Opinion
Civil No. 02-953 (JRT/FLN)
March 18, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Thomas P. Malone, BARNA, GUZY STEFFEN, 200 Coon Rapids Blvd., 400 Northtown Financial Plaza, Coon Rapids, MN 55433, for plaintiffs.
Paul D. Reuvers, IVERSON REUVERS, 230 Townline Plaza, 8585 West 78th Street, Bloomington, MN 55438, for defendants.
Plaintiffs Mark and Kathleen Shimer filed this action in the Cass County District Court, and in their amended complaint, allege that defendants' denial of a sewer hookup to their property violates federal substantive due process and equal protection rights. Defendants removed to federal court and moved for summary judgment on the substantive due process and equal protection claims. The individual defendants also asserted claims of absolute and qualified immunity. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment on the equal protection and substantive due process claims.
Plaintiffs also asserted claims under Minnesota statutes and the Minnesota Constitution.
BACKGROUND
In the summer of 2000, plaintiffs bought a property on Shingobee Island in Cass County (located on Leech Lake, about two and one-half miles southeast of Walker). They anticipated that they would establish a bar/restaurant and have living quarters on the property as well. The purchase agreement was contingent upon the property being rezoned from transitional to commercial use. On September 26, 2000, the Cass County Planning Commission ("CCPC") issued a conditional use permit for the operation of a restaurant with a liquor license and living quarters. The Water and Sewer Commission challenged the issuance of the conditional use permit in state court. The state court found that the issuance of the conditional use permit was not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore upheld the conditional use permit. The Water and Sewer Commission nonetheless refused to provide the necessary hookup. Without a sewer hookup, plaintiffs were unable to move forward with their plans for the restaurant/bar. Eventually, their conditional use permit was revoked.
Plaintiffs represent that the permit essentially "timed-out" because, due to the inability to complete the sewer hookup, plaintiffs could not satisfy the conditions of the conditional use permit.
Plaintiffs contend that the Water and Sewer Commission, and individual members of the commission, objected to the sewer hookup not because the hookup would stress the sewer system, but because of personal animus. Two of the Water and Sewer Commissioners are related to Grant and Kris Oppegard, who own Arthur's, a restaurant located within a few miles of plaintiffs' proposed restaurant/bar. Defendant Jim Rogen's sister is a part owner of Arthur's and defendant Ann Noland is the sister-in-law of Kris Oppegard. Plaintiffs claim that those commissioners were motivated by a desire to eliminate the possibility of competition to Arthur's.
After attempts to obtain the hook-up failed, plaintiffs filed suit in Cass County District Court, asserting several state law claims and requesting an order forcing the Water and Sewer Commission to hook up their property to the system. Plaintiffs successfully moved in state court to amend the complaint to add claims under both the Minnesota and United States Constitutions.
In July of 2002, several months after the Cass County action was filed, the Cass County Board passed a resolution approving the decision of the Water and Sewer Commission to deny the proposed hookup. In making this decision, the Board relied on the opinion of an expert retained to address the sewer capacity on Shingobee Island. In sum, the expert opined that the system was inadequate to handle plaintiffs' proposed hook-up. Despite the County's subsequent action, plaintiffs have not moved to add the County as a defendant. Instead, plaintiffs maintain that the County's approval of the Water and Sewer Commission's decision was a litigation tactic, and that therefore the County need not be added as a defendant.
Plaintiffs moved in state court in March of 2002 to add the County as a defendant. They based this motion on the County's agreement to indemnify the Water and Sewer Commission and the Commission's individual members. The state court denied this request because the indemnification agreement essentially created an insurer-insured relationship between the County and the Water and Sewer Commission, and under Minnesota law, an injured party has no direct cause of action against a negligent party's insurer prior to recovery of judgment against the insured. Nothing prevents plaintiffs from now renewing their motion to add the County as a defendant.
ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party bears the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980). However, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings, but it must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2002).
