Opinion
Civil No. 99-2015 (JRT/FLN)
August 9, 2002
Paul D. Peterson, Peterson Law Office, Minnesota, MN, for plaintiff.
Richard P. Mahoney, Mahoney, Dougherty Mahoney, Minneapolis, MN for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff brought this products liability action after sustaining injuries to the last two fingers of her left hand while operating on a woodworking machine at Cannon Valley Woodwork Inc., located in Cannon Falls, Minnesota. After a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded her $100,138.95 in damages.
This case is before the Court on post-trial motions filed by the parties. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law or alternatively a new trial, denies defendant's motion for a credit on the final judgment and motion for relief under the collateral source statute, and grants plaintiff's motion for judgment in favor of plaintiff.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Michael Weinig AG ("Weinig AG") is a German woodworking manufacturing company. It manufactured its first woodworking machine in 1945 and manufactured its first wood molder, in 1951. It currently manufactures three types of wood molders: 1) the Pro Format, a small single knife machine, 2) the Unimat, a bigger machine, and 3) the Hydromat, a high speed machine with many knives that has the capability of cutting and shaping pieces of wood on all four sides. Weinig AG manufactured the machine at issue in this case, the Hydromat 22 AL, in June 1992. In 1993, Michael Weinig Inc. ("Weinig Inc"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Weinig AG, sold the machine to Cannon Valley Woodworking Inc. ("Cannon Valley"), a kitchen cabinet manufacturer in Cannon Falls, Minnesota. In May 1996, plaintiff began working at Cannon Valley through a temporary employment agency called Express Personnel Services ("Express"). On May 17, 1996, plaintiff was working as a feeder on the woodworking machine when she suffered injuries to the last two fingers of her left hand.
Plaintiff brought separate diversity actions against Weinig AG and Weinig Inc. Both Weinig AG and Weinig Inc. in turn asserted third-party claims against Cannon Valley and Express for indemnity or contribution to the extent their negligence caused or contributed to the incident or to plaintiff's damages. Prior to trial, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with Cannon Valley and Express. Under the agreement, the third-party defendants assigned to plaintiff all rights of recovery of the subrogation interests and plaintiff further agreed to indemnify Cannon Valley and Express to the extent that the defendants could establish a contribution or indemnity claim against them.
This matter proceeded to trial from December 10-18, 2001 against the two defendants, Weinig AG and Weinig, Inc. At trial, plaintiff's theory was that her injuries were caused as a result of an engineering design defect in the machine, specifically, that the machine failed to include proper guarding of the blades such as an interlock guarding system. To this end, plaintiff presented expert testimony of an alternative feasible design of the machine, which, according to plaintiff, would have prevented her injury. Defendants claimed that the incident was not caused by any design defect, but rather, was a result of plaintiff's own negligence and/or the failure of her employers to properly train her on the machine.
During the course of the trial, the parties agreed to dismiss the claims against Weinig Inc. and the case was submitted to the jury against Weinig, AG only. On December 19, 2001, the jury returned a special verdict, finding all parties causally negligent and apportioned comparative negligence as follows: Weinig AG 33%; Cannon Valley and Express 65%; and plaintiff 2%. The jury awarded plaintiff $50,000 in past pain, disability, disfigurement and emotional distress, $1,252.79 for past wage loss, $11,876.16 for past health care expenses, $25,000.00 for future pain, disability, disfigurement and emotional distress, and $12,000 for future health care expenses.
Weinig Inc. remains a part of the litigation only for purposes of recovering any judgment in favor of plaintiff.
Defendant now moves the Court for judgment as a matter of law as to the claim for future health care expenses or alternatively for a new trial on this issue. Defendant also moves for a new trial on all issues pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alternatively, defendant moves for a credit on the judgment for amounts of workers' compensation paid or payable to plaintiff or through application of the collateral source statute. For her part, plaintiff moves for entry of judgment in her favor in the amount awarded by the jury reduced only by the $12,244.13 in workers' compensation benefits paid to plaintiff and the percentage of fault attributed to her by the jury.
