MARKMAN, J.

We granted leave to appeal to consider the following three issues: (1) whether, and to what extent, MCL 600.6304 permits a trier of fact in a medical malpractice action to consider the plaintiff's own pre-treatment negligence to offset, at least in part, the defendant's fault; (2) whether the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483 applies to a wrongful death action based on an underlying claim of medical malpractice, and assuming such cap applies, whether an action filed under the wrongful death act is subject to the higher medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap of § 1483; and (3) whether, and to what extent, MCL 600.6311 applies in a wrongful death action. Regarding the first issue, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that MCL 600.6304(1) did not permit the trier of fact to offset defendants' fault on the basis of plaintiff's alleged pre-treatment negligence. On the basis of the clear and unambiguous language of § 6304(1), we hold that a trier of fact is permitted in "personal injury, property damage, [and] wrongful death" tort actions, which necessarily include medical malpractice actions, to consider a plaintiff's pre-treatment negligence in offsetting a defendant's fault where reasonable minds could differ with regard to whether such negligence constituted "a proximate cause" — a foreseeable, natural and probable cause — of the plaintiff's injury and damages. Further, on the basis of the evidence presented, we believe that reasonable minds could find that plaintiff's pre-treatment negligence in this case — her failing to regularly take her prescribed blood pressure medication during the year preceding her fatal stroke — constituted a foreseeable, natural, and probable cause of her fatal stroke, and thus we remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the opinions of this Court.

Regarding the second issue, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the higher medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap of § 1483 applies to a wrongful death action. Consistent with our recent decision in Jenkins v. Patel, 471 Mich 158, 173; 684 NW2d 346 (2004), in which we held that the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483 applies to a wrongful death action based on an underlying claim of medical malpractice, we affirm the decisions of both lower courts and hold that the higher medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap of § 1483 applies where the injured person, at any time before his death and as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, fits within the ambit of MCL 600.1483(1)(a), (b), or (c).

Regarding the third issue, the Court of Appeals, finding that MCL 600.6311 applies in this case because both the personal representative and the decedent were or would have been sixty years of age or older at the time of judgment, affirmed the trial court's decision that plaintiff's award of future damages should not be reduced to present value. Because the term "plaintiff," as used in § 6311, refers, for purposes of a wrongful death action, to the decedent, and because Mrs. Shinholster, the decedent, was sixty-one at her death and at the time of judgment, we agree with the trial court's interpretation of § 6311, and hold that, on remand, the trial court cannot reduce any future damages awarded to plaintiff to their present value.

I. BACKGROUND

In this medical malpractice action, Betty Shinholster (Shinholster), the decedent, made four visits to defendant Annapolis Hospital in April 1995, complaining of dizziness. Defendant Dr. Dennis Adams (Adams) examined plaintiff on April 7 and April 10, and defendant Dr. Mary Ellen Flaherty (Flaherty) examined Shinholster on April 14. Shinholster's fourth visit on April 16 was precipitated by a massive stroke, after which she entered a coma for several months and died at the age of sixty-one. On behalf of his deceased wife, Johnnie Shinholster filed suit against Adams, Flaherty, and Annapolis Hospital, alleging that they had negligently treated his wife on April 10 and April 14 by failing to recognize that she had been experiencing transient ischemic attacks, or "mini-strokes" that often precede a full-blown, serious stroke.

The jury found in plaintiff's favor and awarded the following damages: (1) $220,000 for past economic damages; (2) $564,600 for past noneconomic damages; (3) $9,700 each year in future economic damages for the years 1999 through 2003; and (4) $62,500 each year in future noneconomic damages for the years 1999 through 2003. The jury further concluded that Shinholster had been twenty percent comparatively negligent in her actions after April 7, 1995, by not regularly taking her prescribed blood pressure medication. Consistent with the jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $916,480, "subject to any applicable statutory limitation, statutory cap, adjustment regarding the computation of comparative negligence or adjustment pursuant to the collateral source rule." The trial court denied defendants' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed but remanded for the recalculation of damages. Shinholster v. Annapolis Hosp, 255 Mich App 339, 360; 660 NW2d 361 (2003). Defendants now appeal to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo. People v. Morey, 461 Mich 325, 329; 603 NW2d 250 (1999).

