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finding that the plaintiff “has produced no evidence to suggest that he was included in the [reduction in force] because he had taken FMLA leave” and therefore, the plaintiff's “eventual termination as part of the RIF [was] too far removed temporally from his EEOC complaint to establish a causal connection in satisfaction of a prima facie case”
Summary of this case from Nzugang v. Hutchinson Precision Sealing Sys.Opinion
Nos. 02 Civ. 7234 (RCC), 03 Civ. 5228 (RCC).
March 21, 2005
OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff Joseph Sgarlata ("Plaintiff" or "Sgarlata") commenced two suits in this Court claiming that his former employer, Defendant Viacom, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Viacom"), discriminated against him and retaliated against him in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 12 U.S.C. § 1981; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 296 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). Plaintiff also claims that his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA"), were violated and that Defendant subjected him to intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law. At the Court's request, Plaintiff filed a consolidated complaint and Viacom now moves for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, Defendant's motion is granted and the two actions are dismissed in their entirety.
I. Background
The following facts are not in dispute unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff is a white male who, at the age of 51, began working as a Network Engineer in Viacom's Information Systems and Technology Department in January 2001. Def. 56.1 Statement (hereinafter "Def. 56.1") ¶ 1. From January 2001 through October 2001, Plaintiff was supervised by Mark Zito ("Zito"). Id. ¶ 3. In Zito's single written evaluation of Plaintiff's work, he noted that Plaintiff "does not consistently meet job requirements."Id. ¶¶ 4-7. Plaintiff disagreed with Zito's evaluation of him, but does not claim that Zito harassed him or discriminated against him in any way. Id. ¶ 8; see also Pltf. 56.1 Statement (hereinafter "Pltf. 56.1") ¶¶ 74-75.
In October 2001, as part of an internal reorganization, Plaintiff began reporting to Steve Bryan ("Bryan"), a black man with whom Plaintiff had worked under Zito and about whom Plaintiff had no previous complaints. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 9-12. Plaintiff liked having Zito as his boss and was not pleased to be transferred to Bryan's group, which was responsible for handling the Cisco infrastructure and day-to-day operations. Id. ¶¶ 14, 18. Plaintiff had worked with Cisco equipment in the past, but does not consider himself a "Cisco expert." Id. ¶ 22; see also Pltf. 56.1 ¶ 71.
Bryan expressed his concerns regarding the amount of time Plaintiff required to complete projects both to Plaintiff and to Marlene Baez ("Baez"), a member of Viacom's Human Resources Department. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 23, 24, 25, 27, 28. Plaintiff contends that Bryan targeted him for termination by assigning him projects that were impossible to complete within the time allotted. Pltf. 56.1 ¶¶ 4-6. Despite Bryan's concerns, Plaintiff received only one verbal warning and was never disciplined or demoted. Def. 56.1 ¶ 30.
On February 19, 2002, Plaintiff submitted a memo to Viacom's Human Resources Department complaining that Bryan criticized him unfairly, yelled at him, withheld praise, and did not assign him "good projects." Id. ¶¶ 31-33; see also Pltf. 56.1 ¶ 88 (stating Plaintiff received a $10,000 bonus in February 2002). Plaintiff also claimed that Bryan had once told a white man sitting next to Plaintiff in the lunchroom to "move his White Ass over." Def. 56.1 ¶ 34. Everyone present, including Plaintiff, considered the comment a joke. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff claims he later had "second thoughts" about the remark. Pltf. 56.1 ¶ 28. Plaintiff also contends that Bryan preferred younger, non-white, "nondisabled" employees, and that he gave them better assignments. Id. ¶¶ 8, 13, 15, 16, 21.