There is a slight discrepancy between the amount of workers' compensation paid in the settlement agreement and the workers' compensation documents. The compensation documents state that the amount of benefits is $12,244.13 while the agreement states that it is $12,256.25. The Court agrees with plaintiff that the actual workers compensation documentation controls.
ANALYSIS I. Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or Alternatively a New Trial as to Future Health Care Expenses
According to defendant, the only evidence in support of future health expenses is the opinion of Dr. Corrine Geiger that plaintiff is likely to need some psychological counseling in the future. Defendant argues that Dr. Geiger provided no testimony concerning the frequency or the cost of such future expenses. Consequently, defendant argues that plaintiff's evidence is based on nothing more than speculative guesswork and is insufficient to sustain this damage award. At a minimum, defendant claims a new trial on the issue of future health care expenses is necessary to prevent injustice against it.
A plaintiff bears the burden of proving future damages to a reasonable certainty by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Pietrzak v. Eggen, 295 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Minn. 1980). Under Minnesota law, there are two evidentiary requirements to support an award of future health care expenses. In the first instance, a plaintiff must show that future medical treatments will be required. Secondly, plaintiff must establish the amount of the damages through expert testimony. Krutsch v. Walter H. Collin GmBh Verfahrenstechnik Und Maschinenfabric, 495 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993); Lind v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn.Ct.App. 1990).
In this case, Dr. Geiger testified that for someone who has experienced the kind of trauma suffered by plaintiff, it is a lifelong condition for which plaintiff will require some level of psychological treatment in the future. Although Dr. Geiger did not testify about the cost of such expenses, the lack of such evidence is not fatal to her claim. Minnesota courts have previously upheld awards for future medical expenses in the absence of expert testimony on this issue. Kwapien v. Starr, 400 N.W.2d 179, 184-85 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987); Leick v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C7-92-2303, 1993 WL 276846 at *1-2 (Minn.Ct.App. July 27, 1993); Ellis v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations, No. C4-00-1916, 2001 WL 710844 at *2-3 (Minn.Ct.App. June 26, 2001).
In Kwapien, the medical expert testified that plaintiff's condition was permanent and that she would be required to undergo physical therapy for the rest of her life. 400 N.W.2d at 184. Evidence was also presented concerning plaintiff's past medical expenses for such therapy and the jury was presented with an actuarial table for plaintiff. Id. From this evidence, the court concluded that:
While there was no testimony directly estimating respondent's future medical expenses, it was possible for the jury to take respondent's life expectancy and factor it against the cost of her past physical therapy treatments to arrive at an approximate figure for future medical expenses. A figure arrived at in this manner based upon the evidence presented would not have been pure speculation.
Id. Likewise, in this case, the jury had evidence of plaintiff's past medical expenses and was instructed regarding plaintiff's life expectancy. See Instruction No. 26.
Accordingly, the Court denies defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and, for the same reasons, denies defendant's alternative request for a new trial or remittitur as to the award of future health care expenses. The Court cannot conclude that the figure arrived at by the jury "shocks the conscience" or was the result of passion or prejudice.
II. Defendant's Motion for a New Trial on all Issues
Defendant also moves for a new trial on all issues pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 59, the Court may grant a motion for a new trial as to all or any of the parties on all issues or on particular issues. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). The standard for granting a new trial is whether the verdict is against "the great weight of the evidence." Butler v. French, 83 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 1996). Any other standard "`would destroy the role of the jury as the principal trier of the facts, and would enable the trial judge to disregard the jury's verdict at will.'" White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 780 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aalco Wrecking Co., 466 F.2d 179, 187 (8th Cir. 1972)). In evaluating a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), the "key question is whether a new trial should have been granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice." McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1400 (8th Cir. 1994).
Defendant claims a new trial is necessary because the jury's decision to assign only 2% of the fault to plaintiff's negligence is against the great weight of the evidence and demonstrates that the jury did not have a clear grasp of the evidence or the issues. The Court disagrees and finds no miscarriage of justice in the way in which the jury assigned fault to the respective parties. The assignment of 2% of fault to plaintiff was not against the great weight of the evidence. There was evidence that the hazard was not open and obvious, but was in fact hidden by the brush apparatus that partially covered the hazard area. Furthermore, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the employers' failure to train and the availability of a reasonable alternative design were more responsible for causing the incident. Accordingly, defendant's motion for a new trial on all issues is denied.
