Summary
In Sharp, et al. v. Learned, 182 Miss. 333, 181 So. 142, this Court said: "* * * that the courts of this state have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit involving the contested title to land situated in another state where there is no question of specific performance of a contract, enforcement of trust, or the doing of any act which from previous dealings is binding upon the conscience of the parties, although the court had jurisdiction of the parties."
Summary of this case from Jacobson v. JonesOpinion
No. 33208.
May 16, 1938.
1. STATES.
The boundary line of a navigable river between two states is the thread of the stream and continues with gradual changes in the thread, but, if the thread is changed by avulsion, the line remains where it was.
2. PLEADING.
A pleading must be construed most strongly against the pleader.
3. INJUNCTION.
In suit to enjoin defendants from prosecuting suit in Louisiana courts against complainant for cutting timber, bill alleging that because of changes in course of Mississippi river the land was situated to westerly side of the navigable stream of Mississippi river and was joined in most part to the Louisiana shore meant that the land was situated in Louisiana and was so situated when the alleged trespass took place, in absence of allegation that the change of the thread of the stream was by avulsion.
4. INJUNCTION.
Ordinarily a court of equity will not restrain the prosecution of a suit in another state unless a clear equity is made out requiring the interposition of the court to prevent manifest wrong or injustice.
5. INJUNCTION.
The comparative convenience or inconvenience of the parties as the result of granting or withholding an injunction restraining the prosecution of a suit in another state should be considered, and injunction should not be granted if it would operate oppressively or inequitably or contrary to the real justice of the case.
6. VENUE.
An action for trespass on land is not a "transitory action" (Code 1930, sec. 495.
7. INJUNCTION.
Where plaintiff claimed title to land under laws of Mississippi, and defendants claimed title to land under laws of Louisiana and alleged change in thread of Mississippi river had transferred land from Mississippi to Louisiana side of river, Mississippi court would not enjoin defendant from prosecuting suit in Louisiana courts against plaintiff for cutting timber from land, since, by the venue statute, the Legislature recognized that it would be to the best interest of parties concerned that actions for trespass on land be brought where trespass was committed (Code 1930, sec. 495).
ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR. (Division B. June 20, 1938.) [182 So. 122. No. 33208.]1. PLEADING.
On demurrer, a bill must be construed most strongly against the pleader.
2. APPEAL AND ERROR.
A suggestion of error, which was filed after reversal of order overruling demurrers to bill, and which was based chiefly on facts not contained in bill, construed most strongly against the pleader, was overruled.
APPEAL from the chancery court of Adams county; HON. R.W. CUTRER, Chancellor.
Jones Stockett, of Woodville, Engle Laub, of Natchez, and Sholars Gunby, of Monroe, La., for appellants.
It is apparent from the bill that a question of title to land is the main one, the appellee claiming it as Mississippi soil and appellants as being Louisiana soil. The bill is not one to remove clouds, or to quiet title; complainant does not come into the court showing any valid or legal claim or title to the lands for which he asserts some vague and indefinite ownership. The bill was not filed in the county where the land is claimed to be, but in Adams County, and is based solely on a prayer to enjoin these appellants from entering any court which they believe and contend has the sole jurisdiction of the cause and of the res. We submit that the demurrers interposed herein, both general and special, should have been sustained and this bill dismissed. We insist that the Chancery Court of Adams County had no jurisdiction hereof and as fully appears from the bill itself.
Before proceeding in any case the court has the primary duty to see that it has jurisdiction both of the subject matter and of the parties.
Broom v. Board of Supervisors, 171 Miss. 586, 158 So. 344; Brotherhood, etc., v. Agnew, 170 Miss. 604, 155 So. 205; Cocke v. Breve, 68 Miss. 775.
True it is that in the case at bar personal service was had upon these appellants, but the thing, the res, the subject matter, according to the bill of complaint is in Louisiana. We say this advisedly; we say it because the verbiage of the bill so clearly indicates it. The allegation contained in paragraph 5 is, in effect, that due to the changes in the course of the Mississippi River, the land is now in Louisiana, and is joined to the Louisiana shore. The court knows judicially that changes in a river caused by the process and progress of accretions carries with those changes the boundaries of the lands affected. The bill contains no fact, nor even suspicion of fact, which changes, alters or modifies this established law.
Sutton v. Archer, 93 Miss. 603, 40 So. 705; 1 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (3 Ed.) 298; 4 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (3 Ed.) 1318; 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (3 Ed.) 17.
