Opinion
Civil Action 4:18-CV-02080
01-18-2022
MATTHEW JOHN SHEFFER, Petitioner, v. CENTRE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
BRANN, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
Presently before the Court are three unopposed motions to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, filed by Defendants in this matter. First, Centre County filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on August 20, 2021, and a brief in support on August 24, 2021. (Doc. 57; Doc. 63). Second, Defendants Assistant District Attorneys Crystal Hundt (“ADA Hundt”) and Jane Doe (“ADA Doe”) filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on August 20, 2021, and a brief in support on August 24, 2021. (Doc. 59; Doc. 64). Lastly, Defendant Pennsylvania State Trooper Jeffery Ebeck (“Trooper Ebeck”) filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on September 8, 2021, and a brief in support on September 22, 2021. (Doc. 65; Doc. 66). In the amended complaint, filed by pro se Petitioner Matthew John Sheffer (“Sheffer”), Sheffer seeks monetary relief from the Defendants regarding his prosecution and bond determination during criminal proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County. (Doc. 44). For the reasons provided herein, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendants' motions to dismiss be granted.
I. Background and Procedural History
Sheffer filed the original complaint in this matter against Defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County on June 16, 2018, under the Docket Number 2018-cv-2276. (Doc. 1-1, at 5). In his complaint, Sheffer brought various claims against Defendants under the Federal Civil Rights Act, the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Pennsylvania Judicial Code, and state common law. (Doc. 1-1, at 5, 29-47). At all times relevant to the complaint, Sheffer was a pretrial detainee at CCCF. (Doc. 1-1, at 6). After being served with the complaint on September 25, 2018, Trooper Ebeck filed a notice of removal to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) on October 24, 2018. (Doc. 1, at 2). The Court referred the case to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge on October 26, 2018.
In late October and early November 2018, Defendants filed several motions to dismiss. (Doc. 4; Doc. 5; Doc. 8; Doc. 10). Adopting a report and recommendation by the undersigned, the Court granted these motions to dismiss on June 26, 2019, dismissing with prejudice: (1) all claims brought against the Centre County Judiciary, the Centre County District Attorney's Office, and the Pennsylvania State Police, Rockview Barracks, for failure to state a claim; (2) all claims brought against the Judicial Defendants on the basis of absolute judicial immunity; (3) all claims brought against ADA Hundt on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity; (4) all claims brought against each Defendant under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1988, for failure to state a claim; and (5) all claims brought against each Defendant under the Pennsylvania Constitution for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 26, at 1-2). Additionally, the Court dismissed without prejudice: (1) Sheffer's municipal liability claims brought against Centre County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Sheffer's claims brought against Trooper Ebeck under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) any remaining state law claims against Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). (Doc. 26, at 2-3). The Court granted Sheffer leave to file an amended complaint that reasserts the claims dismissed without prejudice and that cures the pleading deficiencies outlined in the undersigned's report and recommendation. (Doc. 26, at 3).
Sheffer filed an amended complaint on January 11, 2021. (Doc. 44). In his amended complaint, Sheffer's causes of action arise from his prosecution and bond determination during criminal proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County. (Doc. 44, at ¶ 1); see Commonwealth v. Sheffer, No. CP-14-CR-0000205-2017 (Centre Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.). According to the amended complaint, after being accused of sexual misconduct and investigated by Defendants, Sheffer was arrested on January 24, 2017, and charged with multiple counts of sex-based felony offenses. (Doc. 44, at ¶ 8-16). Specifically, Sheffer raises the following claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) unreasonable search or seizure claim under the Fourteenth Amendment arising from his detention and the subsequent search of his home; (2) due process claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments arising from “the manipulation of the courts by destroying evidence and modifying investigative reports 6 months prior to any change being filed;” and (3) excessive bail claim under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 44, at 7-14).