III. Defendant's Motion for Credit on the Judgment and Motion for Relief under the Collateral Source Statute; and Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment in Favor of PlaintiffDefendant also moves for various setoffs from the verdict, claiming that reductions are necessary under Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977), or, alternatively, under Minnesota's collateral source statute, Minn. Stat. § 548.36. For her part, plaintiff moves for entry of judgment in her favor, claiming that the verdict should be reduced only by the percentage of plaintiff's fault and the amount of workers' compensation paid up to the date of the verdict.
The Court begins by outlining the setoffs that are not in dispute. First, both parties agree that the verdict must be reduced by plaintiff's negligence. Accordingly, the judgment is reduced to $98,136.17. The parties also agree that the verdict must be reduced by the amount of workers' compensation paid by plaintiff's employer up until the time of the verdict. Under Lambertson, a third party is entitled to contribution from an employer in an amount proportional to its percentage of negligence, but not to exceed its total workers' compensation liability. Id. at 689. Accordingly, the judgment is further reduced to $85,892.04.
The Court reaches this amount in the following manner:
$100,138.95 — $2002.78 (2%) = $98,136.17.
The Court reaches this amount in following manner:
$98,136.17 — $12,244.13 = $85,892.04.
As mentioned above, plaintiff claims these are the only reductions that should be made to the judgment. Defendant contends, however, that the verdict should be reduced by additional amounts that it claims are either deductible under the Workers Compensation Act or qualify as covered expenses under the collateral source statute. These additional amounts include: 1) $6,328.19 of past medical expenses and $12,000 of future medical expenses awarded by the jury; and 2) $13,500 paid by Cannon Valley to extricate itself from this lawsuit. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
A. Set off for Past and Future Medical Expenses
The jury awarded plaintiff $11,876.16 in past medical expenses at trial. A portion of that amount, $6,328.19, is for medical expenses that were not paid by workers compensation. However, defendant argues that these are expenses which should have been paid by workers compensation because the jury has now determined that they were incurred as a direct result of plaintiff's injury. Defendant thus claims the deduction is proper under Lambertson. In the alternative, defendant contends the amount should be reduced pursuant to the collateral source statute. Defendant also claims the verdict should be further reduced by the $12,000 of future health care expenses awarded by the jury.
The Court declines to further reduce plaintiff's verdict by the additional amount of past and future damages awarded by the jury. The record reveals that plaintiff incurred $6,328.16 in mental health treatment expenses from several health care providers. Of that amount, $902.66 of the expenses were paid by plaintiff herself. The Court does not believe that, at this stage, it is likely that plaintiff will obtain reimbursement for these costs through the workers' compensation system. Schlichte v. Kielan, 599 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999) (only reducing a portion of past medical expenses awarded by jury for amounts actually paid by workers' compensation). Accordingly, the Court declines to reduce this additional amount under Lambertson.
Reduction of the $6,328.19 for past medical expenses under the collateral source statute is not appropriate either. Under Minn. Stat. § 548.36, a party may move for reduction of an award in the amounts of collateral source payments made for plaintiff's benefit. Upon making such a motion, a court shall determine the amounts of collateral sources that "have been paid for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available to the plaintiff as a result of losses except those for which a subrogation right has been asserted." § 548.36, subd. 2(1). Both insurers have signed statements acknowledging that they seek to assert their subrogation rights in this action. Accordingly, the Court cannot deduct these amounts where subrogation interests have been asserted.
The Court also declines to further reduce the verdict by the amount of future medical expenses awarded by the jury. In Wilken v. International Harvester Co., 363 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1985), the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified that an employer's obligation for contribution to a third-party tortfeasor under Lambertson includes workers' compensation benefits already paid as well as benefits payable in the future. Id. at 767.
The court further explained that this determination is to be made by the trial court and is to be paid in a single, lump sum payment. However, in Schlichte v. Kielan, 599 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999), the court concluded that future workers' compensation benefits are not deemed to be "payable" if recovery of such damages under workers' compensation is merely speculative. Id at 188.