III. ANALYSIS

This Court's primary task in construing a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Murphy v. Michigan Bell Tel Co, 447 Mich 93, 98; 523 NW2d 310 (1994). "The words of a statute provide `the most reliable evidence of [the Legislature's] intent. . . .'" Sun Valley Foods Co v. Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999), quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 US 576, 593; 101 S Ct 2524; 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981). In discerning legislative intent, a court must "give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute. . . ." State Farm Fire Cas Co v. Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002). The Court must consider "both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as `its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.'" Sun Valley, supra at 237, quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 US 137, 145; 116 S Ct 501; 133 L Ed 2d 472 (1995). "The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended." Sun Valley, supra at 237. "If the language of a statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written." Id. at 236.

A. PLAINTIFF'S PRE-TREATMENT NEGLIGENCE 1. MCL 600.6304

MCL 600.6304 generally provides that the trier of fact in a tort action shall determine by percent the comparative negligence of all those who are a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury and subsequent damages. In relevant part § 6304 provides:

(1) In an action based on tort . . . seeking damages for personal injury . . . or wrongful death involving fault of more than I person, . . . the court . . . shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings indicating both of the following:

(a) The total amount of each plaintiff's damages.

(b) The percentage of the total fault of all persons that contributed to the death or injury, including each plaintiff. . . .

(2) In determining the percentages of fault under subsection (1)(b), the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each person at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.

* * *

(6) If an action includes a medical malpractice claim against a person or entity described in section 5838a(1), 1 of the following applies:

(a) If the plaintiff is determined to be without fault under subsections (1) and (2), the liability of each defendant is joint and several. . . .

(b) If the plaintiff is determined to have fault under subsections (1) and (2) . . . the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties. . . .

* * *

(8) As used in this section, "fault" includes an act, an omission, conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of a legal duty, or any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a proximate cause of damage sustained by a party.

On the basis of this statute, defendants contend that the trial court erred in not allowing the jury to consider Shinholster's behavior as manifesting comparative negligence when she failed to regularly take her prescribed blood pressure medication for at least a year before her first visit to the emergency room.

While the Court of Appeals acknowledged that § 6304, on its face, requires a trier of fact to consider such negligence, it nonetheless relied on inferences drawn from this Court's decision in Podvin v. Eickhorst, 373 Mich 175; 128 NW2d 523 (1964), and authority from other states to reach its holding that the statute did not control the situation.

The Court of Appeals erred, in our judgment. Subsection 6304(1)(b) is unambiguous and calls for the trier of fact to assess by percentage "the total fault of all persons that contributed to the death or injury, including each plaintiff," (emphasis added), as long as that fault constituted a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury and subsequent damage.

With regard to what cause constitutes proximate cause, in Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich 443, 448; 70 NW2d 805 (1955), we quoted with approval the following from 38 Am Jur, Negligence, § 55, p 703:

"The proximate cause of an injury is not necessarily the immediate cause; not necessarily the cause nearest in time, distance, or space. Assuming that there is a direct, natural, and continuous sequence between an act and an injury, * * * the act can be accepted as the proximate cause of the injury without reference to its separation from the injury in point of time or distance."

Thus, under § 6304, if a defendant presents evidence that would allow a reasonable person to conclude that a plaintiff's negligence constituted a proximate cause of her injury and subsequent damage, the trier of fact must be allowed to consider such evidence in apportioning fault.