On January 22, 2021, Defendant Centre County filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, and Defendants ADAs Hundt and Doe filed a separate motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the same day, asserting that Sheffer's due process and malicious prosecution claims are barred because they would impugn a prior conviction. (Doc. 45; Doc. 46; Doc. 49, at 24-25; Doc. 50, at 22-24). On August 12, 2021, adopting a report and recommendation by the undersigned, the Court denied the motions to dismiss, finding that the grounds of Sheffer's conviction and bail determination must be exhausted in state court before being brought in this Court. (Doc. 53, at 7; Doc. 54, at 2). Further, the Court stayed the matter pending resolution of Sheffer's state court appeals. (Doc. 54, at 2). On August 10, 2021, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Sheffer's petition for allowance of appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania's order affirming Sheffer's conviction and sentence in the underlying criminal action. (Doc. 55-1, at 1, 5; Doc. 55-2, at 4-5); see Commonwealth v. Sheffer, 580 MAL 2020 (Pa. 2021). After Defendant Centre County filed a motion to lift the stay on the present litigation, the Court lifted the stay on August 18, 2021, and directed Defendants to file their responsive pleadings. (Doc. 55; Doc. 56).
On September 10, 2019, Sheffer filed an appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania for his conviction and sentence in the underlying criminal action. (Doc. 55-1, at 1). On September 25, 2020, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued an order affirming Sheffer's conviction and sentence. (Doc. 55-1, at 5). Sheffer filed a petition for allowance of appeal from the order to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on October 22, 2010. (Doc. 55-1, at 5).
On August 24, 2021, Defendants Centre County and ADAs Hundt, and Doe filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 57; Doc. 59). On September 22, 2021, Defendant Trooper Ebeck filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 65). All Defendants have filed the respective briefs in support. (Doc. 63; Doc. 64; Doc. 66), but Sheffer failed to respond to any of these motions, as required by Local Rule 7.6 (“Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief ….”). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d).
On October 7, 2021, Sheffer filed a motion to reinstate stay, which the Court denied on December 7, 2021. (Doc. 67; Doc. 69). In that Order, the Court ordered Sheffer to file his briefs in opposition to Defendants' motions to dismiss on or before December 21, 2021. (Doc. 69). In the Order, the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge cautioned that in the event Sheffer failed to file timely opposition briefs in accordance with the briefing deadline, he “shall be deemed not to oppose the motions to dismiss” pursuant to Local Rule 7.6. (Doc. 69, at 2). To date, Sheffer has not filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' motions to dismiss.
Given that the time period for briefing has passed, the motions, deemed unopposed, are now ripe for disposition.
II. Legal Standards
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Although a court must accept the factual allegations in a complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Additionally, a court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the United States Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, pro se plaintiffs are still subject to the basic pleading requirements of Rule 8. Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 Fed.Appx. 513 (3d Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit has further instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
B. Claims Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In the complaint, Sheffer invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 44, at 1). Section 1983 provides a private cause of action with respect to violations of federal constitutional rights. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). Thus, to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendants, acting under color of state law, (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). Further, it is well established that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” Baraka, 481 F.3d at 210 (citations and quotations omitted).
III. Discussion
In support of dismissal, Defendants argue that the amended complaint should be dismissed because Sheffer fails to state § 1983, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution claims upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 57, at 7; Doc. 59, at 7; Doc. 66, at 6). Additionally, Defendants aver that Sheffer's § 1983, due process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, collateral estoppel, and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994). (Doc. 57, at 7; Doc. 59, at 8). Defendants also argue that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Sheffer's state law claims. (Doc. 57, at 7; Doc. 59, at 8; Doc. 66, at 7). Lastly, Defendant Ebeck asserts that he is entitled to sovereign immunity as to Sheffer's state law claims. (Doc. 66, at 9). The complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A. Centre County Liability.