In this case, the jury determined that plaintiff would incur $12,000 of future medical expenses. Defendant moves for a dollar for dollar reduction of this amount, claiming that the entire amount will be covered by workers' compensation. In the Court's view, defendant has not met its burden of demonstrating that plaintiff will receive future workers' compensation benefits. Schlichte, 599 N.W.2d at 187 (burden of proof is on movant to demonstrate entitlement to reduction of damages). It is speculative at this point whether plaintiff will receive any future workers' compensation benefits for future medical/psychological treatment. Id. at 188 (affirming district court's determination not to reduce future damages on basis that recovery of those damages under workers' compensation was speculative). The reality is that medical expenses in workers' compensation cases are subject to significant administrative review. Id. at n. 2 190 (J. Anderson, dissenting).
B. Set off for $13,500 Paid by Cannon Valley
Defendant next claims it should receive a setoff for the $13,500 plaintiff received from Cannon Valley or its insurer pursuant to the settlement plaintiff entered into prior to trial. Defendant contends that because plaintiff's only possible claim against Cannon Valley would be under the Workers' Compensation Act, any payments from Cannon Valley must be construed as compensation benefits.
The Court disagrees. The payment represents Cannon Valley's consideration for inducing plaintiff to enter into the agreement and further agree to indemnify Cannon Valley and Express for any right of contribution defendant may succeed in making against her former employers. See Buck v. Schneider Settlement Agreement at 3. Accordingly, the Court views the payment as consideration to enter into this indemnity agreement and not in resolution of a Workers' Compensation claim. For these reasons, the Court concludes that reduction of the verdict on this ground is not warranted.
C. Prejudgment Interest
Finally, plaintiff moves for prejudgment interest pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.09. Minn. Stat. § 549.09, as amended by 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch 247 (H.F. 3584) (West 2002); Simeone v. First Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 73 F.3d 184, 190 (8th Cir. 1996) ("A trial court's authority to award prejudgment interest is governed by statute.") (citing Minn. Stat. § 549.09). This interest is computed as simple interest per annum and the interest rates are statutorily prescribed. Id. (Historical Statutory Note). Defendant contends that plaintiff erroneously computed interest from the date of injury (May 17, 1996) rather than the date the action was commenced. Upon review of the statutory language, the Court agrees with defendant. Minn. Stat. § 549.09 provides that "preverdict . . . interest on pecuniary damages shall be computed . . . from the time of commencement of the action . . . until the time of verdict. . . ." (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court computes the award from December 17, 1999 until December 19, 2001.
Minnesota courts have held that "`interest is available not only on ascertainable special damages but also on general damages such as those for pain and suffering.'" Cox v. Crown Coco Inc., 544 N.W.2d 490, 500-01 (Minn.Ct.App. 1996) (quoting Skifstrom v. City of Coon Rapids, 524 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Minn.Ct.App. 1994)). Interest is not available, however, for "judgments or awards for future damages." Id. subd. 1(b)(2). Based on these principles, the Court awards plaintiff $6,916.52 in prejudgment interest on past damages awarded by the jury.
The Court calculates this figure in the following manner:
December 17, 1999 to December 31, 1999 (14 days) $ 96.86
$63,128.95 x 4% = $2,525.16
$2,525.16/365 days = $ 6.92 (per day)
$6.92 x 14 (days) = $ 96.86
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000 (365 days) $3,156.45
$63,128.95 x 5% = $3,156.45
January 1, 2001 to December 19, 2001 (353 days) $3,663.21
$63,128.95 x 6% = $3,787.74
$3,787.74/365 days = $ 10.38 (per day)
$10.38 x 353 (days) = $3,663.21
TOTAL $6,916.52
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. Defendant's motion for post-trial relief [Docket No. 83] is DENIED.
2. Defendant's motion for a credit on the final judgment [Docket No. 82] is DENIED.
3. Defendant's motion for leave to determine collateral sources [Docket No. 73] is DENIED.
4. Plaintiff's motion for judgment in favor of plaintiff [Docket No. 77] is GRANTED.
5. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $92,808.56.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.