Summary
finding argument that plaintiff cannot identify a specific policymaker more appropriately considered at summary judgment stage, after the plaintiff takes discovery
Summary of this case from T.R. v. Cnty. of Del.Opinion
CASE NO. 6:03-CV-324
November 3, 2003
Douglas R. Larson, Mesquite, TX for Plaintiffs
Darren Keith Coleman, Shaver, Echols Coleman, Longview, TX for Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants Chase Glover, Greg Clanton, James Whittiker, and the City of Winnsboro (collectively "Defendants") have filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or, in the Alternative, Motion for Plaintiff to Re-Plead Pursuant to Rule 7 and, Subject to Said Motions, Defendants' Original Answer, Defenses and Jury Demand (Docket No. 5). Having considered the parties' pleadings and submissions, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Chase Glover ("Glover"), a City of Winnsboro police officer, stopped Plaintiff Todd Lynn Short ("Short") for speeding on July 23, 2001. Short remained in his vehicle while Glover conducted the traffic stop. Fifteen minutes after Glover stopped Short, Defendant Greg Clanton ("Clanton"), also a Winnsboro police officer, arrived to assist Glover with the traffic stop. Ultimately, officers Glover and Clanton issued Short a speeding citation for driving 64 mph in a 50 mph zone. It is undisputed that a trial in the Municipal Court for the City of Winnsboro found Short guilty of speeding.
For reasons disputed on the record, the traffic stop lasted for approximately one hour. Short claims that the stop was unnecessarily long and thus violated two constitutional rights: (1) "freedom from the unreasonable seizure and/or search of the person of Todd Lynn Short;" and (2)"freedom from an illegal and baseless prosecution brought by the defendants against Todd Lynn Short." As a result of the stop, Short claims that he suffered damages from constitutional violations, "loss of [his] physical liberties," and physical pain and suffering.
Short's claim for pain and suffering derives from the allegation that he suffered "heat prostration" from remaining in a parked car for an hour in July.
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 12(b)(1) AND 12(b)(6)
Under what standards should the Court determine this motion?As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether to proceed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) because Defendants have moved to dismiss Short's claims under both. This inquiry is relevant because the standard by which the Court will decide Defendants' arguments differs under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412-15 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit has held that
Where the defendant's challenge to the court's jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal cause of action, the proper course of action for the district court (assuming that the plaintiff's federal claim is not immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction and is not insubstantial and frivolous) is to find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case.Id. at 415. The Williamson court further held that claims are only "insubstantial and frivolous" where they have "no plausible foundation" or are "clearly foreclosed by a prior Supreme Court decision." Id. Thus, in cases such as this one, where the defendant attacks an essential element of the plaintiff's federal claim, a court should analyze the attack under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the federal claim has no plausible foundation.
The Court proceeds under Rule 12(b)(6) because Defendants' challenges in this case are attacks on the merits of Short's claims rather than on the Court's jurisdiction. As discussed below, prior Supreme Court holdings cast doubt on the viability of Short's claims. However, the Court cannot say that Short's claims have "no plausible foundation." Reading Defendants' attacks as a whole, they allege that Short cannot meet an essential element of his claim, not that Short manufactured the claims merely to create federal jurisdiction.
Dismissal under 12(b)(6) is only appropriate if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). Rule 12(b)(6) motions are "viewed with disfavor and [are] rarely granted." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). This Court will construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true. Id.; Mann v. Adams Realty Co., Inc., 556 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1977). However, plaintiffs must plead specific facts, and the Court will "not accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact." Collins, 224 F.3d at 498.
Because the Court proceeds under Rule 12(b)(6), it may only consider the contents of the pleadings and attachments to the pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Id. Defendants correctly argue that the Court may determine a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss based on: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the Court's resolution of disputed facts. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). However, under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may only consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's complaint refers to the documents and the documents are central to the plaintiff's claim. Collins, 224 F.3d at 498 (citing Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Does Short state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983?
Defendants argue that Short cannot state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 because he was convicted of speeding. In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court declared "a § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated." 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994). A district court may dismiss a § 1983 claim that challenges the constitutionality of a conviction unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction has "been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or called into question by the issuance of a habeas writ." Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 477). In the present case, Defendants argue that Short's § 1983 claim challenges the validity of his conviction for speeding and thus he cannot recover as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court further explained that "we think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution." Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
Although Short does not raise the argument, the Court finds that it may consider Short's conviction. Defendants proved Short's conviction by attaching a certified copy of the Wood County Clerk's file to their motion. As discussed above, the Court cannot consider Defendants' attachment as evidence under this Rule 12(b)(6) motion. However, Short's reply to Defendants' motion to dismiss admits that he was convicted of speeding. Thus, the Court may consider Short's speeding conviction. See Collins, 224 F.3d at 498.
The Court rejects Short's argument that his conviction does not bar his § 1983 claim because it is on de novo appeal. Under Texas law, a defendant may appeal cases heard in justice or municipal courts to the county court, and the county court retries the case de novo. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.042 (Vernon Supp. 2003). Short would have this Court rule that trial de novo equates to reversal of the underlying judgment. The standard of review in the appellate court, here the county court, has no effect on the underlying judgment's validity. Moreover, Short has not directed the Court to any Texas law that reverses, expunges, or invalidates the municipal court's judgment pending a new trial in the county court. Entitlement to review in the county court does not
eliminate the possibility that judgment in this Court would collaterally attack the valid municipal court conviction.