In the motion to dismiss, Defendant Centre County states that Sheffer fails to state a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 63, at 14). Specifically, Centre County argues that the amended complaint fails to allege any policy, custom, or practice of Centre County that sustained or gave rise to Sheffer's constitutional claims. (Doc. 63, at 14).
Under Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Servs., the Supreme Court held that “municipalities and other local government units [are] included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see also Huffaker v. Bucks Cty. Dist. Atty.'s Office, No. 88-7218, 1990 WL 96175, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 1990) (“For § 1983 purposes, local governments, whether they be counties, boroughs or municipalities, are subject to the same test for liability [pursuant to Monell].”). To recover against a county, such as Centre County, pursuant to Monell, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead that: “1) the municipality had a policy or custom depriving h[im] of constitutional rights; 2) the County acted deliberately and was the moving force behind the deprivation; and 3) the identified policy or custom caused h[is] injuries.” See Tarapchak v. Lackawanna Cty., 173 F.Supp.3d 57, 84 (M.D. Pa. 2016), appeal dismissed (Aug. 16, 2016), reconsideration denied, No. 15-2078, 2016 WL 9738115 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2016).
After a review of Sheffer's amended complaint, the undersigned finds that it does not adequately allege that Defendants' actions against him were the result of a municipal policy or custom. In the amended complaint, Sheffer alleges that Centre County “intentionally, negligently, and with complete and deliberate indifference for Sheffer's rights authorized, permitted, and tolerated the custom, policy, and practice of the unconstitutional and excessive use of bail by members of the Centre County Judiciary” by failing to elect, promote, and supervise members of the Centre County Judiciary that enforce the laws and protect the constitutional rights of Centre County inhabitants. (Doc. 44, at ¶ 33). Next, Sheffer submits that Centre County “permitted the custom, policy, and practice of using a wealth based detention system, [through] the sole use of excessive monetary bails devoid of the protections of due process, that affected all those that were indigent and accused of any sex-based crime in Centre County, to exist and to be followed.” (Doc. 44, at ¶ 36). Further, Sheffer avers that Centre County “failed to require the Centre County Judiciary to promulgate procedures and policies for the reasonable use of bail that were consistent with the 8th, 5th, and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.” (Doc. 44, at ¶ 37).
Based on the pleadings before the Court, Sheffer has failed to state a claim for municipal liability against Centre County. The amended complaint does not set forth allegations that Centre County undertook any act pursuant to an official municipal policy of some nature that caused a constitutional violation. Kirk v. Wyoming Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 1:CV-11-00665, 2011 WL 6742521, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011) (dismissing claims against county because petitioner failed to allege anything more than an isolated incident of alleged unconstitutional activity by a county employee). Even when taken in the light most favorable to Sheffer, his claims are conclusory and not entitled to an assumption of truth. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679. Further, Sheffer's factual averments do not plausibly establish that any alleged unconstitutional custom may be attributed to Centre County, as opposed to some other actor or entity. See Tarapchak, 173 F.Supp.3d at 84. Sheffer has merely alleged an isolated incident of alleged unconstitutional activity that cannot be imputed to Centre County itself. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24 (stating proof of isolated act insufficient to impose liability under Monell). Thus, the amended complaint does not demonstrate that Sheffer is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to an unconstitutional Centre County policy theory.
Additionally, Centre County argues that if that the Court dismisses all of Sheffer's federal law claims, the Court should deny supplemental jurisdiction over Sheffer's state law claims. Where a district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, as is the case here, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The decision of whether the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction is one that should be based on “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, ” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Ordinarily, when all federal law claims have been dismissed and only state-law claims remain, the balance of these factors indicates that these remaining claims properly belong in state court. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350. In the absence of a viable federal claim, and finding nothing in the record to distinguish this case from the ordinary one, the Court finds that the balance of factors in this case “point[s] toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” See Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Sheffer's state-law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Centre County's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 57) be granted, and that all claims brought against Centre County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be dismissed without prejudice.
