Opinion
1:22-cv-10643 (GHW) (SDA)
05-05-2023
Hakimah Shahid-Ikhlas, Plaintiff, v. The New York And Presbyterian Hospital, Inc., Defendant.
HONORABLE GREGORY H. WOODS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEWART D. AARON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending before the Court is a motion by Defendant The New York And Presbyterian Hospital, Inc. (“Defendant” or “NYPH”), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an Order dismissing the Complaint of Plaintiff Hakimah Shahid-Ikhlas (“Plaintiff” or “Shahid-Ikhlas”). (Def.'s Not. of Mot., ECF No. 14.) For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that Defendant's motion be GRANTED.
For purposes of the pending motion to dismiss, the Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor. See City of Providence v. BATS Glob. Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 50 (2d Cir. 2017).
I. Parties
Shahid-Ikhlas is a Certified Critical Care Registered Nurse who was employed by NYPH at Weill Cornell Medical Center as a staff nurse for the Critical Care - Coronary Care Unit from June 16, 2014 to November 30, 2021. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 9.) NYPH is a domestic not-for-profit corporation organized and existing under New York law. (Id. ¶ 10.)
II. COVID-19 Vaccines
In early 2021, “[i]t [was] the consensus of reliable public health authorities that the COVID-19 vaccine prevent[ed] the spread of the virus, and that healthcare professionals who work[ed] directly with vulnerable patients should be vaccinated.” See Does 1-2 v. Hochul, No. 21-CV-05067 (AMD) (TAM), 2022 WL 4637843, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022). “According to the [Center for Disease Control (‘CDC'), ‘mRNA COVID-19 vaccines [were] highly effective in preventing SARS-CoV-2 infections in real-world conditions among health care personnel, first responders, and other essential workers [and] [t]hese groups [were] more likely than the general population to be exposed to the virus because of their occupations.'” Id. at *2 & n.5 (quoting Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Real-World Study Confirms Protective Benefits of mRNA COVID-19 Vaccines (Mar. 29, 2021)). “The CDC further advised that, ‘SARS-CoV-2 transmission between unvaccinated persons is the primary cause of continued spread.'” Id. at *2 & n.6 (quoting Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Science Brief: COVID-19 Vaccines and Vaccination (Mar. 8, 2021)).
The Court may “take judicial notice of relevant matters of public record.” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012).
III. NYPH's Vaccination Program And Plaintiff's Religious Exemption Request
On or about June 11, 2021, NYPH announced a new COVID-19 policy to its employees which included, among other things, dates by which employees were required to undergo vaccination to maintain their employment with NYPH, as well as the process by which an employee may apply for a religious or medical exemption. (Compl. ¶ 11.) The deadline by which employees seeking an exemption were required to submit their requests initially was August 1, 2021, but later was extended to August 6, 2021. (Id. ¶ 12.) On August 6, 2021, Shahid-Ikhlas submitted a written request for religious exemption under the NYPH COVID-19 Vaccination Program. (Id. ¶ 14.)
IV. New York's Vaccine Mandate And Approval Of Plaintiff's Request
On August 26, 2021, the New York State Department of Health (the “NYS DOH”) issued a mandate applying to hospitals and other healthcare entities, requiring the facilities to continuously require eligible personnel to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 (the “Mandate”). N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 2.61 (2021).The Mandate covered all employees “who engage[d] in activities such that if they were infected with COVID-19, they could potentially expose other covered personnel, patients or residents to the disease.” Id. at § 2.61(a)(2). The only listed exception to the Mandate was for employees for whom the vaccination would be detrimental to their health. Id. at § 2.61(d)(1).
See also Compl. ¶ 18.
On or about September 14, 2021, a temporary restraining order was granted barring the NYS DOH from enforcing its Mandate requiring employers to deny religious exemptions to the COVID-19 vaccine. (Compl. ¶ 19 (citing Dr. A. v. Hochul, No. 21-CV-01009 (DNH), 2021 WL 4734404 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2021).) On September 15, 2021, Shahid-Ikhlas was notified by NYPH that NYPH was putting a hold on its enforcement of any mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policies. (Id. ¶ 20.) On October 1, 2021, Shahid-Ikhlas was notified by NYPH that her request for religious exemption was approved. (Id.)