With regard to the Court of Appeals and Justice CAVANAGH and Justice WEAVER'S reliance, in their concurrence/dissents, on out-of-state authority reaching a different conclusion than our Legislature did on this issue, we presume that the legislators were aware of those approaches and chose to depart from them in establishing Michigan law.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals reliance on inferences drawn from Podvin (the plaintiff's negligence in causing a car accident could not be cited as contributory negligence for subsequent medical malpractice in treating car accident injuries) is misplaced. This case is not relevant because it was decided at a time when any contributory negligence barred a plaintiff's lawsuit. If it was ever relevant, it stopped being so when this Court adopted pure comparative negligence. Placek v. Sterling Hts, 405 Mich 638, 701; 275 NW2d 511 (1979). Moreover, to the extent that the inferences drawn from Podvin are inconsistent with MCL 600.6304, the statute must prevail.

The Court of Appeals also erred by mischaracterizing Shinholster's conduct as merely creating the condition that led her to seek treatment. Decedent's conduct may have done more than that. Her failure to properly take her medications may in fact have constituted a proximate cause of her death.

2. LIMITED REMAND

Because the trial court ruled that not all decedent's pre-treatment negligence could be considered, defendants were limited to submitting evidence that decedent was comparatively negligent only from April 7 onward, when she first visited the emergency room. Yet, it is apparent from that testimony that, had a wider scope of questioning been allowed, just as defendants' expert testimony supported the proposition that failure for ten days (April 7 through April 16) to regularly take her medications constituted a proximate cause, it may well have supported the same conclusion for a greater period. Accordingly, the trial court clearly erred in precluding evidence made admissible by § 6304, and this prevented defendants from receiving a fair trial with regard to the apportionment of damages. MCR 2.611(A)(1)(a). Because the jury in this case has already determined that defendants breached their standard of care, a determination that I note defendants have never appealed, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for calculation of damages only, ordering that the jury be permitted to consider Shinholster's pre-treatment negligence in apportioning fault concerning plaintiff's damages.

While I do not dispute the correctness of the Chief Justice's analysis in her concurrence/dissent concerning the prima facie elements of a tort cause of action, post at 586-587, I nonetheless believe that such analysis must be placed within the proper context. In a tort action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving his prima facie case by demonstrating, as the Chief Justice has noted: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) proximate causation, and (4) damages. If in this case, plaintiff had been permitted to present evidence demonstrating defendant's breach — which evidence was later held to be inadmissible — a remand for an entirely new trial might well be required, because such evidence would, in fact, implicate whether defendant had breached a duty, and, therefore, whether plaintiff had satisfied the prima facie elements of a tort action.

In the instant case, as in all tort actions, plaintiff bore the burden of proving her prima facie case, irrespective of her own negligent conduct. It was only after the jury determined that plaintiff had satisfied this burden, and that defendants were liable, that the jury should have considered whether defendants satisfied their burden of demonstrating that, despite their own liability, they were not exclusively liable because plaintiff herself was also negligent. Because the challenged evidence in this case has nothing to do with defendants' conduct, and thus nothing to do with whether plaintiff has satisfied her prima facie tort case, I believe that the Chief Justice's assertion that "[l]imiting the new trial to damages only ignores the important fact that proximate cause is essential to a plaintiff's prima facie case," is incorrect. Post at 587.

It is important to remember that the conduct of plaintiff, not that of defendants, is at issue here, and that the issue is whether defendants satisfied their burden of demonstrating that, although liable, they are not exclusively liable for plaintiff's injury. That is, we are not considering whether plaintiff satisfied her initial burden of proof relating to whether defendants were a proximate cause of her injury and, thus, are liable.

Certainly, defendants could have argued that, had the jury been permitted to consider plaintiff's pre-treatment negligence, it would not have found that defendants had breached their standard of care at all or that defendants' breach constituted a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. However, defendants did not make such an argument. Instead, they argued only that evidence of plaintiff's own negligence should be considered by the jury in order to determine the extent to which defendants were liable for plaintiff's injury. (Defendants alleged: "Had the jury been properly instructed [concerning plaintiff's pre-treatment negligence], it is likely that the percentage of her comparative fault would have been determined at a much higher level.")

B. CAP ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES

For the reasons stated in Jenkins, supra at 166-173, we hold that the noneconomic damages cap found in MCL 600.1483 applies to a wrongful death action based on an underlying claim of medical malpractice.