II. Statutory Scheme
Minnesota Statutes §§ 116A.01 and 116A.24 permit county boards to appoint water and sewer commissions. Water and sewer commissions are charged with establishing, constructing, operating, and maintaining water and sewer systems. Minn. Stat. § 116A.24, subd. 2. The extent of the authority of water and sewer commissions has not been explored by Minnesota courts. However, the statute explicitly provides that the county board must approve of actions of the water and sewer commissions unless the board waives that approval and files an order that is confirmed by the district court. Minn. Stat. § 116A.24, subd. 2. The statute provides examples of activities the commissions are authorized to conduct, and notes that the list is not exhaustive. Minn. Stat. § 116A.24, subd. 2 (authorizing the commissions to "do all things necessary . . . including but not limited to the following:" employ engineers and other professionals, enter into contracts, adopt rules and regulations relating to the establishment of water or sewer rentals or user fees).
Nothing in the statute explicitly allows water and sewer commissions to deny access to a sewer system. Plaintiffs, in their complaint allege that the "Water and Sewer Commission does not have the power or authority to refuse to allow Mark and Kathy Shimer's Property access to the central Sewer System. . . ." Amended Complaint at ¶ 9.13. Defendants counter that the phrase, "may do all things necessary to establish, construct, operate and maintain a system" necessarily encompasses the authority to deny hookups. Minn. Stat. § 116A.24, subd. 2. Defendants also argue, however, that the Water and Sewer Commission does not have final authority to deny the hookup, and that the County Board of Commissioners retained that authority.
Although the statutory authority of a water and sewer commission is broad, the Court finds that its authority does not include the significant power unilaterally to deny a sewer hookup. Several factors support this conclusion, including the plain language of the statute, and a consideration of other relevant statutes. If the Minnesota Legislature had intended water and sewer commissions to have the unilateral power to deny hookups, it would have explicitly included that important power in the nonexclusive list of powers granted to such commissions. Further, the power to deny a sewer hookup has the potential to place water and sewer commissions at odds with county planning commissions, and county boards of commissioners. The Court finds it extremely unlikely that the legislature intended to grant water and sewer commissions what essentially amounts to a veto power over planning commissions and county boards. Finally, there is little doubt that the County Board retains authority over decisions of the Water and Sewer Commission, especially in the absence of a waiver of that review power.
III. Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiffs request relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of substantive due process and equal protection caused by the Commission's denial of the water and sewer hookup. Section 1983 claims have two essential elements. See DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999, 1002 (8th Cir. 1999). First, plaintiffs must show that the conduct complained of was committed by an entity or person acting under color of law. Id. Second, plaintiffs must prove that that conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Id. The Court first examines whether the Water and Sewer Commission is a "person" for section 1983 purposes. Although the Commission, a subordinate legal entity, is not a "person," there is no question that the individual defendants are "persons," and thus the Court will also address the second element of plaintiffs' section 1983 claims.
A. Acting under color of law
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any "person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" subjects any citizen to deprivation of Constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities and other local government units such as counties are included among those "persons" to whom section 1983 applies. Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); see also Smallwood v. Jefferson Co. Gov't, 753 F. Supp. 657, 659-60 (W.D.Ky. 1991) (holding that a county could be considered a "person" for purposes of section 1983 liability).
Here, however, plaintiffs are not suing Cass County, but the Water and Sewer Commission, a subordinate entity. Subordinate entities are rarely proper defendants in section 1983 actions. See, e.g., Richardson v. County of Cook, 621 N.E.2d 114, 117 (Ill.Ct.App. 1991) (holding County Board of Commissioners not a "person" and therefore not a proper defendant in section 1983 case). In Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582 (3rd Cir. 1998), the Third Circuit found that the actions of the Philadelphia Historic Commission could subject the city to liability. The Historical Commission itself, however, was dismissed as a defendant early in the proceedings. The District Court noted, "[p]laintiff acknowledges that the City of Philadelphia is the proper party defendant and does not oppose [d]efendants' request that the Philadelphia Historical Commission be removed as a [d]efendant." Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 95-7057, 1997 WL 399374, at *3 n. 5 (E.D.Pa. July 14, 1997), aff'd 142 F.3d 582 (3rd Cir. 1998). Similarly, in Umhey v. County of Orange, New York, 957 F. Supp. 525, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the Court held that the County Board of Ethics was merely a subunit of the County, and as such was not subject to suit under section 1983. See also Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 68 F. Supp.2d 602, 626 (D.Md. 1999) (holding that county council, permits department, and the office of zoning commissioner were not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983); Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (S.D.Fla. 1990) (holding that city zoning department not "person" under section 1983).
