may be issued unless the facts stated in the application therefor are verified by the oath of the plaintiff or of some competent witness.
On or about July 11, 2006, the plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. At the time of her arrest, she did not consent to submit to an alcohol chemical test. She initially appealed the suspension of her operator's license for failure to submit to an alcohol chemical test, but later withdrew the appeal after entering a guilty plea on January 10, 2007, to driving while intoxicated. The plaintiff has two convictions for violating § 14-227a. The plaintiff was considered a second offender for purposes of sentencing and suspension of her operator's license. She was sent a suspension notice dated January 15, 2007 notifying her that her license was suspended for one year. Following the one-year suspension, she would not be able to operate a motor vehicle unless it was equipped with an interlocking ignition device ("IID.").
The plaintiff's first suspension pursuant § 14-227b was for an occurrence in Orange, Connecticut on April 27, 1998, for refusing to submit for an alcohol test. Her license was suspended from June 11, 1998 to December 12, 1998. Her second suspension for § 14-227b was for an occurrence in Fairfield, Connecticut on July 23, 1999, again for failure to submit to a test. Her license was suspended from August 22, 1999 to August 22, 2000. This arrest also resulted in a violation of § 14-227a. As a result of that violation her license was suspended until December 9, 2000.
Section 14-227a(I) regarding an interlocking ignition device states in relevant part:
(I) Installation of ignition interlock device. (1) The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall permit a person whose license has been suspended in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (C)(ii) of subdivision (2) of subsection (g) of this section to operate a motor vehicle if (A) such person has served not less than one year of such suspension, and (B) such person has installed an approved ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned or to be operated by such person. No person whose license is suspended by the commissioner for any other reason shall be eligible to operate a motor vehicle equipped with an approved ignition interlock device.
(Emphasis added.)
On January 30, 2007, the plaintiff received a revised notice from the Motor Vehicle Department suspending her license for a three-year period from February 8, 2007 until December 28, 2009. Subsequently, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant requesting a review of her driving history. The plaintiff's position was that she must finish serving a one-year suspension of her license and then would be eligible for reinstatement with an IID. By letter dated August 13, 2007, the Department of Motor Vehicles responded to the plaintiff and notified her that if she had no other suspensions on her driving record, she would be eligible to have her operator's license restored on February 14, 2008, and pursuant to § 14-227a(i) would be required to install and use an IID for a period of two years. However, the defendant alerted the plaintiff that her license was suspended for another reason, that being a third administrative per se violation under § 14-227b, for a test refusal. A suspension was mandated for that violation pursuant to § 14-227b(i)(3)(C), which reads:
The plaintiff received a 99-day credit when computing this time period of the suspension.
(I) Except as provided in subsection (j) of this section, the commissioner shall suspend the operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of a person . . . for a period of: . . . (3) if such person has two or more times previously had such person's operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended under this section, . . . (c) three years if such person refused to submit to such test or analysis.
The defendant was notified that this suspension began on February 8, 2007 and would not end until December 28, 2009. The plaintiff was also notified that this was not a suspension for which an IID was authorized. Therefore, according to the defendant, the plaintiff would not be eligible for reinstatement of her operator's license until December 28, 2009.
The defendant in filing its motion to dismiss, argues that the plaintiff does not cite any statutory waiver of the state's sovereign immunity, nor does the plaintiff seek declaratory or injunctive relief based on a substantial claim that the state or its officials have violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights or that the state or its officials have acted in excess of their statutory authority. The defendant claims that the plaintiff's application is based solely on her claim that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles has made a mistake in interpreting two related but distinct statutes, General Statutes § 14-227a and § 14-227b. The defendant requests that the court dismiss the plaintiff's application as the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because of the state's sovereign immunity.
The plaintiff argues that the defendant has, in fact, acted in excess of his statutory authority and in derogation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The plaintiff states there can be no more a fundamental claim than that of a citizen who alleges an officer of the state has abused his discretion and statutory authority by depriving the plaintiff of the benefits of an existing statutory and legislative scheme. The plaintiff argues that it would be unfair to allow the state to use the shield of sovereign immunity to prevent her from establishing her claims.
Standard of Law
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622, 624, 461 A.2d 991 (1983). "The issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagnon v. Planning Commission, 222 Conn. 294, 297, 608 A.2d 1181 (1992). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised . . . the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Figueroa v. CS Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1, 4, 675 A.2d 845 (1996). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). "The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 199 n. 13, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996).
Discussion
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the state is "immune from suit unless, by appropriate legislation, it authorizes or consents to suit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 555, 569 A.2d 518 (1990). "[S]tatutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Babes v. Bennett, 247 Conn. 256, 262, 721 A.2d 511 (1998).
Our Supreme Court has recognized three narrow exceptions in which a suit against the state or its officials may be maintained. They are: (1) where the state has expressly waived sovereign immunity through the enactment of legislation, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, and has consented to suit under the specific circumstances prescribed in the legislation; Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 85-86, 818 A.2d 758 (2003); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 312-13, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990); (2) where an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief based on a substantial claim that the state or an official of the state has violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff; Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 624, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); or (3) where a plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief based on a substantial claim that a state official has acted in excess of his statutory authority and has thereby violated a right of the plaintiff. Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 314, 828 A.2d 549 (2003); Doe v. Heintz, supra, 31.