In October 2021, the Second Circuit heard a challenge to the Mandate in We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266 (2d Cir. 2021) (hereinafter “We The Patriots I”). The plaintiffappellants in We The Patriots I challenged the Mandate's lack of a religious exemption as a violation of the First Amendment, the Supremacy Clause via Article VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 272.
On October 29, 2021, the Second Circuit issued an Order vacating the injunctive relief that temporarily had blocked the NYS DOH from enforcing the Mandate. (Compl. ¶ 22.) On November 4, 2021, the Second Circuit issued its full opinion upholding the Mandate. See We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 296. On November 12, 2021, the Second Circuit clarified that, while the Mandate was not unconstitutional for want of a religious exemption, medical facilities might be able to accommodate employees with religious exemptions by employing them in a manner that removed them from the scope of the Mandate. See We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 368, 370 (2d Cir. 2021) (hereinafter “We The Patriots II”).
V. Post-We The Patriots II Events And Plaintiff's Deemed Resignation
On November 17, 2021, Shahid-Ikhlas was notified by NYPH that the Mandate no longer permitted religious exemptions and that vaccination was required by November 22, 2021. (Compl. ¶ 25.) On November 22, 2021, Shahid-Ikhlas received an email from NYPH that was sent to all nursing staff, among others, stating:
We have proactively reviewed your position to evaluate whether there was any reasonable accommodation that we could offer. Unfortunately, given the nature of your role, the State's latest vaccination mandate precludes us from allowing you to continue in your role even with weekly testing and masking. Because your job requires your presence in the Hospital interacting with patients or staff, there is no accommodation the State would permit that would not create an undue hardship.(Id. ¶ 26 (Plaintiff's emphases omitted).) The email further warned that “any employees who do not come into compliance by 11/29/21 will be deemed to have opted to resign for not having met a condition of employment.” (Id.)
The same day, November 22, 2021, Plaintiff's counsel submitted to NYPH a request for religious accommodation. (Compl. ¶ 31.) On November 23, 2021, Plaintiff received a text message from her supervisor, Ashley Dorfman, asking Plaintiff to call her that day. (Id. ¶ 32.) Dorfman resigned on November 24, 2021. (Id. ¶ 34.) After working a normal overnight shift on November 28, 2021, on December 1, 2021, Plaintiff was unable to log into her work email or access her schedule. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36.) NYPH deemed Shahid-Ikhlas to have resigned from her employment at NYPH effective November 30, 2021 due to being “non-compliant” with the NYPH COVID-19 Vaccination Program. (Compl. ¶ 39.)
In response to inquiries from Plaintiff's counsel, on December 3, 2021, NYPH's counsel sent an email to Plaintiff's counsel, stating that Plaintiff had been informed in writing that NYPH, after reviewing Plaintiff's specific job position and duties, determined that it could not provide an accommodation to her absent an undue hardship and that, given the nature of Plaintiff's role, the Mandate precluded NYPH from allowing Plaintiff to continue in her role even with weekly testing and masking because her job required her presence in the hospital interacting with patients or staff. (Compl. ¶ 41; see also id. ¶¶ 37-40.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action. She asserts claims for religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) (Count I), the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) (Count II) and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) (Count III). (See Compl. ¶¶ 46-64.) On February 21, 2023, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss. (See Def.'s Not. of Mot.) On March 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed her memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem., ECF No. 16.) On April 14, 2023, Defendant filed its reply. (Def.'s Reply, ECF No. 17.)
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
A defendant may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in a complaint[,]” but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Title VII (Count I)
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any individual . . . because of such individual's . . . religion ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The word “religion” is defined to “include[] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate . . . [a] religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” Id. § 2000e(j). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a Title VII discrimination claim must plausibly allege two elements: “(1) the employer discriminated against him (2) because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015).