In addition, absent specific statutory authority, such subordinate entities do not have the capacity to sue or be sued. See e.g., Galob v. Sanborn, 160 N.W.2d 262 (Minn. 1968) (holding that courts lack power to make division of municipality an entity capable of suing or being sued); Edge v. City of St. Paul, 2002 WL 31260012 (D.Minn. Oct. 7, 2002) (citing Galob v. Sanborn and finding that the Department of Fire and Safety Services is not a party capable of being sued in its own name). See also 56 Am. Jur.2d Municipal Corporations and Other Subdivisions § 787 (noting that "[g]enerally, the departments and subordinate entities of municipalities, counties, and towns . . . do not have the capacity to sue or be sued in the absence of specific statutory authority" and listing county board of commissions among subordinate entities generally lacking the capacity to sue or be sued). Although the actions of the Water and Sewer Commission might subject the county itself to liability, the commission itself is a not a proper defendant subject to suit in a section 1983 lawsuit.
Plaintiffs also argue that the Water and Sewer Commission, by custom, had final decision making authority, and is therefore subject to section 1983 liability pursuant to the line of cases beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). In Praprotnik, the Court determined that individual decisionmakers could subject the municipality to liability if "the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered." Id. Plaintiff urges that liability attaches because the Water and Sewer Commission had final decision-making authority based on the county's custom of failing to supervise it. See id. at 108 (reasoning that liability can also attach to the municipality where the final decision making authority is "so permanent and well settled as to constitute a `custom or usage' with the force of law.") (quoting Adicke v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). However, "an incomplete delegation of authority . . . will not result in municipal liability." Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1402 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Angarita v. St. Louis County, 981 F.2d 1537 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that municipal officials who have final policymaking authority may, by their actions, subject the government to section 1983 liability).
Minnesota Statute § 116A.24, subd. 2, explicitly states that all actions of any water and sewer commission are subject to approval of the County Board unless the board waives that approval. Further, that waiver must be filed in an order with the district court. The County did not waive its responsibility to approve of the Water and Sewer Commission's actions. In fact, the Board eventually approved of the Water and Sewer Commission's actions after retaining an independent expert and obtaining that expert's opinion on the capacity of the sewer system. It is true that the Board was lax in its oversight and did not frequently exercise its authority to approve of actions by the Water and Sewer Commission. However, the Board did not have a custom of failing to act on sewer hookup denials.
In sum, the Court finds that the Water and Sewer Commission is not an appropriate defendant in a section 1983 action. The Water and Sewer Commission does not have final decision-making authority — either under Minnesota Statute, or by custom. It is the County that has that authority. Therefore, the section 1983 claims against the Water and Sewer Commission are dismissed.
There is no question, however, that the individual defendants are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983. The individual defendants are subject to section 1983 liability if their actions deprived plaintiffs of federally protected rights. Therefore, the Court turns to the second step in the section 1983 analysis to determine if plaintiffs were deprived of a federally protected right.
B. Equal protection
"A party claiming a violation of equal protection must establish that he or she is similarly situated to other applicants for the license, permit, or other benefit being sought, particularly with respect to the same time period." Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted); E.T. Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1109 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Different treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate the equal protection clause."). If plaintiffs establish that they were indeed treated differently than those similarly situated, the Court must then determine whether the government entity had a rational basis to differentiate between them. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 471 (8th Cir. 1991).
In this case, plaintiffs do not point to another restaurant or similar commercial enterprise that requested a hookup at the same time they did. Instead, they point to increased residential use, and increased use by established commercial entities. Current residential users who have increased their water and sewer usage cannot be considered to be "similarly situated" to plaintiffs who seek a new commercial hookup. The absence of a similarly situated applicant is fatal to plaintiffs' equal protection claim. See, e.g., Kawaoka v. City of Arroya Grande, 17 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that owners of agricultural property did not establish equal protection claim by alleging that they were treated differently from owners of nonagricultural property); Silver v. Franklin Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of equal protection claim where property owner who did not receive permit failed to present evidence that other property owners who did receive permits were similarly situated). However, even if the Court were to assume that the residential users or current commercial users were "similarly situated," plaintiffs' claim nonetheless fails because it is not unreasonable for the commissioners to treat current users differently from new ones in light of the limited capacity of the sewer system. See McCauley v. City of Jacksonville, North Carolina, 904 F.2d 700, 1990 WL 77105 (4th Cir. 1990) (table decision) (no equal protection violation where "there was limited capacity for sewer services" and the city council chose to allocate the sewer service to single, as opposed to multi-family residences). Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' equal protection claims.