Plaintiff met with Maura McNulty ("McNulty") in Viacom's Human Resources Department and with Bryan's boss, Lee L'Archevesque ("L'Archevesque"), regarding the complaints he outlined in his February memo. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 38, 39. Both McNulty and L'Archevesque told Plaintiff that they would monitor his future interaction with Bryan to ensure it was appropriate. Id. ¶ 41. On several occasions, L'Archevesque assured Plaintiff that he would be available if Plaintiff had any concerns he wanted to share. Id. ¶¶ 42-45; see also id. ¶ 46 (stating Baez also offered to talk to Plaintiff if he had any problems). L'Archevesque and Baez also met with Bryan on several occasions to discuss Plaintiff's February 19 memo. Id. ¶ 53.
After meeting with McNulty and L'Archevesque, as he had requested, Plaintiff began receiving more challenging work. Id. ¶ 48. On March 12, 2002, Bryan assigned Plaintiff a task that had to be completed by the end of the day and asked him to not work on anything else until it was completed. Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiff did not complete the assignment before he left work that day and called in sick the following day. Id. ¶¶ 56-58. Plaintiff did not return to work again until October 8, 2002, nearly thirty weeks later. Id. ¶ 58.
While on leave, Plaintiff had no interaction with Bryan or L'Archevesque. Id. ¶ 59. He did, however, procure documents from Viacom's computer system, author a five-page letter to the EEOC in support of his discrimination claim, speak with an employment recruiter, and perform a variety of duties to support a blackjack business he owned with his wife. Id. ¶¶ 63-70. Despite undertaking these activities, Plaintiff testified that he was "unable to work" during his medical leave of absence. Id. ¶ 72.
Plaintiff described his medical condition during his thirty week leave as "nasty asthmas, severe asthma, depression, stress, anxiety, insomnia . . . dizziness, concentration problems, fatigue, severe fatigue."Id. ¶ 60. In July 2002, while having a cyst removed, Plaintiff reported only asthma, hay fever, hepatitis, and an allergy to penicillin on his medical history intake. Id. ¶¶ 74-77.
On July 17, 2002, Viacom informed Plaintiff that as of that day his medical leave would be designated FMLA leave and he would be eligible for up to twelve weeks of FMLA leave. Id. ¶ 62. In the fall of 2002, as Plaintiff prepared to return to work, his attorney presented Viacom with a list of "accommodations." Id. ¶ 79. In response to Plaintiff's requests, Viacom allowed him to vary his work hours, report to work up to ninety minutes late, and take unscheduled breaks throughout the day. Id. ¶ 82. On September 10, 2002, Plaintiff filed his first lawsuit against Viacom in this Court. Pltf. 56.1 ¶ 116. Plaintiff claims that on October 2, 2002, Viacom threatened to discharge him because of the lawsuit. Id. ¶ 160. On October 7, 2002, Plaintiff's physician notified Viacom that Plaintiff was cleared to return to work on October 8, 2202. Def. 56.1 ¶ 86. Thereafter, Viacom paid Plaintiff his full salary beginning October 7, 2002 and he returned to work on October 14, 2002. Id. ¶ 87.
Four days after returning to work, Plaintiff complained to Baez that Bryan did not seek his response to a question Bryan had asked everyone else in a staff meeting. Id. ¶ 88. Specifically, Bryan asked Plaintiff's colleagues about their schedules for training. Id. Baez explained to Plaintiff that Bryan did not ask the same question of him because he was not scheduled to attend training since he had been out on leave. Id. ¶ 89. On October 22, 2002, Plaintiff again complained to Baez, this time stating his co-workers were "attacking [him] mentally" and that he was being "shunned and isolated." Id. ¶ 90. After investigating this complaint, Viacom informed Plaintiff that it was unable to confirm that he had been harassed or retaliated against by his co-workers. Id. ¶ 92. Six business days after returning to work on October 14, 2002, Plaintiff left again, claiming he was too sick to work. Id. ¶ 93. His wife informed Viacom on October 23 that he was too sick to return to work. Pltf. 56.1 ¶ 150.