The Supreme Court has explained that “the rule for disparate-treatment claims based on a failure to accommodate a religious practice is straightforward: An employer may not make an applicant's religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.” E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 773 (2015); see also Baker v. The Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In brief, it is ‘an unlawful employment practice . . . for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of his employees and prospective employees.'”) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)). A plaintiff may state a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII by “plausibly alleging that he or she ‘actually requires an accommodation of [his or her] religious practice' and that ‘the employer's desire to avoid the prospective accommodation [was] a motivating factor in [an employment] decision.'” Lowman v. NVI LLC, 821 Fed.Appx. 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 773-74) (alterations in original).
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff has not alleged a prima facie case of religious discrimination because the Mandate is a requirement of state law and not an employment requirement. (Def.'s Mem., ECF No. 15, at 12-13.) Although the term “employment requirement” has been used by courts in describing the prima facie elements of a Title VII claim based on a failure to accommodate, see, e.g., Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001), it does not come from the language of the statute itself and thus does not warrant as strict of an interpretation as called for by Defendant. As set forth in Lowman, a plaintiff states a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII by plausibly alleging that she “actually requires an accommodation of [her] religious practice.” Id., 821 Fed.Appx. at 31 (quoting Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 773). Plaintiff has done so here. Plaintiff plausibly alleges that she holds sincere religious beliefs that preclude her from receiving a COVID-19 vaccineand that she requires an accommodation that would allow her to continue working without running afoul of the Mandate. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-18, 25.)
In Knight, the Second Circuit held that, to make out a prima facie case under Title VII for religious discrimination based on a failure to accommodate, an employee must show that she held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement, informed her employer of this belief, and was disciplined for not complying with the conflicting employment requirement. See Knight, 275 F.3d at 167. Although some courts continue to apply this framework, the Second Circuit has not addressed in a precedential decision, whether or to what extent Abercrombie alters this framework.
For purposes of this motion, Defendant does not challenge that Plaintiff has a sincerely held religious objection to COVID-19 vaccination. (See Def.'s Mem. at 11 n.16.)
Plaintiff also plausibly alleges that her need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in Defendant's decision to deem her to have resigned. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was aware of her religious beliefs; that Defendant did not offer her an accommodation and that she was deemed to have resigned for failure to comply with the vaccine requirement. (Compl. ¶¶ 1517, 39, 48-49.) The Court finds these allegations sufficient to make out a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII. See Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 772 n.2 (taking adverse action “because of” the plaintiff's “religious practice” “synonymous with refusing to accommodate the religious practice”); Lowman, 821 Fed.Appx. at 31-32; cf. Riley v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 22-CV-02736 (JGK), 2023 WL 2118073, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2023) (citing Knight, 275 F.3d at 167); Corrales v. Montefiore Medical Center, No. 22-CV-03219 (LAP), 2023 WL 2711415, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023) (citing Knight, 275 F.3d at 167). Accordingly, to avoid liability, Defendant must show that it offered Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation or that doing so would cause undue hardship. See Baker, 445 F.3d at 546; Lowman, 821 Fed.Appx. at 31 (“At the same time, an employer does not ultimately violate Title VII if the prospective accommodation ‘would cause the employer to suffer an undue hardship.'”) (quoting Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2002)). Under Title VII, an accommodation causes an undue hardship “whenever it results in ‘more than a de minimis cost' to the employer.” See Baker, 445 F.3d at 548 (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84).
In Abercrombie, the Supreme Court noted that “[w]hile a knowledge requirement cannot be added to the motive requirement, it is arguable that the motive requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least suspects that the practice in question is a religious practicei.e., that he cannot discriminate ‘because of' a ‘religious practice' unless he knows or suspects it to be a religious practice.” Abercrombie, 575 U.S. at 774 n.3. Regardless, here, there is no dispute that Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's religiously based objection to the COVID-19 vaccine.