B. Defendants ADAs Hundt and Doe's Liability
Defendants ADAs Hundt and Doe argue that the amended complaint fails to state claims under § 1983, intentional infliction of emotion distress, and malicious prosecution. (Doc. 59, at 7). Specifically, ADAs Hundt and Doe argue contend that Sheffer's claims are barred by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, the applicable statute of limitations, collateral estoppel, and Heck. (Doc. 59, at 8). Lastly, ADAs Hundt and Doe submit that should the Court dismiss Sheffer's federal law claims, the Court should deny supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. (Doc. 59, at 9).
In the amended complaint, Sheffer asserts that ADAs Hundt and Doe “intentionally, negligently, and with complete and deliberate indifference for [Sheffer's] rights, ” depriving Sheffer of his constitutional rights, including but not limited to those under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 44, at ¶ 28). As to his due process claims, Sheffer submits that, prior to his arrest, ADAs Hundt and Doe failed to conduct an adequate investigation of the alleged crimes, concealed evidence conflicting with the victim's version of the alleged events, and failed to present evidence conflicting with the victim's version of events or evidence otherwise favorable to Sheffer when applying to the Centre County Judiciary for an arrest warrant. (Doc. 44, at 3-6). Moreover, Sheffer asserts that subsequent to his arrest, ADAs Hundt and Doe concealed evidence favorable to him and failed to timely comply with discovery requests. (Doc. 44, at 5-6, 8-11).
First, ADAs Hundt and Doe argue Sheffer's claims are barred by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. (Doc. 64, at 13). It is well settled that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for actions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process . . .” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). “More than a mere defense to liability, prosecutorial immunity embodies the ‘right not to stand trial' . . . and is properly raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). “[W]hether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for his/her conduct depends on the function the prosecutor was performing.” Segers v. Williams, 12 F.Supp.3d 734, 738 (E.D. Pa. 2014). As such, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit with respect to actions he or she performed in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, but “not to administrative or investigatory actions unrelated to initiating and conducting judicial proceedings.” Odd, 538 F.3d at 208 (quoting Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1251 (3d Cir. 1994)).
Here, the allegations levied against ADAs Hundt and Doe stem from the exercise of their discretion to prosecute Sheffer, and their participation in his resulting state court case. (Doc. 44, at 8-11). Sheffer generally complains of ADAs Hundt and Doe's handling of the investigation process, review of the evidence, disclosure of discovery, and presentation of testimony. (Doc. 44, 9-11). As for his excessive bail claim, Sheffer submits that ADAs Hundt and Doe improperly influenced Centre County Judiciary's initial imposition of bail in the about of $25,000 and improperly denied motions to modify bail by omitting or misrepresenting facts relevant to setting bail as prescribed by Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 520 through 529. (Doc. 44, at ¶ 50-52).
The Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor is immune from suit under § 1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. “Prosecutorial immunity applies even if the prosecutor acted willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith.” Gibbs v. Deckers, 234 F.Supp.2d 458, 462 (D. Del. 2002) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427, 428 n. 27; Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486, 502 (3d Cir. 1997)). Thus, when taken as true in the light most favorable to Sheffer, the allegations in the amended complaint do not suggest that ADAs Hundt and Doe's actions were unrelated to the pursuit of a criminal case against him, or otherwise outside the scope of their official duties as prosecutors. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431; Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1414, 1416 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that prosecutorial immunity extends to the “preparation necessary to present a case” as well as “obtaining, reviewing, and evaluation of evidence.”) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, n.33). As the gravamen of Sheffer's claims pertain to conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, ” ADAs Hundt and Doe are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from Sheffer's claims for monetary damages under § 1983.
Additionally, as discussed supra, in the absence of a viable federal claim, and finding nothing in the record to distinguish this case from the ordinary one, the Court finds that the balance of factors in this case “point[s] toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” See Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Sheffer's state-law claims against ADAs Hundt and Doe without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Accordingly, for these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that ADAs Hundt and Doe's motion to dismiss (Doc. 59) be granted and that all § 1983 claims against them be dismissed with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), as they are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for their alleged actions.