On October 22, 2002 Viacom announced the elimination of many positions within its Information Systems and Technology Department. Def. 56.1 ¶ 94; see also Pltf. 56.1 ¶ 94 (stating Baez knew before Plaintiff returned to work that his position might be eliminated). As a result, both Plaintiff's and Bryan's positions were eliminated. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 95, 97. Viacom informed Plaintiff that his position would be eliminated as of October 25, 2002. Id. ¶ 96. Plaintiff was not replaced. Id. ¶ 101. He commenced his second suit in this Court on July 16, 2003.
II. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Courts must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998).
Once the moving party has met its initial burden of production, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts evidencing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The non-moving party "must produce specific facts indicating that a genuine issue of fact exists. If the evidence [presented by the non-moving party] is merely colorable, or not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). "[I]n the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination." Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997). "[M]ere speculation and conjecture is insufficient to preclude the granting of the motion." Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 1997). Further, the opposing party may not rely on the pleadings, rather he must set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e);see also Alphonse v. State of Connecticut Dep't of Admin. Servs., 2004 WL 904076, at *7 (D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2004) ("Courts within the Second Circuit have not hesitated to grant defendants summary judgment in such cases where . . . plaintiff has offered little or no evidence of discrimination.").
B. Employment Discrimination
All of Plaintiff's employment discrimination claims are subject to the burden-shifting analysis outlined in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) (§ 1981); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 n. 1 (noting that, after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Patterson remains authoritative with respect to burden shifting analysis for § 1981 employment discrimination claims); Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48-49 (2d Cir. 2002) (ADA); Schnable v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (ADEA); Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2000) (Title VII and New York Human Rights Law). Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas, the employee bears the initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating membership in a protected class; qualification for the position; adverse employment action; and circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The burden then shifts to the employer to "articulate a legitimate, clear, specific and non-discriminatory reason" for making its decision. Quaratino v. Tiffany Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995). Finally, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual and that employer was more likely motivated by discrimination. The standards governing motions for summary judgment apply at each step of the burden-shifting analysis. Stern v. Trustees of Columbia University, 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997).
1. Hostile Work Environment
To the extent Plaintiff's complaint alleges harassment in the form of a hostile work environment, he must show that the harassment was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working environment." Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The Court will look to the "totality of the circumstances, including: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with the victim's . . . performance." Hayut v. State Univ. of New York, 352 F.3d 733, 745 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).
Plaintiff points to one race-related comment made by his supervisor. The single race-related comment Plaintiff complains of cannot survive a motion for summary judgment. See Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Because the claimed incidents in the instant case were few in number and occurred over a short period of time, they fail to allege a racially hostile working environment."); Jessamy v. City of New Rochelle, 292 F. Supp. 2d 498, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Although one encounter may constitute a hostile work environment, conduct that can be categorized as a few isolated incidents, teasing, casual comments or sporadic conversation will not be deemed to create a hostile work environment."); Curtis v. Airborne Freight Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 234, 250-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding isolated racial slurs by supervisor are insufficient to create a hostile work environment).
Plaintiff also complains that he was unfairly criticized, that he was not assigned desirable projects, and that he was subjected to unrealistic deadlines. There is no evidence in the record that any of the actions Plaintiff complains of were directed at him because of his race, sex, alleged disability, or age. See Thomas v. Bergdorf Goodman, Inc., 2004 WL 2979960, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2004) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed "to show the required linkage or correlation between race neutral workplace incidents [and] any race-based discriminatory animus"). Further, the alleged "actions do not constitute behavior so severe, intimidating, or pervasive that [Plaintiff's] terms of employment were affected. While [Plaintiff] may have been upset by these events . . . the civil rights statutes are not `general civility code[s].'" Gronne v. Apple Bank for Sav., 2000 WL 298914, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2000), aff'd 2001 WL 30647 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 2001) (granting summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff complained of short-staffed shifts, criticism, rude comments, and exclusion from discussions) (quoting Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the environment at Viacom was sufficiently hostile to survive Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the hostile work environment claims.
2. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the employee must show participation in a protected activity known to the employer; an adverse employment action; and a causal connection between the protected activity and the employment action.Feingold, 366 F.3d at 156. An adverse employment action is defined as a "materially adverse change" in the terms and conditions of employment. See Galabya v. New York City Board of Education, 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000). The change must be "more disruptive than a mere inconvenience of an alteration of job responsibilities." Id. Examples of materially adverse employment actions include termination and demotions accompanied by reduction in salary, material loss of benefits, or significantly diminished responsibilities. Id.
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's arguments in favor of dismissing his retaliation claim, but the Court gathers from the complaint that Plaintiff's alleged protected activity is his February 2002 complaint about Bryan. See, e.g., Consolidated Complaint ¶ 59 (stating Plaintiff suffered from retaliation in the work place and, as a result, went on disability leave beginning March 13, 2002); id. ¶ 61 (stating Plaintiff initiated the July 2002 legal action against Viacom because he found the retaliation intolerable); see also Sack Aff. Ex. 5 (May 15, 2002 EEOC Notice of Charge of Discrimination sent to Viacom regarding Plaintiff's complaints and noting Plaintiff was charging race, age, and retaliation discrimination based on events that took place in March 2002). The Complaint alleges that in retaliation for his complaints about Bryan, he was not given passwords needed to complete a task on March 12, 2002, and that when he returned to employment in October 2002 his colleagues avoided him, his work was unfairly scrutinized, and he was eventually terminated in a department-wide reduction-in-force ("RIF").
None of the interactions with his supervisor or co-workers that Plaintiff complains of can be considered an adverse employment action sufficient to sustain his retaliation claim. See Gibson v. Crucible Materials Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d 292, 300 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (being ostracized by co-workers cannot be basis for retaliation claim); Katz v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 2001 WL 11064, at *14 (Jan. 4, 2001) ("Being yelled at, receiving unfair criticism, receiving unfavorable schedules or work assignments . . . do not rise to the level of adverse employment actions; they do not affect any ultimate employment decisions."); Bennet v. Watson Wyatt Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 236, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding being subjected to unfair scrutiny, being excluded from meetings, and being under utilized were not adverse employment actions); see also Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming that plaintiff's mere subjective belief that she was being retaliated against cannot provide sole basis for surviving summary judgment).
Further, Plaintiff's eventual termination as part of the RIF is too far removed temporally from his EEOC complaint to establish a causal connection in satisfaction of a prima facie case. Courts require a much closer nexus than the eight months that expired between Plaintiff's complaint and his eventual termination. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) ("The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be `very close.'"); Nicastro v. Runyon, 60 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185 (explaining three months between EEOC activity and termination is too long) (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Ponticelli v. Zurich American Ins. Group, 16 F. Supp. 2d 414, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding two-and-one-half months too long). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot survive Defendant's motion for summary judgment on his retaliation claims.
3. Termination
To demonstrate that he was terminated for illegal reasons, Plaintiff "must do more than merely proffer his own believe that he was discriminated against." Dawkins v. Witco Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 688, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was terminated as part of a department-wide RIF, that no one was hired to replace him, and his remaining colleagues assumed his duties. See Roge v. NYP Holdings, 257 F.3d 164, 170 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding fact that plaintiff's duties were distributed among his remaining co-workers supported holding that no reasonable trier of fact could draw inference of discrimination). Bryan, Plaintiff's younger, black boss, was also terminated as part of the RIF. See Brink v. Union Carbide Corp., 210 F.3d 354 (2d Cir. 2000) (table) (affirming summary judgment on age discrimination claim and finding it compelling that a younger co-worker was also terminated as part of RIF that cost plaintiff his job). Plaintiff has not offered any evidence in support of his claim that he was terminated due to his age, race, sex, or disability. Even if he had, "[c]ourts in this circuit have generally recognized reduction-in-force as sufficient evidence to rebut plaintiff's prima facie showing."Meng v. Ipanema Shoe Co., 73 F. Supp. 2d 392, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Balut v. Loral Electronic Systems, 988 F. Supp. 339, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding RIF was legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination); Brown v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 1993 WL 138823, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1993) (granting summary judgment where no reasonable jury could find that bank's RIF was a pretext for race discrimination). Therefore, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's termination claims is granted.