MCL 600.1483 contains two caps on noneconomic damages and provides:

(1) In an action for damages alleging medical malpractice by or against a person or party, the total amount of damages for noneconomic loss recoverable by all plaintiffs, resulting from the negligence of all defendants, shall not exceed $280,000.00 unless, as the result of the negligence of 1 or more of the defendants, 1 or more of the following exceptions apply as determined by the court pursuant to section 6304, in which case damages for noneconomic loss shall not exceed $500,000.00:

(a) The plaintiff is hemiplegic, paraplegic, or quadriplegic resulting in a total permanent functional loss of 1 or more limbs caused by 1 or more of the following:

(i) Injury to the brain.

(ii) Injury to the spinal cord.

(b) The plaintiff has permanently impaired cognitive capacity rendering him or her incapable of making independent, responsible life decisions and permanently incapable of independently performing the activities of normal, daily living.

(c) There has been permanent loss of or damage to a reproductive organ resulting in the inability to procreate.

While defendants have not contested that, as a result of her stroke, Shinholster satisfied § 1483(1)(a) and (b), they and the Chief Justice contend that the higher damages cap applies only if the injured person continues to suffer one of the enumerated conditions set forth in § 1483 at the time of judgment. Post at 592-593. Because Mrs. Shinholster was dead at the time of judgment, defendants and the Chief Justice reason that the higher cap cannot apply. In support of their position, they rely upon the fact that the statute specifically uses the present tense of verbs, i.e., "is" and "has," and that the statute provides that the lower tier is to apply unless, as the result of the negligence of 1 or more of the defendants, "1 or more of the following exceptions apply as determined by the court pursuant to section 6304. . . ." Post at 593 (emphasis added). Because a trial court reduces damages pursuant to § 6304 only after the jury has rendered its verdict, defendants and the Chief Justice conclude that the present tense verbs in the statute refer to that precise moment in time at which "the trial court makes its post-verdict determination concerning whether the cap requires adjustment of the verdict." Post at 592-593. While the trial court noted that the Legislature used the present tense words "is . . . hemiplegic," it also observed that the Legislature did not specify at which time plaintiff must have sustained that condition for the higher cap to apply. The trial court disagreed with defendants' construction of the statute and ruled:

[T]he only sensible way to interpret the statute is to hold that the Legislature intended [the higher cap] to apply to people who had been rendered cognitively incapable, quadriplegic, etc., from the accident in question. Betty Shinholster met this condition here: as the jury found, she suffered the requisite injuries from the accident — she endured these injuries in the several months she lay in a coma before she died. We thus hold that the higher, $500,000 cap applies.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court:

We construe the statute in accordance with the trial court's ruling. Indeed, the adoption of defendants' position would lead to absurd and unfair results. For example, a person who endured months of paraplegia caused by medical malpractice but died of an unrelated and independent cause before the court's verdict adjustments would be subject to the lower cap, whereas a similar person who died a day after the court's verdict adjustments would be subject to the higher cap. We view the better approach to be that advocated by plaintiff and adopted by the trial court. Under this approach, the point of reference for determining whether the injured person fits within MCL 600.1483(1)(a), (b), or (c) is any time after and as a result of the negligent action. Therefore, because Shinholster was rendered incapacitated by defendants' negligence, the higher cap applies. [ Shinholster, supra at 354.]

We agree with the results reached by the lower courts and hold that § 1483 permits a plaintiff to recover a maximum of $500,000 in medical malpractice noneconomic damages if, as a result of the defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff at some point thereafter, and while still living, suffered one of the enumerated conditions of § 1483. We base this interpretation on several textual indicators contained in § 1483 and other pertinent statutes.