Although ADAs Hundt and Doe raise several other arguments in support of dismissal, the undersigned finds the grounds addressed supra to be dispositive. As such, the undersigned declines to consider any additional bases for dismissal of Sheffer's claims.
C. Defendant Trooper Ebeck's Liability
In the motion to dismiss, Trooper Ebeck argues that Sheffer's § 1983 claims are barred unless and until his conviction is overturned because the claims in the amended complaint, if successful, would necessarily invalidate Sheffer's prior conviction. (Doc. 66, at 4). The claims against Trooper Ebeck implicate Sheffer's prior conviction, so no remedy may be issued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until that conviction is invalidated.
“[H]arm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” may not be remedied under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. This extends to bail decisions. Giallorenzo v. Beaver County, 241 Fed.Appx. 866, 867 (3d Cir. 2007).
[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (emphasis in original).
The Third Circuit directs that “when a claim clearly sounding in habeas corpus is combined with a § 1983 claim for damages, the district court should not dismiss the § 1983 claim, but instead may, in its discretion, stay the action until state remedies are exhausted in the habeas claim.” Melvin v. Nickolopoulos, 864 F.2d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 1988).
In the amended complaint, Sheffer asserts that Trooper Ebeck “intentionally, negligently, and with complete and deliberate indifference for [Sheffer's] rights, ” which deprived him of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 44, at ¶ 28). Sheffer challenges the basis of the search of his property and his detention, the treatment of evidence that led to his conviction, and the amount of bail levied against him. (Doc. 44, ¶¶ 27-37). He states that his injuries are “a result of the trespass, excessive bail, false arrest, and imprisonment[.]” (Doc. 44, ¶ 32). If Sheffer were to prevail on his claims, it would imply that his conviction and the bail determination are illegitimate. See Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In Heck, the Supreme Court held that where success in a § 1983 action would implicitly call into question the validity of conviction or duration of the sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve favorable termination of his available state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.”); Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 987 (3d Cir. 1993). On September 25, 2020, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Sheffer's conviction and sentence. See Commonwealth of Pa. v. Sheffer, No. 1501 MDA 2019 (Pa. Superior Ct. Sept. 25, 2020); (Doc. 55-1). Sheffer appealed the decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which denied his petition for allowance of appeal on August 10, 2021. See Commonwealth of Pa. v. Sheffer, 580 MAL 2020 (Pa. Supreme Ct. Aug. 10, 2021); (Doc. 55-2). Therefore, Sheffer's conviction was not overturned and the federal claims against Trooper Ebeck should be dismissed without prejudice as they are barred as a matter of law.
Regarding Sheffer's state law claims, Trooper Ebeck argues that he is shielded by sovereign immunity. (Doc. 66, at 7). Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies, and state officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune from lawsuits brought against them by citizens in federal courts. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). The General Assembly has waived sovereign immunity in nine categories of actions. See 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 8522(b). Intentional torts and civil rights actions are not within the narrow exceptions set forth by the statute. See 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 8522(b); see also Faust v. Com., Dep't of Revenue, 592 A.2d 835, 839-40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991). Therefore, employees of the Commonwealth, such as State Police troopers, are immune from intentional tort and civil rights actions. See Greenberg v. Caesars Entm't Corp., No. 14-4796, 2015 WL 2069411, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2015) (citing cases and stating that “[s]tate and federal cases in Pennsylvania overwhelmingly conclude that the Commonwealth and its officials are immune from claims based on intentional conduct when the officials were acting within the scope of their duties.”); see also Faust, 592 A.2d at 839 (holding that intentional torts and civil rights actions are not within the narrow exceptions to sovereign immunity of Commonwealth and its officials); Litzenberger v. Vanim, No. 01-5454, 2002 WL 1759370, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2002) (concluding that state troopers enjoyed sovereign immunity against intentional tort claims).