C. FMLA
"The FMLA generally requires covered employers to grant employees who have worked for twelve months (or 1250 hours in twelve months) up to twelve weeks' leave during any twelve month period for, inter alia, a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.'" Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D)). It is unlawful "for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The statute "also protects an employee from discharge . . . by an employer if that action is motivated by the employee's taking" FMLA leave. Hale, 219 F. 3d at 68 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)). It is perfectly acceptable, however, for an employer to ask an employee for medical clearance before returning to work, as Viacom did prior to Plaintiff's return. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(4).
Plaintiff received over thirty weeks of leave even though he had not been an employee of Viacom for twelve months preceding his medical leave. He was put back on the payroll before he returned to work. Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant's arguments and has produced no evidence to suggest that he was included in the RIF because he had taken FMLA leave. Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's FMLA claim is granted.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
"Under New York law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a showing of (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent to cause, or reckless disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) severe emotional distress." Stuto v. Fleishman, 164 F.3d 820, 827 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121 (1993)). "`Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.'" Id. (quoting Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 122). Determining whether the alleged conduct is sufficiently outrageous to be actionable is a question of law for the court.Holwell, 81 N.Y.2d at 122. Plaintiff has not offered any argument or evidence in support of this claim. The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the incidents alleged are not sufficiently outrageous to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
E. Sanctions
Defendant has moved for sanctions and argues Plaintiff and his attorney unreasonably refused to voluntarily dismiss certain of his claims. For example, counsel for Defendant warned Plaintiff's counsel that the complaints did not plead claims for relief under the FMLA or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Sack Feb. 13, 2004 Aff. Ex. E (Defense counsels' letters to Plaintiff's counsel dated July 25, 2003, August 1, 2003, and August 6, 2003). Again, at the close of discovery, Defendant's counsel warned Plaintiff's counsel that there was no evidence to support Plaintiff's theories of recovery. See Sack Feb. 13, 2004 Aff. Ex. F (Defense counsel's letter to Plaintiff's counsel dated October 22, 2003). Plaintiff and his counsel did not withdraw any theories of recovery and Defendant thereafter moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's various claims. In opposing Defendant's motion, however, Plaintiff did not proffer any admissible evidence and did not respond to Defendant's arguments regarding his FMLA, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to impose sanctions upon an attorney who violates its terms. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Rule 11 is violated when "(1) a reasonable inquiry into the basis for a pleading has not been made; (2) under existing precedents there is no chance of success; or (3) no reasonable argument has been made to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands." Howard v. Klynyeld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (imposing Rule 11 sanction). In light of the conduct of Plaintiff's counsel to date, the Court agrees that sanctions in the form of attorney's fees and costs on the motion for summary judgment may be appropriate. See TBI Indus. Corp. v. Emery Worldwide, 900 F. Supp. 687, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting Defendant's motion for sanctions with respect to attorney's fees and costs on summary judgment motion); see also Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (explaining, in discrimination context, courts have discretion to award attorneys' fees to a successful defendant where a plaintiff's claims are "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation); 42 U.S.C. § 2003-5(k). The Court directs Plaintiff's counsel to demonstrate to the Court by April 1, 2005 that it has not violated Rule 11(b). Defense counsel's reply to Plaintiff's submission is due on April 8, 2005.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained, the Court grants Viacom's motion for summary judgment in its entirety. As stated above, Plaintiff's Rule 11 submission is due April 1 and Defendant's response is due April 8, 2005.
So Ordered.