C. Substantive due process
To prevail on the claim that they were deprived of substantive due process, plaintiffs must first show a "protected property interest to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection applies." Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, Minnesota, 126 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). If plaintiffs establish this element, they must then show that the government's actions were "truly irrational." Id. See also, Northpointe Plaza v. City of Rochester, 465 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 1991) (holding that a substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "in the zoning context exists, if at all, only in the extraordinary situations"). The Court refers to state law to determine whether plaintiffs have a protected property interest. Id. That interest must be "a legitimate claim to entitlement . . . as opposed to a mere subjective expectancy." Id.
Plaintiffs argue that once the Cass County Board approved the conditional use permit, the Water and Sewer Commission was without discretion to deny the sewer hookup and therefore plaintiffs had a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. As the Court has determined, the Water and Sewer Commission was without authority to deny the sewer hookup. The Court assumes that the issuance of the conditional use permit gives plaintiffs a protected property interest in the subsequent sewer hookup. See Northpointe Plaza, 465 N.W.2d at 689 (protected property interest in land use permits); Hay v. City of Andover, 436 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989) (property interest in special use permit). But see Schwardt v. Office of Appellate Courts County of Watonwan, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2003 WL 297804 *4 (Minn. February 13, 2003) (suggesting that conditional use permit holders do not have absolute right to use property as indicated in conditional use permit).
Assuming for the sake of further analysis that plaintiffs have established a federally protected property interest in the hookup, plaintiffs must next show that defendants' conduct satisfies the "truly irrational" standard. The Eighth Circuit has set a demanding standard for plaintiffs claiming substantive due process violations in the zoning and land-use area: "[T]he plaintiff must show more than that the government decision was arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law." Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Lemke v. Cass County, Nebraska, 846 F.2d 469, 470-471 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc)). Such claims should be limited to "truly irrational" governmental actions. Id. (emphasis added). "An example would be attempting to apply a zoning ordinance only to persons whose names begin with a letter in the first half of the alphabet." Id.
Cases in which the municipalities' conduct was arguably harsher but still did not subject the municipality to section 1983 liability are illustrative of this heightened standard. For example, in Queen Anne Courts v. City of Lakeville, 726 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1989), the court determined that the plaintiffs' allegations that the city caved in to neighborhood opposition, ignored its owns studies, and had no factual basis for its decision did not rise to the level of egregious and irrational conduct that would state a federal substantive due process claim. 726 F. Supp. at 738. Likewise, in Northpointe Plaza, the court concluded the city actions were not egregious and irrational and did not state a substantive due process claim, despite the city's reliance on an expert with an obvious conflict of interest, and rejection of the only credible expert studies and recommendations. 465 N.W.2d at 691.
Plaintiffs here claim the individual defendants acted in bad faith. Though the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that "a bad faith violation of state law remains only a violation of state law," Chesterfield Dev. Corp., 963 F.2d at 1105; Carpenter Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Fenton, 251 F.3d 686, 689 (8th Cir. 2001), it has also noted that a decision might be "so corrupted by the personal motives of local government officials that due process rights are implicated." Bituminous Materials, 126 F.3d at 1071. This, however, is not such a case. Plaintiffs' allegations of bad faith on the part of various commissioners do have merit; members of a governmental commission with family ties to the primary competitor of an applicant for services should not participate in the commission's decision. However, it is undisputed that two independent experts opined that plaintiffs' proposed restaurant would overburden the sewer system. Plaintiffs dispute the accuracy of this opinion, but do not dispute that the reports in fact existed and were relied upon. Even if plaintiffs are correct and the expert opinions are inaccurate, the commissioners nonetheless had a rational basis for denying the hook-up. See Northpointe Plaza, 465 N.W.2d at 689 (no section 1983 claim even though city relied on erroneous report of expert who had obvious conflict of interest). Further, although plaintiffs allege that the County's decision to uphold the hookup denial was a litigation tactic, they do not dispute that the County had before it the opinion of an independent expert that the sewer system could not handle the added stress of the proposed restaurant. Defendants, therefore, are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' substantive due process claims.
