Summary
In Shapiro, the Court held that the relation back doctrine was inapplicable because the original pleading did not give notice of the transaction and occurrence alleged in the amended pleading.
Summary of this case from Porter v. AnnabiOpinion
July 7, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.).
The plaintiffs are awarded one bill of costs.
Following service by the plaintiffs of their fourth amended complaint, they received an amended answer thereto from the defendant Lillian Schoninger in February 1985. The amended answer contained, inter alia, four counterclaims (denoted as second through fifth counterclaims) setting forth causes of action for the alleged improper construction of a condominium which the plaintiff Vector Yardarm Corporation (hereinafter Vector) constructed and of which the defendant Lillian Schoninger is a unit owner. The defendant Stanley Schoninger is her husband, and the plaintiff Donald Shapiro is an owner of and an officer of Vector.
The plaintiff moved, inter alia, to dismiss these counterclaims upon the ground that they were barred by the applicable Statutes of Limitation. In its order dated May 2, 1985, Special Term denied this branch of the motion, holding that "[t]hese claims existed at the time the plaintiffs asserted their claims against the defendants in 1978 and were not time barred at that time" citing CPLR 203 (c). We disagree.
The defendant Lillian Schoninger has, in effect, conceded that these counterclaims were time barred in June 1982, on the last day that an action in law might be commenced. We do not find a basis for allowing them to be subsequently revived by way of an amended pleading interposed in February 1985.
CPLR 203 (e) provides that "[a] claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading". In the instant action, none of the defendants' prior pleadings gave any notice that the plaintiffs' conduct in connection with the construction of the condominium would be called into question. Indeed, their original (joint) answer consisted merely of a general denial. It is uncontradicted, however, that the plaintiffs had actual notice of the gravamen of Lillian Schoninger's counterclaims as evidenced by her commencement of other proceedings and actions against them, as well as by the commencement in New York County of an action brought by the board of managers of the Yardarm Beach Condominium, setting forth causes of action virtually identical to the counterclaims. We find that these facts are not dispositive.
Although CPLR 203 (e) should be liberally construed (Town Bd. v National Sur. Corp., 53 Misc.2d 23, 26, affd 29 A.D.2d 726), mere notice alone, independent of the original pleadings, is inadequate; the pleadings themselves must give the requisite notice (Werner Spitz Constr. Co. v Vanderlinde Elec. Corp., 64 Misc.2d 157, 162-163; see also, Nichimen Co. v Framen Steel Supply Co., 44 Misc.2d 260, 261-262; New York Tel. Co. v County Asphalt, 86 Misc.2d 958, 959-960). As the defendant Lillian Schoninger's pleadings fail to satisfy the statutory requisites, her second through fifth counterclaims must be dismissed. Lazer, J.P., Mangano, Gibbons and Spatt, JJ., concur.