First, this interpretation of § 1483 is consistent with the text of the statute itself, which, as noted, provides that the lower tier applies "unless, as the result of the negligence of 1 or more of the defendants, 1 or more of the following exceptions apply. . . ." (Emphasis added.) As long as, at some point after the defendant's alleged negligence occurred and before the decedent's death, it could be said that, "as the result of the negligence of 1 or more of the defendants . . . [t]he plaintiff is hemiplegic" or the plaintiff "has permanently impaired cognitive capacity" or "[t]here has been permanent loss of or damage to a reproductive organ," the higher damages cap tier applies. Not only is this understanding of § 1483, and specifically its use of the present tense of verbs, consistent with this Court's decision in Michalski v. Bar-Levav, 463 Mich 723, 732-733; 625 NW2d 754 (2001) (construing provisions of the Handicappers Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101, which are also written in the present tense, yet holding that the "present" tense refers to events existing during the pendency of the plaintiff's employment, when her cause of action arose), but it also avoids the arguably incongruous results about which the trial court and Court of Appeals were concerned.

Second, we believe that the text of the wrongful death act, MCL 600.2922(1), (2), and (6), provides additional support for our understanding of § 1483. These provisions state that "the personal representative of the estate of the deceased person" be able to "maintain an action and recover damages [against] the person who or the corporation that would have been liable, if death had not ensued. . . ." Subsection 2922(6) expressly permits the deceased's estate to recover "reasonable compensation for the pain and suffering, while conscious, undergone by the deceased person during the period intervening between the time of the injury and death. . . ." Accordingly, while we agree with the Chief Justice that the Legislature is free to make "a policy decision that the survivors of dead medical malpractice victims are entitled to lesser damages than are living medical malpractice victims who are suffering from one of the three types of permanent conditions enumerated in [§ 1483]," post at 592, we see no indication in the statute that the Legislature, in fact, made such a decision; rather, we believe that the Legislature made a quite contrary policy decision in § 2922(1), (2), and (6) by permitting a decedent's estate to recover everything that the decedent would have been able to recover had she lived.

Third, we believe that the interplay between the wrongful death act, particularly § 2922(6), and § 1483 provides additional textual support for our understanding of § 1483. Subsection 2922(6) states that in a wrongful death action "the court or jury may award . . . reasonable compensation for the pain and suffering, while conscious, undergone by the deceased person during the period intervening between the time of the injury and death. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Section 1483 provides that pain and suffering resulting from certain enumerated injuries are compensable at a higher rate. Thus, the Legislature has apparently determined that "reasonable compensation" for such pain and suffering may sometimes be in excess of $280,000. However, by concluding that, no matter what type of injuries resulted in a decedent's death, survivors in a wrongful death action may never recover under § 1483's higher cap if the decedent is dead at the time of judgment, defendants and the Chief Justice effectively preclude the awarding of "reasonable compensation" under § 2922(6) for the conscious pain and suffering undergone by at least some decedents before their death, where such pain and suffering resulted from one of the enumerated injuries in § 1483. That is, we believe that defendants and the Chief Justice overlook the express directive of § 2922(6) that the jury may award "reasonable compensation" for a decedent's conscious pain and suffering — compensation which, in the Legislature's estimation, may sometimes be in excess of $280,000 if conscious pain and suffering results from an injury enumerated in § 1483.

Finally, in asserting that the higher damages cap of § 1483 applies only where the plaintiff is suffering one of the conditions enumerated in the statute at the time of judgment, we believe that defendants and the Chief Justice give extraordinary and undue weight to the fact that the Legislature has used the present tense of the verbs in § 1483(1)(a) and (b). Particularly, in concluding that "the structure of § 1483(1) indicates that the Legislature intended that an exception, if it is applicable, apply at the time [of judgment]," post at 592, we note that the Chief Justice fails to ensure that her own interpretation of § 1483 is consistent with the Legislature's use of the verb tense "has been" in § 1483(1)(c). This use of the past tense of the verb indicates an intention by the Legislature that an injured party need not always be alive at the time of judgment for the higher cap to apply, but rather only have suffered, at some point in the past as the result of a defendant's negligent conduct, the type of injury enumerated in § 1483(1)(c).

