Opinion
Civil Action No. 8:19-cv-00020-BHH-KFM
01-18-2019
Leslie Jay Shayne, a/k/a Les Shayne, a citizen and resident of South Carolina, Pro Se, and on behalf of Charlotte Shayne, his 96 year old incapacitated mother, as her court appointed guardian and conservator (S.C.), Plaintiff, v. Sondra Lampl, a citizen and resident of the State of New Jersey, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, seeks a declaratory judgment against the defendant (doc. 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff's complaint spans twenty-seven pages, with more than one hundred and fifty pages of exhibits (docs. 1-1-18). The complaint involves the care of 95-year old Charlotte Shayne ("C. Shayne"), the plaintiff's mother, who is incapacitated (doc. 1). The exhibits to the complaint include various orders and filings from the South Carolina Probate Court, the New Jersey Probate Court, proposed briefs to the New Jersey Appellate Court, as well as affidavits and some medical records for C. Shayne (doc. 1-1-1-18). In the present matter, the plaintiff alleges jurisdiction based upon diversity (the plaintiff is from South Carolina and the defendant is from New Jersey) and federal question jurisdiction based upon the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution (doc. 1 at 9).
In the body of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that after C. Shayne's husband passed, C. Shayne moved to New Jersey (doc. 1 at 2). During her time in New Jersey, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has been C. Shayne's caretaker (doc. 1 at 2, 11). At some point, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant sought to move C. Shayne to a nursing home from a 24/7 care facility (doc. 1 at 2-4). Due to this, the plaintiff contends that in February, 2017, he sought emergency temporary guardianship of C. Shayne due to the defendant's alleged outrageous spending of C. Shayne's wealth and C. Shayne's deteriorating health (doc. 1 at 3). The probate court in South Carolina issued a temporary and then a final order ("SC Order") granting the plaintiff guardianship and conservatorship over C. Shayne—basing jurisdiction on the substantial ties doctrine (doc. 1 at 4-5). Despite the SC Order that the plaintiff alleges was registered with New Jersey, when the plaintiff went to New Jersey to bring C. Shayne to South Carolina, he was prevented from moving her and the SC Order was given no effect (doc. 1 at 5-6).
The plaintiff alleges that after the SC Order was issued the defendant sought guardianship of C. Shayne in the New Jersey Probate Court (doc. 1 at 6). The plaintiff alleges that the judge in New Jersey was biased against him and continually denied his motions (doc. 1 at 7, 16-19). The plaintiff alleges that the New Jersey Probate Court then issued an order appointing the defendant as C. Shayne's guardian ("NJ Order") (doc. 1 at 20-21).
The plaintiff's complaint seeks only one cause of action: declaratory judgment (doc. 1 at 26 ("FOR A FIRST AND ONLY CAUSE OF ACTION (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT" (as in original complaint)). Plaintiff contends that there is a justiciable controversy between the SC order and the NJ order and alleges that the two orders are incapable of reconciliation (doc. 1 at 26). For his relief, the plaintiff asks this Court to declare that the SC Order is in full force and effect and that the NJ Order is vacated and null and void and that this court issue a pick-up order so the plaintiff may pick up his mother in New Jersey (doc. 1 at 27).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff is a pro se litigant and his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction, however, does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them." Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, "constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute." In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, "and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears." Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 seeking declaratory relief (doc. 1). The plaintiff's request that this Court issue a declaratory judgment that the NJ Order should be vacated and found null and void is subject to summary dismissal because, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court is without jurisdiction to issue such a declaration. Weathers v. Pou, No. 2:09-cv-270-JFA-RSC, 2009 WL 1139984, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 27, 2009).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). "[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself." Davani v. Virginia Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006). Here, the plaintiff asserts his claim with this Court because he feels that he was injured by the NJ Order, and he asks this Court to overturn the NJ Order (doc. 1 at 26-27). It is well-settled, however, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction even when a challenge to state court decisions or rulings concerns federal constitutional issues; instead, only the United States Supreme Court may review those state-court decisions. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983) (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can be conducted only by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Davani, 434 F.3d at 719 (explaining how the expansive interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was limited by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)); see also Dukes v. Stone, C.A. No. 3:08-cv-505-PMD-JRM, 2009 WL 398079, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2009) (explaining that only the United States Supreme Court is empowered with appellate authority to reverse or modify a state court judgment).
The doctrine applies even if the state court litigation has not reached a state's highest court. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 892-93 & nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (providing that a federal court must accord full faith and credit to a state court judgment); Robart Wood & Wire Prods. Corp. v. Namaco Indus., 797 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1986); Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262, 263 (10th Cir. 1986) ("It is well settled that federal district courts are without authority to review state court judgments where the relief sought is in the nature of appellate review."); Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases). To rule in favor of the plaintiff in the present action would, necessarily, require this Court to overrule, or otherwise find invalid, the NJ Order. Cf. In re Genesys Data Tech., Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 all federal courts must give full faith and credit to valid state court judgments). Such a result is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, even though the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (2006) (noting that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a declaration that a state court judgment was null and void as the power to so review a state court judgment lied with the United States Supreme Court); see Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tuggle, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (W.D. Ark. 2003) (finding that Rooker-Feldman barred suit because "any such findings would be in direct conflict with and undermine one of the state court judgments"). Therefore, the complaint is subject to summary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, the undersigned takes judicial notice of two pending federal actions between the plaintiff and the defendant—along with several other parties—concerning same or similar facts as addressed in the instant matter. See Shayne v. Discover Bank, C.A. No. 8:18-cv-03057-BHH-KFM (D.S.C.); see also Discover Bank v. Greenwood House Home for the Jewish Aged et al, C.A. No. 3:18-cv-16020-FLW-TJB (D.N.J.). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the instant matter be summarily dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and that no declaratory judgment be issued.
See United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992) (the district court had the right to take judicial notice of a prior related proceeding); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that '[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'").
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge January 18, 2019
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).