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Seward v. Seward

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
Sep 4, 2015
NO. 2014-CA-001701-ME (Ky. Ct. App. Sep. 4, 2015)

Opinion

NO. 2014-CA-001701-ME

09-04-2015

BRADLEY ALLEN SEWARD APPELLANT v. RENEE MICHELLE SEWARD APPELLEE

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: John W. Wooldridge Shepherdsville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Anne W. McAfee Shepherdsville, Kentucky


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODNEY BURRESS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 11-CI-00240
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: COMBS, J. LAMBERT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: Bradley Seward appeals the order of the Bullitt Circuit Court which denied his motion to modify child support. After our review, we affirm.

Bradley and Renee Seward divorced in 2011. At the time, Bradley worked second shift at the Ford Motor Company. On August 19 of that year, they entered into a property settlement agreement, which provided that:

During the proceedings, Renee was restored to her maiden name. However, the notice of appeal names her as "Renee Seward." --------

2.1. [Bradley] and [Renee] shall have joint custody of the 2 minor children of the parties. . . . After [Bradley] shifts to first shift, parenting time shall be divided 2 days to [Bradley], 2 days to [Renee] and alternate Friday evening until Monday evening.

3.1 After the house sells, [Bradley] shall pay to [Renee] for the support of the minor children of the Parties, the sum of $1,100 per month while he works second shift and $800.00 per month if he works first shift.
The reduction of child support reflected the loss of supplemental shift income that Bradley anticipated that he would lose when he transitioned to first shift (day shift). Likewise, the equal timesharing was intended to allow Bradley more time with his children; indeed, he testified that his reason for changing shifts was to gain additional time with the children.

Bradley transitioned to day shift in June 2013. The court entered an order which reinforced the relevant provisions of the original property settlement agreement on July 1, 2013. Eight days later, Bradley filed a motion to reduce the child support obligation upon which the parties had formerly agreed. The trial court entered an order on October 9, 2013, denying his motion for modification.

On June 25, 2014, Bradley filed another motion to modify child support, which is the subject of this appeal. The court held a hearing on September 3, 2014. It entered its order denying the motion on September 22, 2014. This appeal followed.

Matters concerning child support are subject to statute and to the discretion of the trial court. Nosarzewski v. Nosarzewski, 375 S.W.3d 820, 822 (Ky. App. 2012). Child support obligations may be modified within the sound discretion of the court. Snow v. Snow, 24 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Ky. App. 2000). We may only disturb the findings of the trial court if it has abused its discretion by making decisions that were "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Clary v. Clary, 54 S.W.3d 568, 571 (Ky. App. 2001).

Kentucky Revised Statute[s] (KRS) 403.213(1) directs that the amount of child support may be modified "only upon a showing of a material change of circumstances that is substantial and continuing." Bradley argues that the equal timesharing and his reduction in income are substantial changes which warrant a modification of the child support obligation. He claims that the guidelines of KRS 403.212 should be applied in lieu of the property settlement agreement.

The guidelines "serve as a rebuttable presumption for the establishment or modification of the amount of child support. Courts may deviate from the guidelines where their application would be unjust or inappropriate." KRS 403.211(2). One criterion for deviating from the guidelines is agreement of the parents who have "demonstrated knowledge of the amount of child support established by the . . . guidelines." KRS 403.211(3)(f). A property settlement agreement which sets forth a child support obligation is "an enforceable contract between the parties, and it is not the place of courts to disturb it absent some showing of fraud, undue influence, overreaching or manifest unfairness." Pursley v. Pursley, 144 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Ky. 2004).

In its order of October 9, 2013, the trial court found that Bradley and Renee had both entered into the agreement with the full knowledge contemplated by KRS 403.211(3)(f). Bradley did not appeal that order, and he does not dispute the soundness of the property settlement agreement. He also has not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances. The current circumstances are identical to what was envisioned by the agreement. His child support obligation was reduced due to his shift change as anticipated. He and Renee both testified that the equal timesharing arrangement is according to the original agreement. Bradley cannot now legitimately object to an agreement which facilitated his ultimate purpose of enlargement of time with his children.

Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. It found that Bradley is bound by the agreement into which he willingly entered. He has not demonstrated a change in circumstances which would have compelled the trial court to nullify the agreement in order to modify child support.

We affirm the Bullitt Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: John W. Wooldridge
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Anne W. McAfee
Shepherdsville, Kentucky


Summaries of

Seward v. Seward

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
Sep 4, 2015
NO. 2014-CA-001701-ME (Ky. Ct. App. Sep. 4, 2015)
Case details for

Seward v. Seward

Case Details

Full title:BRADLEY ALLEN SEWARD APPELLANT v. RENEE MICHELLE SEWARD APPELLEE

Court:Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

Date published: Sep 4, 2015

Citations

NO. 2014-CA-001701-ME (Ky. Ct. App. Sep. 4, 2015)