Further, we note that, had the Legislature truly intended that an injured party must continue to suffer the higher tier injury at the time of judgment, it knew how to make that intent specific, as shown by MCL 600.6311, infra, in which the Legislature states that this provision is to apply if "a plaintiff . . . is 60 years of age or older at the time of judgment." (Emphasis added.) Unlike § 6311, § 1483 does not provide such a clear temporal framework. Moreover, had the Legislature intended that the term "is," as used in § 6311, mean what defendants and the Chief Justice assert it means in § 1483 (i.e., at the time of judgment), we see no indication in § 6311 that the Legislature qualified the term within the temporal framework of "at the time of judgment."

Defendants and the Chief Justice fail to explain why the use of the present tense of verbs in § 1483(1)(a) and (b) demonstrates that the Legislature intended that a plaintiff suffer from one of the enumerated conditions at the time of judgment, rather than at the time the action is filed, the jury is selected, opening statements are made, the first witness takes the stand, closing statements are made, at the beginning of jury deliberations, or at the time at which the jury renders its verdict. Defendants and the Chief Justice assert that the Legislature showed an intent to set the temporal framework at the time of judgment by stating that the higher tier exception applies " as determined by the court pursuant to section 6304. . . ." However, in our judgment, references in § 1483 to § 6304 serve merely to clarify under which statute the court is authorized and required to reduce the damages award consistent with § 1483. We do not read into this reference a legislative intent to bar a plaintiff, whose decedent has suffered while still alive and has suffered "as the result of the negligence of 1 or more of the defendants, 1 or more of the following [injuries]," from recovering pursuant to the higher tier merely because the plaintiff's decedent was unfortunate enough to die before the post-verdict damages determination. Rather, on the basis of the statutory language previously discussed, we believe that the better interpretation of the statute is that, as long as a plaintiff suffers, while still living and as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, one of the enumerated conditions set forth in § 1483, the statute's higher damages cap applies.

Because plaintiff in this case presented evidence from which it could be rationally concluded that, "as the result of the negligence of 1 or more of the defendants," it could have been said at some time before her death that she "is hemiplegic, paraplegic, or quadriplegic [as a result of] [i]njury to the brain," or "has permanently impaired cognitive capacity," we agree with the determination made by the lower courts that the higher damages cap of § 1483 applies under the circumstances of this case.

C. MCL 600.6311

While MCL 600.6306(1)(c), (d), and (e) provide that all future damages awarded to a plaintiff be reduced to gross present value, MCL 600.6311 creates an exception to this general rule by stating, "Sections 6306(1)(c), (d), and (e) . . . do not apply to a plaintiff who is 60 years of age or older at the time of judgment." Thus, only when a plaintiff is younger than sixty years of age at the time of judgment, must the trial court reduce the plaintiff's future damages to present cash value.

Plaintiff asserts that, for purposes of § 6311, the term "plaintiff" in a wrongful death action is either the personal representative or the decedent, based on the age that the decedent would have been had she been alive at the time of judgment. On the other hand, defendants and the Chief Justice contend that § 6311 is a limited exception that does not apply to a wrongful death action because the "plaintiff" in such an action is the estate, which cannot have an age. Post at 596.

The trial court held that, for purposes of § 6311, the term "plaintiff" refers to the decedent in a wrongful death case, and that because Shinholster was sixty-one at the time of her death, she necessarily would have been "60 years of age or older at the time of judgment." Thus, § 6306(1)(c), (d), and (e) do not apply. Although the Court of Appeals found that § 6311 is "ambiguous with regard to the term `plaintiff' as applied to wrongful death cases," Shinholster, supra at 357, that Court declined to resolve the issue, holding that § 6311 applies because both the personal representative and the decedent were or would have been sixty years of age or older at the time of judgment:

MCL 600.6311 specifically refers to "a plaintiff who is 60 years of age or older . . ." (emphasis added). Accordingly, we could potentially hold that because the plaintiff here — Shinholster's personal representative — was over sixty, the MCL 600.6311 exception applied. However, we note that MCL 600.6306 also uses the term "plaintiff" in referring to comparative negligence. See MCL 600.6306(3) ("the total judgment amount shall be reduced . . . by an amount equal to the percentage of plaintiff's fault"). Clearly, this reference to "plaintiff" is not a reference to a personal representative in a wrongful death case, because the personal representative would not be the one evaluated for comparative negligence; instead, the decedent would be so evaluated. We conclude that the statues at issue are essentially ambiguous with regard to the term "plaintiff" as applied to wrongful death cases.

