Opinion
January 6, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Stuart Cohen, J.).
The IAS Court properly dismissed, for lack of standing, plaintiff Shea's individual claims, seeking to recover sums purportedly due from defendant Hambro America Incorporated to plaintiff SPM Associates on a promissory note and guarantee as set forth in the sixth and seventh causes of action, where, as here, plaintiff Shea named himself in an individual, rather than in a representative capacity, with respect to those claims, since it is settled that a partnership cause of action belongs only to the partnership itself or to the partners jointly, and that an individual member of the partnership may only sue and recover on a partnership obligation on the partnership's behalf (Stevens v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 722).
Nor did the IAS Court err in dismissing that portion of the eighth cause of action which sought damages against defendant Paschall for the alleged breach of a purported oral shareholder voting agreement between plaintiff Shea and defendant Paschall, since the record reveals that the purported agreement was not in writing, as specifically mandated by New York Business Corporation Law § 620 (a), which requires that all voting agreements between shareholders be in writing and signed by the parties to the agreement in order to be valid and enforceable.
That portion of the ninth cause of action for tortious interference with contract as against defendants Paschall and Powell was also properly dismissed because they were signatories to the 1989 Operating Agreement which formed the basis for the interference claim (Koret, Inc. v. Christian Dior, S.A., 161 A.D.2d 156, 157, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 714). Recovery for tortious interference is not permitted absent a showing that those defendants intended to harm plaintiff Shea without economic or other lawful excuse or justification (Sun Ref. Mktg. Co. v McInerney, 139 A.D.2d 505, 506, lv dismissed 73 N.Y.2d 809).
Finally, the IAS Court did not err in directing a reference as to whether the complaint should be dismissed as against defendant Hambros PLC, the parent company of defendant Hambro America Incorporated and a holding company organized under the laws of the United Kingdom, for lack of jurisdiction, because the sharply conflicting affidavits submitted by the parties with respect to whether Hambros PLC is subject to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) for "doing business" in New York (see, Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Intl., 19 N.Y.2d 533) and whether the parent-subsidiary relationship between Hambros PLC and Hambro America Incorporated was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign parent (see, Taca Intl. Airlines v Rolls-Royce of England, 15 N.Y.2d 97), required a jurisdictional hearing (see, Cato Show Print. Co. v. Lee, 84 A.D.2d 947, 949).
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Kupferman, Asch and Nardelli, JJ.