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Shelton v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
May 12, 2020
No. 19-15989 (9th Cir. May. 12, 2020)

Opinion

No. 19-15989

05-12-2020

SHEKESHA RENEE SHELTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee, and TONYA STROZIER, Defendant.


NOT FOR PUBLICATION

D.C. No. 4:18-cv-00187-JGZ MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding Before: BERZON, N.R. SMITH, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Shekesha Renee Shelton appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in her employment action alleging claims under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Dep't of Fair Emp't & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 736 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Shelton failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Tucson Unified School District's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Shelton's November 2015 and May 2016 evaluation scores, and its failure to accommodate Shelton's request for coverage to express breast milk on May 19, 2016, were pretextual. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228-30 (2015) (setting forth burden-shifting framework for PDA claims).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shelton's motion to amend the complaint because Shelton failed to comply with the local rules. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that this court gives "[b]road deference" to district court's interpretation of its local rules); D. Ariz. Loc. R. 15.1(a).

We reject as without merit Shelton's contention that the district court's grant of summary judgment violated her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See Johnson v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[A] summary judgment proceeding does not deprive the losing party of its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.").

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Shelton v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
May 12, 2020
No. 19-15989 (9th Cir. May. 12, 2020)
Case details for

Shelton v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist.

Case Details

Full title:SHEKESHA RENEE SHELTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL…

Court:UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Date published: May 12, 2020

Citations

No. 19-15989 (9th Cir. May. 12, 2020)