Where the suit is strictly local, the subject matter is specific property, and the relief when granted is such that it must act directly upon the subject matter, and not upon the person of the defendant, the jurisdiction must be exercised in the state where the subject matter is situated.
4 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (3 Ed.) 1318; Platte Fisheries v. Wadford, 170 Miss. 617, 155 So. 161.
A citizen of any state has the right, the privilege of having the courts of that state pass upon and adjudicate the question as to the validity of his title to land, and a citizen of a state other than the one in which the land is located has the same right, or privilege. The injunction here denies these appellants of their constitutional right.
Sturgis v. Jackson, 88 Miss. 508, 40 So. 547; Columbia, etc., v. Morton, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 114; Jones v. Hughes, 137 N.W. 1023, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 502.
It is the contention of the appellants that the establishment of title is a suit of a local nature and that the proper place for the trial of such a case is in the county or parish where the land lies. Therefore, the threatened suit was not of a transitory nature but one of local nature and, quite naturally, the appellants, proceeding to protect themselves in the matter of the cut timber, assumed that the parish in which the land lies was the proper place to establish their title in order that they might then proceed to sue for the damage done them by the cutting of the trees on said land.
There are no elements of equity and good conscience on behalf of the appellee in this case whereby the appellants should have been restrained from asserting their right to title to the land and trying same in the parish in which it is claimed that land lies.
Being in Madison Parish, Louisiana, we assert that that court is the proper place to try title to the land. Title to the land in question is the basis upon which can be established damages for the cutting of the trees therefrom.
14 R.C.L. 358, par. 60.
If the lands in controversy are Louisiana lands it is but proper that in a local action the courts of the state where the lands lie should be the proper courts to adjudicate title. The force of a Mississippi decision as to the ownership of lands in another state would not necessarily be binding upon the courts of that state where the lands are situated.
Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 33 L.Ed. 918; 14 R.C.L. 417, par. 119.
A very clear case must be made out to authorize a court of equity to enjoin suits on the grounds that they are vexatious and oppressive.
32 C.J. 94, par. 88; Standard Roller Bearing Co. v. Crucible Steel Co., 71 N.J. Eq. 61, 63 A. 456.
This injunction, if granted, would compel the appellants to litigate their Louisiana title in Adams County, Mississippi.
Section 495, Code of 1930; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 33 L.Ed. 538.
Nothing in the bill here shows a contract between appellants and appellee; nothing in the bill shows fraud in the dealings between the parties; nothing in the bill shows a matter of trust between appellants and appellee, and, therefore, the subject matter being ownership of land, the Chancery Court of Adams County, Mississippi, had no jurisdiction whatsoever in this, a local matter establishing the title to land, to enjoin these appellants.
Platte Fisheries v. Wadford, 170 Miss. 617, 155 So. 161; Sutton v. Archer, 46 So. 705, 93 Miss. 603.
The boundaries of the two states need not to be established in order for the ownership of the land in controversy to be established in either appellants or appellee.
Smoot Sand Gravel Corp. v. Washington Airport, Inc., 283 U.S. 348, 75 L.Ed. 1109.
The allowance of this injunction is an abridgement of the constitutional rights of appellants.
Cofrode v. Michigan, 7 L.R.A. 511; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 427, 80 L.Ed. 299.
Brandon Brandon, of Natchez, for appellee.
We submit that the recitals of the bill of complaint contain not only all necessary averments of fact necessary to afford the Chancery Court of Adams County, Mississippi, jurisdiction of this cause, but also fully sufficient averments to support the prayer for relief and the action of the court in issuing temporary writ of injunction.
Whereas, it is a well recognized principle that the courts of one country can exercise no jurisdiction or control over courts of another, and the rule once prevailed that a court could not restrain a citizen within its jurisdiction from prosecuting a suit in a court of a foreign nation: "Gradually, however, recognition was given to the distinction between endeavoring to control the action of a foreign court, by a mandate directed to it, and controlling the action of a resident, over whose person the court had undisputed jurisdiction, until, according to later decisions, unqualified approval is given to the doctrine that, in a proper case, if the court has jurisdiction of the person it may enjoin him from prosecuting such a suit. The courts in these cases proceed on the theory that the restraint operates on the person of the litigant who, as a resident within the jurisdiction of the court from which the mandate is issued, may be compelled to recognize and obey its laws and the decrees of its tribunals."