IV. Immunity
Because the Court has found that plaintiffs cannot maintain a cause of action pursuant to section 1983, it is not necessary to address whether the individual defendants are entitled to immunity. However, even assuming plaintiffs could sustain their section 1983 claims, the Court finds that the individual plaintiffs nonetheless would be entitled to qualified immunity.
The individual defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity because their actions were administrative, rather than legislative. See Barbaccia v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp. 260, 267 (N.D.Cal. 1978) (finding qualified immunity where defendant city council members were sued for their participation in zoning decisions regarding plaintiff's land, reasoning that actions set forth in the complaint did not involve the promulgation of legislation of a general or prospective nature).
"Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability `insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Stone's Auto-Mart, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 721 F. Supp. 206, 210-11 (D. Minn. 1989) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Harlow results in a three-part test with respect to an asserted qualified immunity defense. See Domina v. Van Pelt, 235 F.3d 1091, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000); Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1996). The Court must first determine if defendants' conduct violated a constitutional rule that was settled at the time of the challenged conduct. Id. If so, the Court turns to the question of whether defendants should have known of this rule. Id. Finally, if defendants should have known of the rule, the question becomes whether they should have known that their conduct violated this rule. Id.
The Court must first determine if there is a settled constitutional rule prohibiting the complained of conduct. Dicta from an Eighth Circuit decision supports plaintiffs' argument that the bad motives of individual decisionmakers might preclude qualified immunity. As discussed above, a land use decision might be "so corrupted by the personal motives of local government officials that due process rights are implicated." As an example of such a case, the Eighth Circuit in Bituminous Materials referenced Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325 (6th Cir 1983). Bituminous Materials, 126 F.3d at 1071.
Wilkerson involved the denial of a barbershop license by a decisionmaker who owned the barbershop next door to the applicant's shop. The court found that defendants "intentionally misapplie[d] state licensing law to keep [plaintiffs] from obtaining an occupational license," and noted that the licensing of the new shop would have created "direct and significant competition" for one of the defendants. 699 F.2d at 326, 328. The Wilkerson Court found sufficient evidence for a jury to find that all of the decisionmakers were motivated by improper bias because the other defendant licensing agents were good friends with the defendant who owned the competing barbershop. Id. In contrast, in this case, the individual defendants do not own the potentially competing restaurant. Further, the individual defendants had an independent, and rational, basis for the recommendation that the hookup be denied — namely the opinion that the proposed hookup would stress the sewer system.
Perhaps more importantly, no Minnesota or Eighth Circuit case has held that the denial of sewer services, even if based in part on improper motives, amounts to the denial of a constitutional right. If anything, the law in Minnesota would lead a reasonable person to the opposite conclusion. See Northpointe Plaza, 465 N.W.2d at 689 (relying on Eighth Circuit cases to hold that city's arbitrary conduct in denying conditional use permit did not support federal substantive due process claim under section 1983 even though city relied on expert who had obvious conflict of interest); Queen Anne Courts, 726 F. Supp. 733. There is no indication in the Minnesota statutes that individual commissioners could be subject to personal liability for attempting to preserve the sewer system. In the absence of clearly established law, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.
V. Remand
The Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to continue hearing state claims following dismissal of federal claims. See Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court declines to exercise its discretion to remand the case to state court. See Baker v. Farmers Elec. Co-op., Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 283 (5th Cir. 1994) (pendent jurisdiction may continue even after federal claims upon which jurisdiction is based have been dismissed); New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1505 (3rd Cir. 1996) (holding that federal court's initial jurisdiction over case provides constitutional power for court to continue to hear it pursuant to supplemental jurisdiction). When a case has been properly removed to the federal district court, this Court is reluctant to remand the case back to state court after hearing and resolving dispositive motions.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) states, in pertinent part: "The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if — . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motion for partial summary judgment [Docket No. 28] is GRANTED. The § 1983 substantive due process and equal protection claims (Counts VI and VII) in plaintiff's amended complaint [Docket No. 1] are DISMISSED with prejudice.