The Court notes that, “[o]n January 13, 2023, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari in Groff v. DeJoy, [143] S.Ct. [646], No. 22-174, 2023 WL 178403, which presents two issues: first, ‘[w]hether this Court should disapprove the more-than-de-minimis cost test for refusing Title VII religious accommodations stated in' Hardison; and second, ‘[w]hether an employer may demonstrate undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business' under Title VII merely by showing that the requested accommodation burdens the employee's co-workers rather than the business itself[.]'” Riley, 2023 WL 2118073, at *3 n.5 (alterations in original) (citing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 27-31), Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S.Ct. 646 (2023) (No. 22-174), 2022 WL 3701768, at *27-31). The parties have not asked the Court to stay this motion pending the Supreme Court's decision in Groff. In any event, the Court agrees with Judge Koeltl's determination in Riley that a stay is unnecessary since “[g]rants of certiorari do not change the law, and a district court remains bound by circuit precedent until the Supreme Court or the court of appeals changes that precedent.” Riley, 2023 WL 2118073, at *3 n.5 (quoting In re Generali COVID-19 Travel Ins. Litig., 577 F.Supp.3d 284, 294 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), aff'd sub nom. Oglevee v. Generali U.S. Branch, No. 22-336, 2022 WL 16631170 (2d Cir. Nov. 2, 2022)) (alterations in original).
Here, because Defendant did not offer Plaintiff an accommodation, the issue before the Court is whether reasonably accommodating Plaintiff would cause Defendant undue hardship as a matter of law. See Ansonia Bd. Of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986) (“[T]he extent of undue hardship on the employer's business is at issue only where the employer claims that it is unable to offer any reasonable accommodation without such hardship.”). It is well established that Defendant would suffer an undue hardship as a matter of law if it was required to accommodate Plaintiff by exempting Plaintiff from the vaccine requirement, while allowing her to perform work that would require her to be vaccinated under the Mandate, because such accommodation would require Defendant to violate the law. See Riley, 2023 WL 2118073, at *4 (“‘Title VII does not require' entities covered by [the Mandate] to provide employees with a ‘blanket religious exemption allowing them to continue working at their current positions unvaccinated.'”) (quoting We the Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 292); see also id. (“Title VII cannot be used to require employers to break the law.”); Corrales, 2023 WL 2711415, at *7 (“The Court of Appeals has provided that dismissal of an employee's Title VII claim because of undue hardship is appropriate where, in granting the employee's accommodation request, the employer would be required to violate state or federal law.”) (citing Lowman, 821 Fed.Appx. at 32 (affirming dismissal of Title VII claim where employee's requested accommodation would require employer to violate the Internal Revenue Code); Bey v. City of New York, 999 F.3d 157, 170 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of Title VII claim where employee's requested accommodation would require employer to “depart from binding federal regulations”)); Marte v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 22-CV-03491 (CM), 2022 WL 7059182, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2022) (“Defendant correctly argues that Plaintiff's requested accommodation would qualify as an undue hardship because it required Defendant to violate the law.”). However, Plaintiff contends that Defendant was required to present an accommodation that would remove her from the scope of the Mandate by allowing her to perform work that would not require her to interact in person with patients and staff. (See Compl. ¶¶ 28-29.) The Court disagrees.
In We the Patriots II, the Second Circuit recognized that “it may be possible under the [Mandate] for an employer to accommodate-not exempt-employees with religious objections, by employing them in a manner that removes them from the [Mandate's] definition of ‘personnel.'” Id., 17 F.4th at 370 (emphases in original). Plaintiff suggests that such an accommodation was possible here by alleging that, since May 2020, one of her roles was to conduct interviews virtually by Zoom and that “in the past, staff members in similar roles as Plaintiff, who requested job accommodations, were given opportunities to perform other tasks that did not require them to interact in-person with patients or staff, such as making discharge calls to former patients and performing patient chart reviews.” (Compl. ¶ 29.) The Second Circuit went on to reiterate, however, that, “[o]f course, Title VII does not obligate an employer to grant an accommodation that would cause ‘undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.'” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).