14 R.C.L., pages 411, 412, sec. 112, pages 413, 414, sec. 114, pages 414, 415, sec. 115, page 415, sec. 116.
A frequent ground on which a court of equity is asked to grant injunctive relief is where the institution of a suit in another state is fraudulent, or is brought for the purpose of vexing, harassing or oppressing an opponent. This is well illustrated where both parties are residents of the same state, and the object of the prosecution of the action in the state is to evade the laws of the domicil, and to subject the defendant to some penalty or remedy of an oppressive character to which he is not subject in the state of his residence and wherein the alleged cause of action arose. In such a case, while there is an evasion of the laws of the domicil, yet the controlling motive is by invoking the aid of the laws of the foreign jurisdiction to annoy, harass and oppress an opponent and thus to coerce him to attain a desired end.
14 R.C.L., page 416, sec. 117.
It was at one time contended that under the provisions of the constitution of the United States, declaring that full faith and credit should be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state, and that the citizens of each state should be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, every citizen of the United States had the absolute right to prosecute an action in the courts of any state of the United States, and, therefore, that an injunction could not issue from a court of the state of his domicil forbidding him to exercise this right in the courts of another state. This contention, however, did not receive judicial approval. On the contrary, the doctrine is well established that these constitutional limitations do not operate as a prohibition against the power of a court of equity to afford this relief.
14 R.C.L., page 412, sec. 113.
The applicable principles contended for by this appellee have been announced by the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi in three cases: Fisher v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846; Davis v. Natchez Hotel Co., 158 Miss. 43, 128 So. 871; E.J. Platte Fisheries v. Wadford, 170 Miss. 617, 155 So. 161.
It is well settled that the courts of one state may take jurisdiction of a transitory cause of action originating in another state, when the defendant has been locally found and served, even though both parties are at the time domiciliary residents of the foreign state.
Weaver v. Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364.
Brandon Brandon, of Natchez, and Wells, Wells Lipscomb, of Jackson, for appellee, on Suggestion of Error.
Argued orally by A.H. Jones and S.B. Laub, for appellant, and by Gerard Brandon, for appellee.
Appellee filed his bill in the chancery court of Adams county against appellants, R.B. Sharp and Mason Stricker, to enjoin them from prosecuting any suit in the courts of Louisiana against appellee for cutting timber from the lands known as Diamond Island Towhead in the Mississippi river. Appellants demurred to the bill both generally and specially. The demurrers were overruled, and appeal granted appellants to settle the principles of the cause.
The bill alleges in substance that appellee and appellant Sharp are resident citizens of Adams county in this state, and that appellant Stricker is a resident citizen of Wilkinson county in this state; that appellee had cut and removed timber from Diamond Island Towhead; that he claimed title to the island through a land patent from this state and other conveyances describing the land as situated in Warren county in this state; that appellants claimed title to the island through Louisiana grantors and by virtue of the laws of that state, in which they claimed it is situated. The location of the island — whether in Louisiana or in Mississippi — is set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the bill as follows:
"That amongst the tracts of land and real estate claimed and owned by the Complainant is a tract of land in Warren County, Mississippi, known as Diamond Island, or Diamond Island Towhead, being largely timbered lands, and therefrom your Complainant has recently cut, severed, and removed certain trees and timber.
"(5) That because of the changes in the course of navigable stream of the Mississippi River, said Diamond Island or Diamond Island Towhead is now situated to the Westerly side of the present navigable stream of the Mississippi River, and is joined in most part to the Louisiana shore."
The bill charges that appellants were threatening to bring suit against appellee in the courts of Louisiana for the alleged trespass in the cutting of the timber; that appellee owned real estate of large value free from encumbrance in the counties of Adams, Jefferson, Claiborne, and Warren in this state, and also in the parishes of Concordia, Tensas, East Carroll, and Madison in Louisiana; that it would be unfair, unjust, harassing, and expensive to appellee to be forced into the courts of Louisiana to defend the threatened action by appellants. An injunction was issued and served on appellants in accordance with the prayer of the bill.
We are of the opinion that the chancellor was in error in sustaining the bill. We reach that conclusion upon the following considerations: In paragraph 4 of the bill it is alleged that Diamond Island Towhead is situated in Warren county in this state; however, in view of the facts set out in paragraph 5 that was a mere conclusion of the pleader. In paragraph 5 the facts are stated; they show without doubt that the island is situated in the state of Louisiana and not in Warren county in this state. It is therein set forth that because of the changes in the course of the Mississippi river the island is now "situated to the Westerly side of the present navigable stream of the Mississippi River, and is joined in most part to the Louisiana shore." The boundary line of a navigable river between two states is the thread of the stream and continues with gradual changes in the thread; however, if the thread is changed by an avulsion the line remains where it was. Arkansas v. Mississippi, 250 U.S. 39, 39 S.Ct. 422, 63 L.Ed. 832; Arkansas v. Mississippi, 252 U.S. 344, 40 S.Ct. 333, 64 L.Ed. 605; Louisiana v. Mississippi, 282 U.S. 458, 51 S.Ct. 197, 75 L.Ed. 459.