However, the Court finds that one of Short's § 1983 claims does not attack the constitutionality of his conviction. Short claims that the government violated his constitutional rights by detaining him for an unreasonable period of time and by conducting an "illegal and baseless" prosecution. To the extent that Short claims the prosecution was "illegal and baseless" he challenges the constitutionality of his conviction because a finding in this Court that the prosecution was baseless would necessarily conflict with the municipal court's finding that Short is guilty. In contrast, a finding in this Court that the police detained Short for an unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner would in no way conflict with the municipal court's finding Short exceeded the speed limit. See Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746. Although Short's conviction precludes the Court from adjudicating whether officer Glover had probable cause to stop Short, it does not preclude the possibility that an initially legitimate stop became unconstitutional due the officers' conduct during the stop. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Short's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for "illegal and baseless prosecution brought by the defendants against Todd Lynn Short" but denies Defendants' motion to dismiss § 1983 claims for unreasonable search and seizure.
Does Short state a claim for Malicious Prosecution under Texas Law?
To state a cause of action under Texas law for malicious prosecution, Short must prove:(1) the commencement of a criminal prosecution against plaintiff; (2) which has been caused by the defendant or through defendant's aid or cooperation; (3) which terminated in favor of the plaintiff by acquittal; (4) that plaintiff was innocent or not guilty of the charge against him; (5) that there was no probable cause for such proceeding; (6) that it was done with malice; and (7) which resulted in damages to plaintiff. Parker v. Dallas Hunting and Fishing Club, 463 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, no writ). Because the municipal court convicted Short of speeding, he cannot prove that he was "innocent or not guilty of the charge against him." Therefore, based on the facts alleged in his complaint, he cannot recover for malicious prosecution under Texas law and such claims must be dismissed.
Does Short state a claim for false arrest and illegal imprisonment?
Under Texas law, the elements of false arrest or false imprisonment are: (1) a willful detention of the person, (2) against the person's consent, and (3) without authority of law. Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). To avoid a collateral attack on Short's outstanding speeding conviction, the Court must presume that Short was in fact speeding when pulled over. If Short was speeding, then Short cannot prove that Officer Glover initially stopped him without authority of law. However, the Court is reluctant to dismiss this claim because, based on the facts as pled by Short, it is possible that Defendants lost the authority of law to detain Short at some point during the extended traffic stop. Therefore, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss the false arrest claim without prejudice to re-urge at a later point in the proceedings.
Does Short state a claim for assault and battery?
Defendants assert that Short cannot recover for assault and battery because officers Glover and Clanton never physically touched Short or threatened him with physical violence. Under Texas law, "in an assault and battery case, if the defendant establishes a lack of physical contact, then he successfully eliminates an essential element of the cause of action, thereby making it impossible for the plaintiff to prevail at trial." Preble v. Young, 999 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex.App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Short's complaint does not allege that the officer Glover or Clanton ever made physical contact with him. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the assault and battery claim.
Does Short state a claim against the City of Winnsboro?
Municipal liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof of three elements: (1) a policymaker, (2) an official policy, and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose "moving force" is the policy or custom. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). Short must identify "a municipal policymaker who could be held responsible, through actual or constructive knowledge, for enforcing a policy that caused [his] injuries." Id. at 578-79. The Court will not dismiss a claim against a city where a plaintiff satisfies the general notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Pivonka v. Collins, 2002 WL 1477455, *2 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993)).
Defendant Winnsboro alleges that the Court should dismiss Short's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because the complaint does not identify the specific policymakers. Short's complaint alleges that unidentified "Winnsboro policymakers" established several enumerated unconstitutional policies in violation of § 1983. Taking Short's allegations as true, the complaint does allege that a Winnsboro policymaker established unconstitutional policies. The Court finds that Winnsboro's argument that Short cannot identify a specific policymaker would be more appropriate in a no — evidence motion for summary judgment, after Short has had access to discovery. Considering the general disfavor of Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the Court holds that Short's complaint is sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO FILE A REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ASSERTIONS
Defendants Glover, Clanton, and Whitaker ask the Court to require a Reply from Short regarding their asserted qualified immunity defense. Defendants have pled their qualified immunity defenses in their original answer and in their motion to require a reply. The Court grants Defendants' motion and orders Short to file a reply that is specifically tailored to Defendants' qualified immunity defenses and that complies with the requirements set forth in Schultea v. Wood and its progeny. 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995).
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Short's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for "illegal and baseless prosecution brought by the defendants against Todd Lynn Short" and orders those claims DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. However, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Short's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for unreasonable search and seizure. The Court further DENIES Defendants' motions to dismiss Short's claims for false arrest and § 1983 claims against the city of Winnsboro. The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Short's assault and battery claim. The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Short's claim for malicious prosecution and ORDERS it DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Finally, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to require Short to file a response to asserted qualified immunity defenses and ORDERS Short to file a reply that is specifically tailored to Defendants' qualified immunity defenses and that complies with the requirements set forth in Schultea v. Wood and its progeny. 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995).