Under the circumstances of this case, even if Plaintiff could perform some tasks remotely, it is inescapable, in the Court's view, that, given Plaintiff's role as a staff nurse for the Critical Care - Coronary Care Unit, any accommodation that would entirely remove her from the hospital, and from all in-person interaction with patients and staff, would result in at least a de minimis burden on Defendant. Cf. Kane v. de Blasio, No. 21-CV-07863 (NRB), 2022 WL 3701183, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2022) (“Plaintiffs' inability to teach their students safely in person presents more than a de minimis cost.”) (dismissing claims challenging constitutionality of vaccine mandate applicable to New York City Department of Education staff). At a minimum, Plaintiff would be unable to perform patient care duties requiring physical contact with patients and, thus, Defendant would have to require another nurse to cover those duties or hire a replacement nurse. Either option would impose a cost on Defendant of the kind the Supreme Court has found to be more than de minimis. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84. Moreover, an employer is not required “to create a position to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs.” Cf. Robinson v. Children's Hosp. Bos., No. 14-CV-10263 (DJC), 2016 WL 1337255, at *8 (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 2016) (granting motion for summary judgment).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against because she was treated differently from other staff members, she does not adequately allege that they were similarly situated. See D'Cunha v. Northwell Health Sys., No. 22-CV-00988 (MKV), 2023 WL 2266520, at *2 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2023) (dismissing religious discrimination claim when, inter alia, plaintiff “fail[ed]to plead the religious affiliation of these other individualsi.e., whether they were in (or outside of) her protected group, their job responsibilities, or their reasons for seeking and obtaining an exemption”). Notably, in her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that all nursing staff received the email stating that “there is no accommodation the State would permit that would not create an undue hardship.” (Compl. ¶ 26.)
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim based on Defendant's alleged failure to engage in an interactive process (see Compl. ¶ 30; see also Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 12-13), the Court finds that there is no such independent claim. In an analogous case under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and despite implementing regulations under the ADA that explicitly reference the interactive process, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3), the Second Circuit has held that “there is no valid independent claim under the ADA for failure to engage in an interactive process[.]” Sheng v. M&T Bank Corp., 848 F.3d 78, 87 (2d Cir. 2017). Rather, “an employer's failure to engage in a good faith interactive process can be introduced as evidence tending to show disability discrimination . . . and that the employer has refused to make a reasonable accommodation[.]” Id. (internal citations and alterations omitted). Given the similarity between the requirements of Title VII and the ADA (other than regarding the threshold for finding undue hardship), the Court finds the holding in Sheng equally applicable in the Title VII context. Indeed, Plaintiff has not cited any legal authority to support her contention that an employer's failure to engage in an interactive process is actionable. (See Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 1213.) Thus, where, as here, the only possible accommodation would cause undue hardship, an employer does not violate Title VII by failing to engage in an interactive process. Cf. id. at 86. (“failure to engage in an interactive process does not form the basis of an ADA claim in the absence of evidence that accommodation was possible”) (quoting McBride v. BIC Consumer Prod. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2009); accord Slater v. Douglas Cnty., 743 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1195 (D. Or. 2010) (“‘If an employer can show that no accommodation was possible without undue hardship, it makes no sense to require that he engage in a futile act' [ i.e., attempt to negotiate an accommodation.]”) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1988)).
For these reasons, I recommend that Plaintiff's Title VII claim be dismissed.
II. NYSHRL And NYCHRL Claims (Counts II & III)
I recommend that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims.Although federal district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “that are so related to” federal claims “that they form part of the same case or controversy[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), such jurisdiction is “discretionary,” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997), and a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
The Court notes that, while claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL often are analyzed together, the Court declines to do so here given, among other reasons, the differing definitions of undue hardship. As set forth above, under Title VII, an accommodation causes an undue hardship “whenever it results in ‘more than a de minimis cost' to the employer[,]” Baker, 445 F.3d at 548 (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84 ), under the NYSHRL, an accommodation causes an undue hardship when it “requir[es] significant expense or difficulty (including a significant interference with the safe or efficient operation of the workplace or a violation of a bona fide seniority system.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(10)(d)(1).
Since Plaintiff's Title VII claim is the only claim over which this Court has original jurisdiction, it is appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law and city-law claims at this early stage of the litigation. See Riley, 2023 WL 2118073, at *6 (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over religious discrimination claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that Defendant's motion to dismiss be GRANTED.
In her opposition to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff does not request leave to amend and thus I recommend that leave to amend not be granted sua sponte. See Trautenberg v. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison L.L.P., 351 Fed.Appx. 472, 474 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Given that [plaintiff] did not move for leave to replead in opposition to [the] motion to dismiss his original complaint with prejudice, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant him, sua sponte, leave to replead.”).
NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Woods.
FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).