These categories include: vehicle liability; medical-professional liability; care, custody and control of personal property; Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks; potholes and other dangerous conditions; care, custody or control of animals; liquor store sales; National Guard activities; and toxoids and vaccines. 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 8522(b).
Trooper Ebeck, as an employee of a state agency, is likewise insulated from Sheffer's state claims. “[W]hen an employee of a Commonwealth agency [i]s acting within the scope of his duties, the Commonwealth employee is protected by sovereign immunity from the imposition of liability for intentional tort claims.” Pickering v. Sacavage, 642 A.2d 555, 560 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (citing LaFrankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)). Officers of the Pennsylvania State Police Department share in the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310; see, e.g., Pa. State Troopers Ass'n v. Pa., No. 1:06-CV-1079, 2007 WL 853958, * 4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2007) (citing Pa. State Police v. Klimek, 839 A.2d 1173, 1174 n.1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)). The state law claims asserted against Trooper Ebeck are all intentional torts and, therefore, do not fall within the enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity. The doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply when a Commonwealth employee acts outside the scope of his or her employment. See La Frankie, 618 A.2d at 1149. However, in the amended complaint, Sheffer concedes that “[t]he acts of Defendant Ebeck which are the subject for this lawsuit were undertaken in the regular course of his employment for Defendant Centre County Municipality.” (Doc. 44, at ¶ 4) (emphasis added). Nowhere does Sheffer allege that Trooper Ebeck was acting outside the scope of his duties as a state trooper. La Frankie, 618 A.2d at 1149 (sovereign immunity barred state law claims because plaintiff admitted in his complaint that the Commonwealth employee acted within the scope of his employment). Thus, Sheffer's state law claims against Trooper Ebeck are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and should be dismissed.
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Trooper Ebeck's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 65) be granted. All claims brought against Trooper Ebeck under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed without prejudice and state claims against Trooper Ebeck should be dismissed with prejudice, as he is entitled to sovereign immunity for his alleged actions.
IV. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. The Third Circuit has also acknowledged that a district court has “substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.” Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000). As such, it is recommended that Sheffer be given the opportunity to file a second amended complaint that is complete in all respects and cures the pleading deficiencies identified herein.
The second amended complaint must be a unified pleading that stands by itself without reference to the original complaint. Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). The second amended complaint should further specify the claims Sheffer wishes to bring, who he wishes to allege each claim against, and the specific facts that show each Defendant's liability for each claim. Boyd v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 583 Fed.Appx. 30, 32 (3d Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 2374 (2015). Insofar as Sheffer intends to bring this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the second amended complaint must additionally establish the existence of actions taken by Defendants which have resulted in constitutional deprivations, and specify which actions are alleged as to which Defendants. As a final matter, the second amended complaint should be limited to those claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and that have questions of law or fact in common to all named Defendants and claims.
V. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Defendant Centre County's motion to dismiss (Doc. 57) be GRANTED, as the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Sheffer's § 1983 claims against Centre County should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
2. Defendants ADAs Hundt and Doe's motion to dismiss (Doc. 59) be GRANTED, as the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Sheffer's claims against ADAs Hundt and Doe should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as ADAs Hundt and Doe are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity;
3. Defendant Trooper Ebeck's motion to dismiss (Doc. 65) be GRANTED, as the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Sheffer's § 1983 claims against Trooper Ebeck should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and his state law claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as Trooper Ebeck is entitled to sovereign immunity; and
4. Plaintiff be granted leave to file a second amended complaint, that clarifies the bases of his claims and cures the pleading deficiencies outlined herein, within thirty (30) days upon the disposition of this Report and Recommendation.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MATTHEW JOHN SHEFFER, Petitioner, v.
CENTRE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:18-CV-02080
(BRANN, J.) (MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated January 18, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.