There is no allegation in the bill that Diamond Island Towhead was thrown on the west side of the thread of the river by an avulsion. Applying the rule that a pleading must be construed most strongly against the pleader, the bill means that Diamond Island is now situated in Louisiana; that it was so situated when the alleged trespass took place, and if it was ever situated on the Mississippi side of the river it has gone to the Louisiana side by gradual change in the thread of the stream and not as the result of an avulsion.
We have here, therefore, an alleged trespass on land situated in Louisiana. Appellants claim title to the land under the laws of that state, while appellee claims title under the laws of this state. All the parties are residents of this state. As to whether there was a trespass depends on where the title is, and the final question is whether that question should be settled by the courts of Louisiana or the courts of Mississippi. Ordinarily, a court of equity will not restrain the prosecution of a suit in another state unless a clear equity is made out, requiring the interposition of the court to prevent manifest wrong or injustice. 14 R.C.L., p. 417, sec. 119. The comparative convenience or inconvenience of the parties as the result of granting or withholding the injunction sought should be considered, and none should be granted if it would operate oppressively or inequitably, "or contrary to the real justice of the case." 14 R.C.L., p. 358, sec. 60. Although Platte Fisheries v. Wadford, 170 Miss. 617, 155 So. 161, is not directly in point on its facts, it supports those principles.
Sutton v. Archer, 93 Miss. 603, 46 So. 705, is nearer in point on facts and principles. That was a suit by Sutton and others to confirm their alleged title, and the cancellation of Archer's claimed title to Towhead Island and Island No. 83 in the Mississippi river. The complainants deraigned title from the United States government. The two islands formerly lay in the river near the Mississippi side of the main channel and had been recognized by the federal government as being in Washington county in this state; they were gradually washed away and the course of the river gradually shifted from the Arkansas side, these changes being accompanied by a slow accretion of land onto the Arkansas side, until the place where the islands had been became a part of the Arkansas bank of the river. The defendants, whose grantors were owners of the land in Arkansas from which the river had gradually receded and to which the accretion had gradually added area, proved that the site of the two islands had by accretion and change of the river become a part of their property on the Arkansas side of the stream. The court held that although the islands were originally in Mississippi they were gradually washed away by a change in the channel of the river and deposited upon a projection on the Arkansas shore, and that thereby they became a part of the lands of that state, and the courts of Mississippi had no jurisdiction over them; that the courts of this state have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit involving the contested title to land situated in another state where there is no question of specific performance of a contract, enforcement of trust, or the doing of any act which from previous dealings is binding on the conscience of the parties, although the court had jurisdiction of the parties.
Here the land is in Louisiana. If there was a trespass it took place in that state. The foundation of the suit is the title to the land — whether in appellants or appellee — and that question is solvable by the laws of Louisiana. It is not a transitory action. Section 495, Code 1930, declares the policy of the state with reference to the venue of actions for trespass on lands. It provides, among other things, that actions for the actual value of trees, for the statutory penalty for cutting and boxing trees and firing woods shall be brought in the county where the land or some part thereof is situated. We do not mean to hold that this statute is controlling here, but we do hold that by its enactment the Legislature recognized that it would be to the best interest of the parties concerned that such actions be brought in the venue where the trespass was committed.
Reversed and remanded.
The original opinion, construing the bill on the demurrers thereto most strongly against the pleader, as has been the established rule throughout the judicial history of this State, responded to the bill so construed by reversing the decree and remanding the cause. A lengthy suggestion of error has been filed, based chiefly upon asserted differentiating facts not contained in the bill, construed as aforesaid, and the court is requested to decide according to the said newly asserted facts, which, of course, we cannot do.
It is manifest, therefore, that upon the return of the record the bill will be amended, and thereupon a different case will be presented; wherefore, instead of the interlocutory appeal having operated to settle all the controlling principles of the case or to prevent delay, it will have settled nothing of any substantial value and will have caused delay, — instead of settling anything it has simply furnished a means for a preliminary piecemeal discussion with this court. These are the fruits in too many cases under our statute allowing interlocutory appeals.
Suggestion of error overruled.