However, it is not necessary, in the instant case, to resolve the ambiguity in MCL 600.6311. Indeed, both the "plaintiff" (i.e., the personal representative and the person who brought the lawsuit) and the decedent in this case satisfied the MCL 600.6311 exception. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to reduce the amount of future damages to present value. [ Shinholster, supra at 356-357.]

The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, i.e., that "a word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting," affords us some assistance in interpreting § 6311. See G C Timmis Co v. Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416, 420; 662 NW2d 710 (2003). We apply this doctrine to include the other provisions of Chapter 63 of the Revised Judicature Act because the term "plaintiff" does not stand alone here, and cannot be read in a vacuum. Instead, "[i]t exists and must be read in context with the entire act, and the words and phrases used there must be assigned such meanings as are in harmony with the whole of the statute. . . ." Arrowhead Dev Co v. Livingston Co Rd Comm, 413 Mich 505, 516; 322 NW2d 702 (1982). "Although a phrase or a statement may mean one thing when read in isolation, it may mean something substantially different when read in context." G C Timmis Co, supra at 421.

MCL 600.6305(2) provides, in part:

In the event of death, the calculation of future damages shall be based on the losses during the period of time the plaintiff would have lived but for the injury upon which the claim is based.

Further, MCL 600.6306(3) provides, "If the plaintiff was assigned a percentage of fault . . . the total judgment amount shall be reduced . . . by an amount equal to the percentage of plaintiff's fault." As described by the Court of Appeals, these "reference[s] to `plaintiff' [are] not . . . reference[s] to a personal representative [or an estate] in a wrongful death case, because [neither] would . . . be the one evaluated for comparative negligence; instead, the decedent would be so evaluated." Shinholster, supra at 357. We agree with the trial court and hold that, for purposes of § 6311, the term "plaintiff" refers to the decedent, Mrs. Shinholster.

However, our inquiry into the application of § 6311 in the instant case does not stop there. Rather, § 6311 states that it applies if the plaintiff is "60 years of age or older at the time of judgment." (Emphasis added.) Because the term "plaintiff" refers to the decedent in a wrongful death action, and because Shinholster was sixty-one at her death and at the time of judgment, we agree with the trial court's interpretation of § 6311, and hold that, on remand, the trial court cannot reduce any future damages awarded to plaintiff to their present value.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because § 6304(1) requires, without exception, that a trier of fact be permitted in all "personal injury, property damage, [and] wrongful death" tort actions to consider the conduct of all parties whose conduct has constituted a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages, and because, on the basis of the evidence presented by defendants, reasonable minds could find that plaintiff's pre-treatment negligence here constituted "a proximate cause" — a foreseeable, natural, and probable cause — of her fatal stroke, we remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the opinions of this Court. Further, based on our decision in Jenkins, where we held that the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap of § 1483 applies to a wrongful death action based on an underlying claim of medical malpractice, we affirm the decisions of both lower courts and hold that the higher cap of § 1483 applies when the injured person, at any time while still living and as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, fits within the ambit of § 1483 (1)(a), (b), or (c). Finally, because the term "plaintiff," as used in § 6311, refers, for purposes of a wrongful death action, to the decedent, and because Mrs. Shinholster, the decedent, was sixty-one at her death and at the time of judgment, we agree with the trial court's interpretation of § 6311, and hold that the trial court cannot reduce any future damages award to plaintiff to their present value.

CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR and YOUNG, JJ., joined in section III(A) and with the determination in section III(B) that the medical malpractice cap of § 1483 applies to a wrongful death action based on an underlying claim of medical malpractice.

CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., joined in section III(C) and concurred in the result only with regard to section III(B).

WEAVER, J., joined in sections III(B) and III(C).