Ruffin v. Dept. Of Public Works, 50 Conn.Sup. 98, 103-04, 914 A.2d 617 (2006).
"[T]he exception to sovereign immunity for actions in excess of statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, applies only to actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, not to those seeking monetary damages." Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 321.
The first of the three narrow exceptions stated in Ruffin v. Dept. Of Public Works, supra, 50 Conn.Sup. 103-04, does not apply to the present matter. Therefore the court examines the second and third exceptions. The plaintiff has sought injunctive relief based on a substantial claim of a violation of a constitutional right and that a state official has acted in excess of his statutory authority. The plaintiff claims that the ongoing suspension of her driver's license will cause her irreparable harm as to her right to earn a living.
In determining the issues in this matter, the court is aware that several statutes relating to our driving under the influence laws are involved. In interpreting those statutes and their legislative scheme this court notes that General Statutes § 1-2z provides that "[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." When the meaning of a statute is not plain and unambiguous, however, "we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." See Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 712-13, 937 A.2d 675 (2007).
"Pursuant to its police powers, the legislature has given the commissioner of motor vehicles broad discretion to oversee and control the operation of motor vehicles generally." Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 509, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is authorized to enforce the provisions of the statutes concerning motor vehicles and the operators of such vehicles. Id. In furtherance of this authorization, General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) 14-111(a) provides that the commissioner superintend the use of licenses: "No provision of this chapter [Chapter 246, "Motor Vehicles"] shall be construed to prohibit the commissioner from suspending or revoking any registration or any operator's license . . . or from suspending the right of any person to operate a motor vehicle in this state . . . for any cause that [the commissioner] deems sufficient, with or without a hearing . . ." Id.
"The legislature enacted the statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles, including 14-111, for the protection of the lives and property of the citizens of this state." Hickey v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 170 Conn. 136, 139, 365 A.2d 403 (1976). "In matters concerning public safety, the legislative department in the use of its police power is the judge, within reasonable limits, of what the public welfare requires." (Internal quotation marks omitted, citations omitted.) Id.
Our legislature by the enactment of Section 14-227a(i) regarding an interlocking ignition device, has acknowledged that a statute permitting operators, whose licenses have been suspended, to use such a device is in the best interests of such operators. Operators benefit by being able to retain and make use of a license, even with the condition of an interlocking ignition device, rather than having to forfeit all use of a motor vehicle. See Id. at 510. A loss of all use of one's motor vehicle is "particularly onerous in a society dependent on automotive transportation." Id. However, General Statutes 14-227a(i) regarding an interlocking ignition device permits the Commissioner to allow the use of an interlocking ignition device provided that the suspended operator is not under suspension for any other reason than the provisions of § 14-227a(g)(2)(C)(ii) which reads in relevant parts as follows:
(g) Penalties for operation while under the influence. Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall: . . . (2) for conviction of a second violation within ten years after a prior conviction for the same offense . . . (C)(ii) if such person has been convicted of a violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section on account of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section, have such person's motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for one year and be prohibited for the two-year period following completion of such period of suspension from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14-227j . . .
The suspension of her operator's license, that the plaintiff complains of, is the three-year suspension imposed on February 8, 2007 for a violation of General statutes 14-227b, regarding implied consent to test an operator's blood, breath or urine. Section 14-227b provides for this three-year suspension if such person refused to submit to such test or analysis and is a multiple offender under § 14-227b.
The meanings of the relevant sections of General Statutes §§ 14-227a and 14-227b are clear from ascertaining the text of these statutes and their relationship to each other. They are plain and unambiguous and do not yield unworkable results. See General Statutes § 1-2z. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles clearly had the statutory authority to impose the three-year suspension for multiple violations of § 14-227b and to refuse the use of an interlocking ignition device to the plaintiff.
Additionally, State action can survive constitutional scrutiny only if it (1) serves a compelling state interest, and (2) is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. 640. There can be little dispute that the state's asserted interest in highway safety is a compelling state interest. See Burns v. Barrett, 212 Conn. 176, 184, 561 A.2d 1378, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 563, 107 L.Ed.2d 558 (1989). The second issue therefore, is whether the action taken by the Commissioner in further suspending the plaintiff's operator's license was sufficiently tailored to serve the state's interest in highway safety.
The court finds that the suspension imposed on the plaintiff until 2009, and the Commissioner's rejection of her request to allow her to operate her vehicle with an interlocking ignition device were both reasonable and necessary to achieve the goal of protecting the public safety. The plaintiff has failed to raise a substantial claim that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or the state have violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The Commissioner was acting within his statutory authority, and the facts, as alleged, do not reveal that he was acting in excess of such authority. There was no arbitrariness or abuse of discretion in the Commissioner's decision to further suspend the plaintiff's operating license pursuant to the provisions of § 14-227b. The statute clearly gave him this authorization. Further, § 14-227a(i) permits the Commissioner to allow the installation of an interlocking device for a person whose license is suspended, as long as, the license suspension is not for any other reason as set forth in the statute. (Emphasis added.) See 14-227a(i). In the present matter the subject suspension was for a violation of § 14-227b, which constituted "another" reason. The Commissioner's actions were those that were contemplated by the legislature when they enacted the relevant provisions of General Statutes § 14-227a and § 14-227b. The plaintiff's action is barred by the State's sovereign immunity and is hereby dismissed.